Alison Jane Lea & Anor v Live Daily Property Ltd

1. This is my decision on the Applicants’ Form FR1 application to be registered as the proprietors of land adjoining Hollybank, The Dale, Bonsall, Matlock (“the Disputed Land”) by virtue of adverse possession.

2. For reasons given in previous Orders, the Respondent has been barred from taking part in this summary paper determination. The land

3. The Disputed land is a narrow strip of land running immediately alongside the dwelling Spring Cottage and the lay of the land is best understood by reference to the following north-orientated plans with the parties’ titles outlined in red and the location of the Disputed Land (a) indicated by the blue arrow on each plan, and (b) shown shaded blue on the HMLR notice plan: Applicants’ title plan Hollybank – edged red Respondent’s title plan Spring Cottage – edged red HMLR notice plan Disputed Land tinted blue The Applicants’ case

4. The Applicants’ Statement of Case sets out their case as follows. They were registered as the proprietors of “Hollybank” on 23 October 2014. Their predecessor in title, Stephen Webb, was registered as proprietor on 4 February 1991. The Respondent was registered as the proprietor of “Spring Cottage” on 30 March 2023. The Disputed Land has been within the exclusive possession of, first, Mr Webb and then themselves ever since 1991. They rely upon: 4.1 A Statutory Declaration sworn by Mr Webb on 1 October 2014 confirming his exclusive possession and treatment of the Disputed Land. I note, in particular, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 which I will not repeat here. 4.2 A Statutory Declaration sworn by a Mr Stephen Ellitot on 16 April 2025 confirming Mr Webb’s Statutory Declaration. Mr Elliot lived at the very nearby “Glenholme” just to the east of the Respondent’s Spring Cottage between 1993 and 1994 and then at “The Cottage” a little further along the main road to the west since 1994. 4.3 A letter dated 15 April 2025 written by Keith and Olive Bond confirming Mr Webb’s Statutory Declaration. 4.4 Their own evidence as to their exclusive possession of the Disputed Land since buying Hollybank in 2014. The Respondent’s case

5. The Respondent’s Statement of Case took the following points: 5.1 The Disputed Land is registered and under Schedule 6 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and the Applicants have the burden of proof of establishing exclusive possession and an intention to possess for 10 years. 5.2 The Respondent maintained the Disputed Land and did not ask for permission to access it – it disputes the Applicants’ claim that they gave it permission. 5.3 Any evidence pre-dating the Applicants’ ownership is irrelevant Applicants have to prove their own 10 years continuous possession. The legal framework

6. Adverse possession claims in respect of unregistered land are governed by the Limitation Act 1980 (‘ the 1980 Act ’). Section 15(1) provides that ‘No action shall be brought by any person to recover land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him.’ Paragraph 8(1) Schedule 1 of the 1980 Act provides that a right of action accrues ‘when the land is in possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run.’ Section 17 of the 1980 Act provides that the title of the legal proprietor ‘shall be extinguished’ at expiration of the limitation period. Since we are concerned with unregistered land, the provisions of Schedule 6 of the Land Registration Act 2002 (“ the 2002 Act ”) do not apply.

7. The general legal principles applicable to adverse possession claims are well- established and perhaps best taken from Powell v McFarlane, J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham and Balevants Ltd v Sartori . Insofar as relevant to the present matter, they can be summarised as: 7.1 The person with paper title is presumed to be in possession of the land which is the subject of the application. 7.2 The burden is on an applicant to show that they (a) are in factual possession of the land, and (b) have an intention to possess the land, over a 12 year period. The time that they have been in possession may be aggregated with that of their predecessor(s) in title. 7.3 In order to establish factual possession, the applicant must demonstrate that they have an appropriate degree of exclusive physical control of the land. Their possession must be exclusive and they must deal with it as an occupying owner might have been expected to have done so and that no one else has done so. This is a matter of fact which will depend on all the circumstances which include, in particular, the manner in which the land is commonly enjoyed. 7.4 In order to establish the requisite intention to possess, the applicant must show that they intended to possess (not own) the land to the exclusion of all others. The intention to possess must be manifested clearly so that it is apparent that the applicant was not merely a persistent trespasser.

9. Since it is the Applicants who have brought this application, the burden of proof is upon them to the civil standard (i.e. the balance of probabilities). The issues

10. The Applicants must satisfy me that for a 12-year period, they and/or their predecessors in title have adversely possessed the Disputed Land. Analysis and discussion

11. I have read and considered with a critical eye all the evidence (including the exhibits) put forward by the Applicants. It is, of course, unchallenged because of the barring order made against the Respondent. This evidence is that since 1991 the Disputed Land could only be accessed by crossing their title and that to all intents and purposes it looked as though it was within their title (including during their predecessor in title’s ownership). The Applicants themselves give extensive and detailed evidence about the situation on-the-ground since they bought Hollybank in 2014. This includes considerable focus on the issue of whether anyone, including on behalf of the Respondent, accessed the Disputed Land with or without their permission. The Applicants’ predecessor in title, Paul Webb, also gives brief but compelling evidence in his Statutory Declaration: he had thought the Disputed Land was part of his title and had treated it as the paper owner might have done (by excavating, landscaping and planting it) without any interruption (see his paragraphs 3 and 4). This is corroborated by Stephen Elliott and Keith and Olive Bond, all of whom have lived close by for something like 30 years, and the photographic evidence.

12. I accept the Applicants’ evidence – it is unchallenged and I can see no basis upon which to reject it - and find that since the early 1990s the Disputed Land has been in the exclusive possession of the owners of the Applicants’ title (this includes Mr Webb) with the requisite intention to possess. This means that adverse possession had been achieved by the mid-2000s.

13. The principal, and in my view insurmountable, problem that the Respondent has is that it only came on-the-scene in about March 2023 and so almost all its evidence only addresses the very recent history of the Disputed Land. There is Martin Rickards’ “To whom it may concern” letter dated 4 June 2025 but I cannot see anything in this that undermines the Applicants’ case. Addressing the three issues raised in the Respondent’s Statement of Case (see paragraph 6 above): 13.1 The Disputed Land is unregistered. The Registry has confirmed this and referred this matter on that basis. Schedule 6 of the Land Registration Act 2002 is irrelevant to these proceedings. We are concerned with the Limitation Act 1980 . 13.2 The Respondent may have carried out some maintenance work on the Disputed Land since 2023 but the Applicants’ evidence addresses this in some detail and as indicated above, I accept that evidence. There is, for example, no doubt that “Jodie” painted the flank wall of Spring Cottage (I have in mind the photographs submitted by the Respondent showing this midway through) but this is dealt with at paragraph 32 of Alison Lea’s Witness Statement which makes it clear that Jodie’s access was with permission. In any event, all these acts took place long after adverse possession had been established back in the mid-2000s. 13.3 Lastly, there is the Respondent’s pleaded assertion that anything that took place prior to the Applicants’ ownership is irrelevant. I have no difficulty in rejecting this patently wrong argument. It is well-established that a predecessor in title’s adverse possession is to be included when calculating time (see Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property at 7-037). In fact, in this matter I have found that it is only Mr Webb’s exclusive possession that was needed for the Applicants to succeed. Conclusion

14. Accordingly, I have above directed the Registrar to give effect to the Applicants’ application to be registered as proprietors of the Disputed Land. Dated this 11th day of December 2025 Judge Alexander Bastin BY ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL