UK case law

Dan Tranz Limited v The Pensions Regulator

[2025] UKFTT GRC 1465 · First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Pensions · 2025

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Background

1. Dan Tranz Limited (“the Employer”) challenges a Fixed Penalty Notice (“FPN”) dated 7 August 2024 and an Escalating Penalty Notice (“EPN”) dated 6 September 2024. Both notices were issued by The Pensions Regulator (“the Regulator”).

2. The FPN was issued under section 40 of the Pensions Act 2008 (“ the 2008 Act ”). It required the Employer to pay a fixed penalty of £400 for failure to comply by 22 July 2024 with a Compliance Notice (“CN”) dated 10 June 2024. The EPN was issued under section 41 of the 2008 Act imposing a penalty at a daily rate of £500 from 4 October 2024. The Employer seeks a reduction in the penalties imposed or for the penalty notices to be set aside. Procedural matters

3. The Tribunal has erroneously referred to the Appellant as Dan z Tranz Limited in some communications and case management directions/decisions. I have used the spelling as it appears in the appeal form and Companies House registration.

4. The parties and the Tribunal agree that this matter is suitable for determination on the papers in accordance with rule 32 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the 2009 Rules”). The Tribunal has been provided with a bundle of documents consisting of some 224 pages. The Tribunal has considered all the evidence and submissions made by both parties. The law

5. The 2008 Act imposes a legal obligation on employers in relation to the automatic enrolment of certain “jobholders” into occupational or workplace personal pension schemes and to maintain their membership of a qualifying pensions scheme. The Regulator has statutory responsibility for securing compliance with these obligations and may exercise enforcement powers provided by the 2008 Act .

6. Each employer is assigned a date (the “duties start date”) from which the timetable for performance of their obligations is set. From that date an employer has a duty to pay contributions to a qualifying pension scheme under section 3 (automatic enrolment of eligible staff into a pension scheme). The employer must regularly and periodically pay its own and its employees’ contributions to the managers or trustees of the pension scheme.

7. An employer must provide certain specified information to the Regulator about its compliance with these duties in a “declaration of compliance” within 5 months of its duties start date.

8. The Regulator may issue a CN to a person if the Regulator is of the opinion that the person has contravened one or more of the employer duty provisions ( section 35(1) of the 2008 Act ). A CN directs the person to whom it is issued to take, or refrain from taking, the steps specified in the notice in order to remedy the contravention.

9. If the Regulator is of the opinion that a person has failed to comply with a CN, then it may issue a FPN under section 40(1) of the 2008 Act . A FPN is a notice requiring the person to whom it is issued to pay a penalty within the period specified in the notice. The penalty is determined in accordance with regulations. The current prescribed fixed penalty is £400.

10. In the event of any further breach, the Regulator may issue an EPN under section 41 of the 2008 Act . This requires the employer to pay a penalty that accrues at a daily rate until the employer complies with the notice. The level of penalty is set out in Regulation 13 of the Employers' Duties (Registration and Compliance) Regulations 2010 (“2010 Regulations”).

11. Under section 44 of the 2008 Act , a person can make a reference to the Tribunal in respect of the issue or amount of a penalty notice. The conditions are that the Regulator has completed a review under section 43, or “the person to whom the notice was issued has made an application for the review of the notice under section 43(1)(a) and the Regulator has determined not to carry out such a review” ( section 44(2) (b)).

12. An employer may ask for a review of a FPN of EPN under section 43(1) (a) of the 2008 Act . The prescribed period for a written application to review under section 43(1) (a) is 28 days from the date of the notice (Regulation 15(1) of the 2010 Regulations). The effect is to suspend the relevant notice whilst a review is taking place ( section 43(4) ) . The Regulator may confirm, vary or replace the notice after the review ( section 43(6) ).

13. Section 303(6) (a ) of the 2004 Act provides that the proper address for the service of documents by post in the case of a body corporate is its registered or principal office. Regulation 15(4) of the 2010 Regulations creates a presumption that notices are received by the employer when addressed to them and sent to their registered office or principal office address. However, that presumption is capable of being rebutted on the basis of contrary evidence: Philip Freeman Mobile Welders Ltd v Pensions Regulator [2022] UKUT 62 AAC.

