Claire Mireille N'Djosse v Ifedayo Adedapo Kolawole Adeyeye

1. MRS JUSTICE JUDD: On 5 November 2025, I found the father in this case to be in contempt of court by breaching orders made by Mr Justice Hayden on 16 July and 27 August 2025. I set out the detail of the breaches found in paragraph 22 of the judgment I gave on that date. My reasons for finding the father in contempt of those orders are also set out in that judgment.

2. I adjourned the case after making those findings and listed it ten days later to make a decision as to penalty. Following that, I adjourned it again at the request of both parties in order to make enquiries as to further legal steps which could be taken in Nigeria to obtain the child's return to France as soon as possible.

3. The expert opinion became available only the night before the penalty hearing. On that date the father stated he wished to take the steps identified by the expert, Oba Nsugbe KC, in order to further the return of the child. The mother supported this and so, I adjourned again and listed the case for a short hearing on the last day of term and then on that date, because of time constraints, the hearing could not take place until today's date.

4. The father is no longer legally represented because, he tells me, he is simply unable to afford it. The applicant mother's solicitors had emailed him on two occasions in the past two weeks to advise him that he may be entitled to legal aid and providing him with a list of solicitors experienced in this type of work. He told me that whilst he would wish to have legal advice, he had taken no steps to speak to any of the firms of solicitors because he had been refused legal aid before when he was unemployed and did not believe he would be granted legal aid now.

5. The case has been adjourned several times and I consider it would be quite wrong to adjourn it again. The father has had legal advice in relation to the contempt proceedings over a significant period of time; indeed, the several previous hearings. He was provided with the court bundle at least 24 hours ago and, within that bundle, he had had all of the documents before, with the exception of a statement or affidavit filed by the mother’s solicitor. He was sent that statement by email yesterday, as well as the bundle. Today, he was provided with a hard copy of those documents so that he could follow what was being said in court. I am satisfied that he has had a full opportunity to put his case with respect to my decision as to the penalty to be imposed.

6. Contempt of court is governed by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 , the Civil Procedure Rules 2020 and, in particular, rule 81 and the linked Practice Direction. Contempt in family proceedings is governed by the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and, in particular, rule 37 and Practice Direction 37. There are a range of powers available to the court so far as penalties are concerned, by virtue of section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.

7. Contempt can carry a prison sentence of up to two years and, in the High Court, an unlimited fine. Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, part 81, a party prejudiced by a contempt can, as well as applying for a committal order, seek a writ of sequestration but there is no equivalent procedure in the Family Procedure Rules.

8. The penalty to be imposed is within my discretion. In coming to my decision, I bear in mind what the Court of Appeal stated about sentencing in the cases of Liverpool Victoria Insurance Company Limited v Khan [2019] EWCA Civ 392 and Her Majesty's Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15. In the latter case guidance in paragraph 44 provided as follows: “1. The court should adopt an approach analogous to that in criminal cases where the Sentencing Council's Guidelines require the court to assess the seriousness of the conduct by reference to the offender's culpability and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused.

2. In light of its determination of seriousness, the court must first consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty.

3. If the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty will suffice, the court must impose the shortest period of imprisonment which properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt.

4. Due weight should be given to matters of mitigation, such as genuine remorse, previous positive character and similar matters.

5. Due weight should be given to the impact of committal on persons other than contemnor, such as children or vulnerable adults in their care.

6. There should be a reduction for an early admission of the contempt to be calculated consistently with the approach set out in the Sentencing Council’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea.

7. Once the appropriate term has been arrived at, consideration should be given to suspending the term of imprisonment. Usually the court will already have taken into account mitigating factors when setting the appropriate term such that there is no powerful factor making sentence appropriate, but a serious effect on others, such as children or vulnerable adults in the contemnor's care, may justify suspension."

9. A number of principles were also set out by Lady Justice Hale, as she then was, in Hale v Tanner [2000] EWCA Civ 5570,: namely, it is common practice and usually appropriate, in view of the sensitivity of the circumstances of these cases, to take some other course than imprisonment on the first occasion. If imprisonment is appropriate, the length of the committal should be decided without reference to whether or not it is to be suspended. A longer period of committal is not justified because its sting is removed by virtue of the suspension.

