Birmingham City Council v V & Anor

DISTRICT JUDGE PARKER:

1. I am dealing with a child who was born in April 2025. The 26-week timetable ended on 16 th October 2025.

2. The threshold findings which the local authority invite me to make for the purposes of final care orders is based upon the mother’s misuse of alcohol and substances, the fact that she has had four older who are similarly no longer in her care, she has a transient lifestyle, she did not seek antenatal care prior to the birth, and there has been a complete disengagement of working with professionals. I note she has criminal convictions, including an assault on an older child, and she has been assessed as high risk.

3. To summarise, the mother’s ability to safely care for this young child is compromised in a number of ways, including excessive alcohol and drug issues, a significant history of volatile and domestic abusive behaviours towards her elder children, and her ex-partner, her lack of engagement with a host of professionals, including, but not limited to antenatal care, probation, substance misuse services, and social workers, and indeed any preparation for the birth, and her mental health and other vulnerabilities. The Child and Family Assessment summarises the risk of significant harm due to neglect, the s.47 assessment, which is historic, but reports domestic abuse, and she has been assessed as not suitable for the Family Drug and Alcohol Court.

4. At the outset, the mother alleged that the father had died, and an explanation was invited of ascertaining whether any other family members would be available, and that included those in the Czech Republic. The guardian’s position at the outset was that the level of concerns were so high, that a separation following the child’s birth was justified, and I indeed made an interim care order in relation to sanctioning this on 25 th April 2025.

5. I have read a number of statements.

6. The Probation Service reports a high risk of harm regarding domestic abuse and non-engagement through her transient lifestyle.

7. The midwife reported that the engagement of the mother deteriorated from the birth.

8. The social worker was unable to engage with the mother with regard to a parenting assessment, and as to the identity of the potential putative father and paternal family members.

9. A subsequent social work statement indicates further enquiries in relation to the family network.

10. The father was identified and located in relation to the half-siblings and a welfare assessment was to be undertaken as to his ability to care for the child, including other suitable relatives. Sadly, he was unable to offer care for this child.

11. One potential putative father it was confirmed had indeed passed away, and another individual who was located asserted that he was not the father.

12. I note that by an order of 15 th September 2025, an address was ultimately located for the mother; furthermore, that the initial birth registration of the child, which was effected on 10 th July 2025, was undertaken under an incorrect name.

13. The parenting assessment of the mother is not a full assessment due to her non-engagement. She has not attended any family time and has not seen the child since the day of birth. Sadly, there is therefore no evidence of any positive change regarding her lifestyle.

14. The order of 18 th November 2025 records that the mother was served with the papers on the 8 th October 2025, no alternative carers were identified, and the plan was now one of permanency in relation to adoption.

15. I made placement directions following that order whereby the Child Permanency Report needed to contain the steps and enquiries made of individuals, and photographs of the child’s siblings, information in relation to them and the efforts that have been made. I also note that the testing of Hepatitis C has come back negative, and that this also needs to be recorded in the Child Permanency Report as well as the guardian’s final recommendations.

16. I have read the final evidence of the local authority. Again, it reiterates that the mother has had no contact with the local authority, nor has she engaged in the court process, despite the local authority making extensive efforts, and her current whereabouts remain unknown, as does the identity of the father. There is a single plan for adoption, which is approved by the independent reviewing officer and has been ratified by the agency decision anchor, and, as I said, there are no alterative carers. The correct birth name has now been amended and registered. The guardian supports the application of the local authority.

17. I will briefly set out the law. I am fully aware that it is crucial and important wherever possible that children are brought up by their birth families, and the local authority should follow the statutory scheme set out in the Children Act to promote and encourage that. There is, of course, the statutory gateway under s.31(2) of the Children Act, known as the threshold criteria, to limit the local authority’s intervention, and the court’s intervention, in family life.

18. I am satisfied, however, on the basis of all the evidence, that the threshold test for intervention under the Children Act is clearly met, based upon all the evidence and the summary concerns in relation to the mother’s ability to safeguard her child, as I have previously set out. Of course, where the threshold is crossed, I still have to apply the welfare test under s.1 of the Children Act concerning what, if any, order is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child. I have regard, of course, to Article 6 and Article 8 of both the child and the parents, and whether a care order is proportionate to the risk of harm to which they would be exposed if they were to be rehabilitated to the mother’s care.

19. Having undertaken a global holistic evaluation of the realistic options available for the child’s upbringing, I am afraid there is no other option but to make a final care order in this matter and a removal of the child from the mother’s care. The mother has not put a positive case. She has not attended family time, she has not attended court, and she has not engaged with professionals.

20. Of course, there is an application for a placement order as well, and therefore I must have regard to s.1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 . I am aware that a care order is a serious order that can only be made when the facts justify it, where it is in the child’s interests or where it is necessary and proportionate. The aphorism “nothing else will do” applies with particular reference to this case because there is an application for placement for adoption, the most serious of all orders, one that severs the parental relationship altogether.

21. Ultimately, my decision in this case, sadly, is placement for adoption, which is sought by the local authority, is also necessary and proportionate in this case. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the threshold conditions are met, and that there is no other realistic option for this child, having evaluated the whole of the evidence, than to make final care orders placing the child outside the family. I am driven to that conclusion, and similarly the conclusion that a placement order is the only order that can meet the child’s immediate and lifelong welfare needs.

22. Accordingly, I make final orders, both in relation to care and indeed placement orders. I dispense with the mother’s consent. Treating the child’s welfare as paramount, a placement order is the only order that can meet the child’s immediate and lifelong welfare needs, and an order that is both necessary and proportionate having regard to the rights of the mother and the child.

23. That is my judgment, and the reason for it. _____________ Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Telephone No: 020 7067 2900 DX: 410 LDE Email: [email protected] Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com