14. If the Tribunal concludes that it does have jurisdiction then the Tribunal must, under section 103(4) of the 2004 Act, determine what (if any) is the appropriate action for the Regulator to take in relation to the matter referred to out. The role of the Tribunal is to make its own decision on the appropriate action for the Regulator to take, having regard to the evidence before it. The Tribunal may confirm, vary or revoke a penalty. When it reaches a decision, the Tribunal must remit the matter to the Regulator with such directions (if any) required to give effect to its decision. The facts

15. The Employer is a private limited company registered at Companies House, Belfast. It was incorporated on 30 April 2021. The Employer is an employer for the purposes of the ‘Employer Duties’ under the 2008 Act . Mr Daniel King is registered as the company director and individual person with significant control.

16. On 18 March 2024 the Regulator wrote to the Employer informing it that every employer in the UK must put certain staff into a workplace pension scheme and pay into it. This is called ‘automatic enrolment’. The letter advised that the Employer’s duties start date was 1 January 2024 which was when its first member of staff started work. The letter stated that the Employer must act immediately and complete a declaration of compliance by 31 May 2024.

17. The Regulator sent a reminder letter on 4 April 2024 for the Employer to comply with its automatic enrolment duties. It highlighted in red text the declaration deadline of 31 May 2024. Another reminder letter in the same format was sent on 17 May 2024.

18. On 10 June 2024 the Regulator issued a CN to the Employer under section 35 of the 2008 Act . It advised that the Employer had failed to comply with a requirement to inform the Regulator how it had met its automatic enrolment duties. The CN states that the Employer must complete a declaration of compliance by 22 July 2024 and warns that a failure to comply by the deadline may incur a £400 penalty.

19. The Employer failed to complete a declaration of compliance by 22 July 2024 and on 7 August 2024 the Regulator issued a FPN imposing a fixed penalty of £400. The FPN warned that a failure to comply with the CN by 4 September 2024 may result in an EPN at a daily rate which varies from £50 to £10,000.

20. When the Employer failed to complete a declaration of compliance by 4 September 2024, the EPN was issued on 6 September 2024, with a daily accrual of £500 with effect from 4 October 2024.

21. On 4 November 2024, the Regulator issued a penalty reminder letter for an outstanding penalty of £14,400.00.

22. The Employer made a review request in respect of the FPN and EPN on 12 November 2024. The request was received by the Regulator on 18 November 2024 who did not accept the request as it was received outside the 28-day time limit. The Regulator did “not consider it appropriate to conduct a review on our own initiative.”

23. The Employer complied with the CN by filing a declaration of compliance on 8 November 2024.

24. The Employer’s referral to the Tribunal is dated 22 November 2024. In summary, the grounds of challenge are: 24.1 The Employer received “the escalating letter” on 7 November 2024. 24.2 Its accountants immediately enrolled the Employer in a pension scheme and filed the declaration of compliance on 8 November 2024. 24.3 A review by the Regulator was requested but was refused on 18 November 2024 as being outside the 28-day time limit. The Employer did not have the option to appeal within 28 days because the time limit had already expired by the time the EPN was received on 7 November 2024. 24.4 The company has only been operating for a short period of time and could not financially withstand such a penalty. It does not recall receiving the FPN. It only received the EPN.

25. The Regulator resists the challenge. On 7 March 2025, the Regulator applied to strike out the entire reference on the grounds that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the matter as the conditions in section 44(2) of the 2008 Act are not met. The strike out application was refused by the Tribunal on 14 August 2025 as being inappropriate at that stage. Whilst the Judge did not agree that the Employer had at that time provided credible evidence to rebut the presumption of service, it was found to be in accordance with the overriding objective to allow the Employer opportunity to present their evidence at a hearing. The Judge directed that the reference be decided at a hearing which will consider: (a) whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings, and (b) if so, whether the reference should succeed.

26. On 12 September 2025, the Regulator made another application to strike out the reference. This second application was refused on the basis that no substantial new arguments were raised by the Regulator in relation to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and that it would not be fair to make a summary determination on the prospects of the Employer’s case succeeding. Submissions The Employer

27. The Employer has instructed Chartered Accountants to make submissions on its behalf. It is undisputed that the review request was outside the 28-day statutory timescale. However, the Employer says the lateness was caused by it not receiving the original notices, which were not sent by recorded delivery. The Employer argues that it cannot be proven that the notices were delivered or brought to the attention of any responsible person within the company.

28. Parallels are drawn to a recent decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) in MBP Europe Ltd v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 1069 (TC) , where the Tribunal accepted a claim of non-receipt of a critical notice despite HMRC showing it had been sent.