10. There are two objectives in contempt proceedings. One is to mark the court's disapproval of the disobedience to its order. The other is to secure compliance with the order in future. The length of a committal has to bear some reasonable relationship to the maximum of two years which is available. The court has to bear in mind the context. This may be aggravating or mitigating.

11. In the case of Egeneonu [2018] EWCA Civ 1714, the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment for contempt, in circumstances where the contemnor had breached a number of court orders including an order for the return of children to the jurisdiction from Nigeria. Lord Justice Peter Jackson stated at paragraph 22: "It involves the calculated separation of three children from their mother and the contemptuous disregard for court orders. Those who abduct children in this way must expect lengthy sentences if they are found to be in contempt of court."

12. In the case of Elkndo v Elsyed [2024] EWHC 2230, Mr. Justice Cobb, as he then was distilled the principles arriving from a number of cases and approached his task having regard to a number of points that he set out in paragraph 12 of that judgment which I will not repeat here. I have had regard to that and, in particular, to what he says at paragraph 12(4): namely, that if I impose a sentence of imprisonment, it is open to me to order that the execution of the committal order can be suspended for such a period or on such terms that I consider appropriate.

13. The background to this case is of a child of 4 years old who had never been out of the care of his mother, being removed from her without any warning, the father taking advantage of having the child with him during a contact visit as ordered by the French courts. This child has not seen his mother in person since. Further, the child has been placed with relatives of the father and an order made in Nigeria making them his legal guardians. That order records that both parents agreed to this. The assertion that the mother agreed is false. On any basis, it is clear that the father facilitated this.

14. I make it clear that I am not sentencing him for the abduction itself but for the contempt I have found, but it is the context in which the orders of Mr Justice Hayden were made.

15. I take into account the fact that the father has engaged throughout with these proceedings, appearing at every court hearing, paying to be represented by counsel and solicitors on each occasion save for today, and also paying for the expert report. He has had to work very hard indeed to meet all his costs over a number of months. He is responsible, I think, for supporting his older child, maybe both children, and has very considerable debts. He has not been in any trouble during his life and has no previous convictions.

16. I also take into account the fact that it appears that the advice he obtained from his solicitors in Nigeria was erroneous to the extent that he was advised to seek to register the orders of Mr Justice Hayden for the return of the child in Nigeria when it was simply not possible to do so, registration being only available for money judgments. Nonetheless, he was also advised by them to seek to set aside the guardianship order, but did not do so for several months. That is a matter that I considered in coming to my decision in relation to contempt, some time ago now.

17. In his statement of dated 17 November 2025, the father stated that he understood from his lawyers he could not do both together, that is to set aside and apply to register, and that it had to be an either/or approach. Now, he says that it was his former solicitors here who misled him about this.

18. Following my findings in November, the respondent points out that he made applications to the Nigerian court to set aside the guardianship order together with a certificate of urgency, and says he is doing what he can to progress things there. Whilst I accept that he has made applications to the Nigerian court, I simply do not accept that he is doing what he can to progress things there, even now. The application he made fell short of informing the court as to the false basis upon which the Guardianship order was obtained. He seeks to lay some of the blame for this on his lawyers, both here and in Nigeria. In my judgment, the responsibility is his own. He has given conflicting accounts of how the orders in Nigeria came to be made and the truth of it is that very little has changed over time. The prospect of this child being returned to his mother appears little closer than it ever did.

19. The respondent father is a micro-electronics engineer and consultant. In his statement in December, he said he is working 80 hours a week to try and earn sufficient money to meet all his responsibilities including legal fees. He is highly skilled and, at least at that time, earned about £20,000 a month gross. He lives in rented accommodation with his two daughters. The rent is reasonable at just under £2,000 a month.

20. In his email to the court the night before this hearing, he said he has recently given up one of his jobs because he cannot sustain it. He says he is suffering a great deal of stress because of these proceedings and that his mental health has deteriorated. He has incurred a lot of legal costs and owes over £200,000, mostly to family but also to his previous solicitors. He now represents himself and I notice he criticises his solicitors, alleging that they did not provide him with copies of court orders and says they gave him flawed advice. He says they interfered in his extradition proceedings and sought a case management hearing without his consent, and that his legal team withdrew because of non-payment of fees.