29. The Employer submits that the Regulator’s argument over lack of jurisdiction under section 44(2) (b) is overly formalistic. The contemporaneous response declining to review because of lateness is, in substance, a determination not to carry out a review within section 44(2) (b), consistent with Freeman ’s fairness-first approach.

30. Posting alone does not guarantee receipt. The presumption can be displaced on the facts especially where there is no recorded delivery, a strong internal control system and evidence of swift corrective action once the issue is uncovered.

31. The Employer considers that allowing the EPN to stand would be disproportionate to an administrative oversight that caused no substantive detriment. The escalating £14,000 penalty flowed solely from unreceived notices. Contributions were paid, no member suffered loss, and the declaration of compliance was filed immediately once alerted.

32. To support its case, a signed and dated witness statement is produced from Nicole King, Office Manager of Dan Tranz Limited. Ms King states that she is responsible for day-to-day administration including collecting and opening all items of post. She confirms the company’s registered office address which is also the home address of the directors. The business operates from the office and workshop located in the yard behind the house. All company post is directed to this address. Incoming post is delivered by Royal Mail each working day via the letterbox in the front door of the house. There is no external post box or shared delivery point.

33. Ms King confirms that no formal log or register is kept of post received, but she says that the system has operated consistently and reliably. She states: “To my knowledge, no statutory notices or letters from The Pensions Regulator were received at the registered office before the penalty reminder letter dated 4 November 2024.” Between August to October 2024 there was no Royal Mail redirection or hold instruction in place for the Employer and the office continued to receive post from HMRC and other government bodies without issue. When the reminder letter was received Ms King immediately brought it to the attention of the company directors. Ms King is confident that had the original CN or any penalty notices been delivered to the office, they would have come to her attention. It is her stated belief that no such documents were ever received at the company’s registered office. The Regulator

34. The Regulator invites the Tribunal to strike out the appeal under rule 8(2)(a) of the 2009 Rules for lack of jurisdiction with respect to each notice because the conditions in section 44(2) of the 2008 Act are not met.

35. The Regulator refers to the decision in Mosaic Community Centre Limited v Pensions Regulator (PEN/2015/0004) as showing that the Tribunal only has jurisdiction when a review under section 43 has been undertaken by the Regulator. The Regulator says there was no review in this case. There was also no refusal to carry out a review within the meaning of section 44(2) because the Appellant had not requested a review in the prescribed 28-day period set down in regulation 15(1) of the 2010 Regulations. The Regulator therefore says that the necessary conditions in section 44 to permit a reference to the Tribunal are not met.

36. If not struck out, the Regulator submits that the grounds of appeal do not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for failure for which the penalty notices were issued. There can be no dispute that the Employer bears a statutory responsibility to give prescribed information on its compliance with the 2008 Act .

37. The CN, FPN and EPN were all sent to the Appellant’s registered office address. Reliance is placed on the presumptions of service pursuant to section 144 a of the 2008 Act , section 303(6) (a) of the 2004 Act and section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 .

38. The Re gulator refers to London Borough of Southwark v (1) Runa Akhter v (2) Stel LLC 2017 UKUT where the Upper Tribunal held that a mere assertion of non-receipt is insufficient to overturn the presumption of service. The Tribunal’s attention is also drawn to various First-tier Tribunal decisions where Akhter has been followed.

39. The Regulator considers it unclear why the Employer was able to receive the penalty reminder letter but not the preceding correspondence. No evidence of rebuttal has been provided amounting to more than a bare assertion. Main issues

40. The main issues in this appeal are: • Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings, and • If so, whether the reference should succeed. Consideration and decision

41. Whilst the Employer draws heavily upon the decision of the Tax Chamber in MBP Europe Ltd, that was a tax case decided on its individual merits. I do not disregard the decision, but another recent decision of more direct relevance to this case was made by the Tribunal President of this Chamber in J.M Kamau Limited v The Pensions Regulator [2025] UKFTT 00425 (GRC). It was designated as a lead case in relation to the issue of: “Where a notice under the Pensions Act 2008 was delivered by Royal Mail to the proper address as defined by section 303(6) of the Pensions Act 2004 , but did not come to the attention of the person to whom it is addressed, is it open to the person to argue that the notice has not been issued for the purposes of the 2008 Act , with the consequences for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction discussed in Philip Freeman Mobile Welders Ltd v The Pensions Regulator (Tribunal procedure and practice - tribunal jurisdiction) [2022] UKUT 62 (AAC) at [34]?”

42. This issue raised points of law that are applicable to the Employer’s argument in this instance that the penalty notices were not received. Moreover, the Tribunal President took the opportunity to explore a number of other important issues in relation to the issue of penalty notices in pension cases.

43. The Employer seeks to distinguish Kamau as turning on speculative mis-delivery and detailed evidence of envelope generation/dispatch. The facts may differ and, of course, each case must be decided on its individual merits. A First-tier Tribunal decision does not create legal precedent nor does one First-tier Tribunal decision bind another. Nevertheless, Kamau is relevant and persuasive to the approach to be taken and principles applied in the same subject matter. The Employer also argues that this case is clear and consistent on non-receipt and there was immediate compliance once aware. The evidence on those factors is to be considered. Kamau does not suggest otherwise. Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction

44. As set out by the Tribunal President in Kamau at [22] whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction requires consideration of the following matters: (a) as a matter of fact were the FPN and/or EPN issued to the Employer in a manner prescribed by section 303 of the 2004 Act , and if so when, and (b) as a matter of law, were the notices received by the Employer and, if so, when

45. From the wording of section 44(1) , no reference can be made to the Tribunal unless a penalty notice has been issued.

46. The Employer is a limited company (a body corporate) and both penalty notices were addressed to its registered office address. It is undisputed that those notices bear the correct postal address.

47. In the Kamau case Cathy Doherty gave evidence on behalf of the Regulator. She explained in some detail how notices are computer generated and subject to a reconciliation process before despatch. At paragraph [54] it is recorded that: “ An issue has never been identified whereby the system shows a letter as having been generated, but it has subsequently found that the letter has not been in fact been despatched. ” The systems employed by the Regulator for the sending of notices by post was accepted by the Tribunal President as “reliable and robust” [78]. This is important because the Chamber President went on to say at [80]: “In future cases before this Tribunal, The Pensions Regulator is entitled to rely upon the evidence of Ms Doherty, as detailed in [32] to [55] above, as to the system it operates for the issuing of IPBs, FPNs and EPNs. There will be no further requirement to produce a witness statement detailing these processes, unless a direction is made to that effect in a given matter.”

48. This is predicated both on Ms Doherty’s evidence continuing to accurately reflect the processes in place and it also continuing to be the case that there have not been any adverse issues with the system that could cause doubt as to the reliability of the information it produces.[81]

49. In this case, Ms Doherty has provided confirmation that her evidence in Kamau continues to reflect the Regulator’s processes in place, and that there have been no adverse issues with the system that could cause doubt as to the reliability of the information it produces. The service provider for printing and despatching the documents has changed, but Ms Doherty states that the checking and reconciliation processes remain in place and are robust. The Employer has been made aware of such reliance by the Respondent’s submissions. A copy of the Kamau decision is also provided within the bundle.

50. Noting that a bare assertion is unlikely to suffice to meet the burden placed on it, the Regulator produces screenshots of the relevant tabs on its computer management system entries in line with paragraph [84] of Kamau. These confirm the issue date and show the correct address for service of the CN, FPN and EPN.

51. There is no requirement for “concrete dispatch proof” from the Regulator as the Employer suggests or for the notices to be sent by recorded delivery or tracked post. The Employer argues that the letters prove only that they were created, not enveloped, stamped and posted. However, following the Tribunal’s robust and detailed examination of the Regulator’s processes in the Kamau case, and the confirmatory statements and evidence received in this case, I give substantial weight to the Regulator’s case that the notices were, as a matter of fact, sent to the correct address on the dates stated within them.

52. When considering the question of whether a notice was issued it is necessary to go on to consider whether the notices were, as a matter of fact, received. That necessitates the weighing and evaluation of the Employer’s evidence of non-receipt against that put forward by the Regulator.

53. The Employer states that the registered office address is a residential dwelling. A photograph is supplied of the front door letterbox and the internal post collection box. This is stated to be the only postal delivery point at the address.

54. In terms of the FPN, I note that the reasons for appeal given in the GRC1 form which was completed by the Employer’s Accountant states: “ They don’t recall receiving the initial letter stating the £400 fine, they just received the escalated letter .” Being unable to recall whether the FPN was received is not the same as not receiving it. It firmly indicates that the Employer cannot remember if the FPN was received. As the appeal progressed Ms King was more forthright in her witness statement of 7 October 2025 in stating her belief that none of the penalty notices were ever received. This belief relies upon the single posting point at the address, continued receipt of other formal correspondence and her responsibilities for the daily collection, sorting and handling of post. I do not doubt Ms King’s belief, but her statement (made many months after the relevant events of 2024) is inconsistent with the grounds of appeal.