21. The extradition proceedings are still going on, and I do take into account the fact that he faces them as well as the proceedings in this court. He is awaiting a decision as to extradition that will be made at the beginning of February. I am told that in the event that I pass a sentence of imprisonment, then the extradition will not take effect until after that sentence is completed.

22. I take into account that this is the first time the father has been found to be in contempt of court, albeit with respect to two orders. They were made in relatively quick succession, and I therefore treat them the same way as I would the breach of a single order. Nonetheless, even one breach in a case such as this is extremely serious, given the background facts. I have thought very carefully about this, but I consider that no less a penalty than a sentence of imprisonment meets the seriousness of the case.

23. In my judgment the proper sentence of imprisonment in this case, taking into account the aggravating and mitigating factors and the father's background circumstances, is one of six months. I have carefully considered whether I should suspend the sentence or provide for a short period of time before it takes effect in order to give the respondent a last chance to comply with the order. But the events of the last two months have convinced me that this would not change anything. Therefore, the sentence of imprisonment will take effect immediately.

24. I then turn to the question of costs. The applicant mother has applied for an order for costs. The application encompasses costs of £2,000 which the mother has paid her solicitors and then pro bono costs to be paid to both counsel and solicitors. The total amount of those pro bono costs is £14,850 for counsel and £28,400 for the solicitors.

25. I am also asked to make an order under schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 for a lump sum, which would provide for the father to pay the mother a sum which would allow her to pay her Nigerian lawyer in the proceedings there. A quote has been given of £2,355 for her to be represented in the first instance.

26. The father has stated that he has debts of around £200,000 and that he simply cannot afford to pay any costs. I asked him whether he would be prepared to voluntarily pay the sum required for the mother's Nigerian lawyer, but he said he could not afford even that. He says he has very little money left at all. He did say he has paid one of his relatives £20,000 that he owed her just before Christmas, because she was buying a house.

27. As I have passed a sentence of immediate imprisonment on the father, he is going to be unable to work and I simply do not know what the situation is going to be when he is released. He may well then be extradited to France.

28. I will make an order that the father shall pay the mother a sum of £3,000 by way of a lump sum under schedule 1 of the Children Act. That will cover the initial costs of a lawyer to represent her in Nigeria and leave some more, because I do not doubt that further costs will be required there. I have absolutely no doubt that I should make that order, which is in this child's best interests, given the lack of progression of the case in Nigeria without her input. I also bear in mind what has been said about her, without her being able to answer it, by the relatives in the Nigerian proceedings.

29. As to the rest of the costs that are sought, I will make an order that the father shall pay the mother £2,000 for the costs she incurred at the start of these proceedings. They have all been brought about by his conduct.

30. I consider the father can make these payments now, that is the £3,000 plus the £2,000, or at least within a short time, although I know it will be difficult. He is still expecting to be paid for work he has been doing until as recently as yesterday. Some of the money he owes is to relatives and I consider that every priority should be given to putting the mother in some funds in this way.

31. I further make an order that the father should pay £30,000 of the pro bono costs which are not to be enforced without the leave of the court. Now, this is a high sum and at the moment the father has little means of paying it. That is why I have ordered that it should not be enforced.

32. I wish to say that the work that has been done on behalf of the mother in these proceedings has been absolutely crucial. It has been much appreciated by the court and has been of the greatest help and provides a very important service to the mother. It is for those reasons it seems to be right that they should be paid if, in time, it is possible for that to happen.

33. So, those are my orders. A sentence of six months' imprisonment to commence straightaway and those orders for costs. Now, so far as the father is concerned, I should say this. You still have the opportunity to purge your contempt. What this court has always wished for is for this child to be returned and for you to do what Mr Justice Hayden required. If you do that, you can apply to this court to purge your contempt. If L is returned it is very likely this would be the end of your prison sentence. But as things stand, the order is for six months, and it is starting now.

34. You also have the right to appeal my decision. During the course of submissions, you said you would not be able to appeal the extradition if you were in prison. Prisoners engage in appeals frequently. It is not unusual at all. So, the fact that you are in prison as a result of my order does not prevent you seeking permission to appeal. You have a list of solicitors and if you wish to seek advice about that, then I strongly advise you to go and see a solicitor. You have applied for me to stay the order pending your appeal. I am not prepared to do that, given all the circumstances of the case. But when you make an application to the Court of Appeal, no doubt they will consider it very quickly. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected] This transcript has been approved by the Judge