55. For that reason, I do not agree that the Employer has “credibly and consistently asserted non-receipt of the original” notices. I accept that the GRC1 form was not completed by a director of the company. Nevertheless, it was completed by the Employer’s Accountant, a professional representative, who must have taken instructions. There has been a shift in position from not recalling receipt of the FPN at the time of completion of the GRC1 form to the later denial of receipt of any of the statutory notices. The inconsistency in the Employer’s case diminishes the weight that I give it.

56. That aside, I consider it unlikely that the Employer did not receive the multiple communications from the Regulator which were all correctly addressed. There were three warning letters in March, April and May 2024, the CN in June 2024 followed by the FPN in August 2024 and EPN in September 2024. Yet, it was only when a payment reminder for £14,400 was sent in November 2024 that the Employer accepts there was receipt of a document from the Regulator. The swift response at that point does not provide evidence of non-receipt previously.

57. The Employer “does not dispute the general reliability of the Regulator’s internal procedures but submits that systems alone cannot conclusively establish receipt.” That is the wrong test. The Regulator has the burden of proof, to the balance of probabilities, that the penalty notices were issued. It does not need conclusive evidence of receipt.

58. When considering the Employer’s evidence of non-receipt weighed against the Regulator’s robust processes that have remained unchanged, I am satisfied that the Regulator has discharged the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that the penalty notices were issued by post on the dates identified, and that the notices were sent to the Employer’s registered and proper address.

59. I turn to the second question of whether as a matter of law the penalty notices were received by the Employer and, if so, when.

60. As already stated, the presumption of receipt within regulation 15(4) of the 2010 Regulations is rebuttable as confirmed by the Upper Tribunal in the Freeman case at [35]. The burden of rebutting the presumption is upon the Employer. Only if the Employer rebuts the presumption must the Regulator actually prove service, on the balance of probabilities, without the benefit of the presumption.

61. I am satisfied that the Regulator has shown that the FPN and EPN were properly addressed, pre-paid and posted through robust processes in place. Essentially, the Employer relies on the same points as before. The Employer does not contest that the correct address appears in the notices and there is no contrary evidence to show they were not pre-paid or posted. There was no requirement to show that the responsible person at the company actually received the notices.

62. The system the Employer has in place for receiving and opening post carries limited weight only. It does not demonstrate that the penalty notices were not, or could not have been, received. Nor does the prompt action following receipt of the penalty reminder provide evidence of non-receipt of the preceding notices. The Employer relies upon the memory of Ms King. I recognise that Ms King believes, as the person tasked with opening the post, that the notices were not received. I repeat my previous findings that the Employer’s account has not been consistent over claimed non-receipt and the unlikelihood of so many communications from the Regulator not being received.

63. I find that the Employer has not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of receipt. It follows that, as a matter of law, the FPN and EPN were deemed to be received by the Employer in the ordinary course of post by virtue of section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 .

64. The Regulator has not conducted a review of either the FPN or EPN. The parties agree that no request for a review of either the FPN or EPN was made within the requisite 28-day time limit. The Regulator refused to conduct any review for this reason. This means that the conditions of section 44 of the 2008 Act are not met.

65. The Employer suggests that the Tribunal has jurisdiction captured by section 44(2) (b) as the Regulator has determined not to carry out such a review. This subsection only applies where an application has been made under section 43(1) (a), but such application must be made within the prescribed timescale. That did not occur.

66. It follows that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine the references made by the Appellant in respect of either the FPN or the EPN under section 44(2) (a) of the 2008 Act .

67. Even if I am wrong in concluding that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction, the references would still be bound to fail. The Employer has provided no evidence of a reasonable excuse for non-compliance, other than to suggest that it had not received the relevant notices. It is incumbent on employers to ensure that their business is compliant in this area, regardless of any reminders received or not received from the Regulator. Therefore, had I gone to consider the merits, I would have found that there is no reasonable excuse for the Employer’s failure to comply with its obligations. Conclusion

68. Under rule 8(2) of the 2009 Rules, the Tribunal “must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal - (a) does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them;”. Consequently, the proceedings are struck out.