UK case law

F v M & Ors (Finding of Fact)

[2026] EWFC B 48 · Family Court (B - district and circuit judges) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

1. THE DISTRICT JUDGE: This application relates to the three children, C1 (born 2015) now 10; C2 (born 2018 ) now 7; and C3 (born 2021) now 4. The father is F (born 1978), now 46, living in Area A. Mother is 37 (born 1988), she and the children living not far away from father. Both parents have parental responsibility.

2. The applicant father is a litigant in person and has been so throughout. He has had the benefit of a QLR. ‘The QLR’ accepted the appointment to enable cross-examination of mother. Mother has been represented by counsel , and the children who are parties were represented by ‘the children's guardian’ who was previously their family court adviser. As a result of illness, he has been replaced by another children’s guardian, who instructs counsel, who was present at the last two hearings in September and November 2025. The children’s guardian has not been able to be here throughout the hearing, but I know counsel for the children and her instructing solicitor have taken notes and have been in discussion with him. Also, what I think is regrettable (though not his fault) is that the children’s guardian has not been able to speak to the children and clearly has not had the opportunity previous CG had to speak to the children on at least three occasions during the process of the previous and current proceedings.

3. All three of the children live with their mother. The boys did spend time with their father, including overnights, in accordance with an order by this court made in March 2024, but this came to an end in May 2025, when contact was suspended by mother. The reasons or justification in relation to that are in dispute, and more recently, in an order I made in September 2025, that contact has been reinstated, albeit on a fortnightly basis, for two hours, unsupervised, with collection and return being the Contact Centre X in Town Y, I will return to that point in this judgment.

4. This is the father's application made on 21 May 2025 to (and I quote this; he was representing himself) "restore contact, vary the previous order, a prohibited steps order to prevent ceasing contact with the children", and indeed during the course of the proceedings it is clear father now seeks to reverse the roles, in other words that the children live with him and that they spend time with the mother on the same basis as he had by order of March 2024.

5. At a hearing on 10 September 2025 (page 60 in the electronic bundle which I will refer to throughout this judgment), following input from the parties and the previous family court adviser, I determined it was necessary and proportionate to have a fact find hearing to establish various things, not least the two schedules which I am going to make reference to, but also the children’s guardian, in a helpful position statement that can be found within the bundle, set out what he saw as being important things for the court to consider namely: firstly, the assessment of any harm suffered by the children and the extent of risk of further harm; secondly, whether the motivation of these proceedings is to promote the best interests of the children or for a form of domestic abuse; thirdly, capacity of parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse, and once those matters are identified, for the children's guardian to consider the welfare of the children and what would be the best, most appropriate way forward in terms of either work, progression of arrangements or reconsideration of what the current position is; and finally, an invitation to consider what is known as a section 91(14) order to prevent ongoing litigation if that was not in the best interests of the children.

6. The issue for me at this hearing is therefore to determine the facts and allegations. I have not heard submissions or evidence in relation to the welfare issues or contact for the children, but I may do so in the light of what has been an invitation by mother's counsel, in her submissions about the interim position, but I will return to that in due course, after I have delivered my judgment and there has been some opportunity for discussion by all, including the guardian, about the way forward.

7. There is a lengthy history in this case. The bundle contains not only these proceedings but the previous proceedings. Both have chronologies. At page 3 is a brief, succinct chronology (no criticism of the solicitors) and on the back of mother’s counsel’s written submissions, she provides, a more detailed and thorough chronology of significant events which is a helpful document. I am not going to go into the full detail, but in order to understand the context of how this case came before the court I give some background facts of how the family got to where they are.

8. The parties' relationship commenced in 2012. C1 was born in 2015. The parents married in August 2016. C2 was born in 2018 and C3 in 2021. There have been problems in the relationship. Both acknowledge that situation. Mother left the former matrimonial home in February 2023, when father had kicked a hole in the bedroom wall, about which I will refer further. There is a picture at page 264 of the bundle relating to that, and father has given some lengthy evidence about it. It is something I will need to address. Father had subsequently then been arrested by the police in February 2023 and May 2023 for allegations of coercive and controlling behaviour made by the mother against him, but the police took no further action. Mother did return to the family home, during February 2023, but the parties separated for a final time in July 2023 after relationship duration of about 11 years on or off. . The parties divorced in 2024.

9. Both made cross-applications to this court in July 2023 under reference LV23P00659, giving rise to what were two reports from the former FCA/CG, the then family court adviser, leading to what I did describe as a ‘final’ child arrangements order of 27 March 2024, which can be found at page 5 of the bundle. It is important because a lot of the issues have arisen around the interpretation of that order. It was an order made without the making of any findings, because at that point both the court and the then FCA did not think it was necessary or proportionate. The children had an established relationship with the father, albeit allegations were being made, it was not something I considered was necessary; the order provided the children were to live with mother and spend time with the father overnight on a Wednesday through to Thursday on alternate weekends. The court, the family court adviser and mother, who repeated this expression in her evidence yesterday (and I am sure it is the same for father), had hoped that would be an end of the proceedings and there would be no more.

10. Sadly, problems continued to occur, and the details of those problems form part of the schedules of allegations. In April 2025, father maintains that the mother had breached the order and he was unable to have the children over the Easter holiday. There were difficulties with the two older boys' school, School X, problems with the childminder employed by the mother, allegations of harm physically by mother, and allegations of risk of sexual abuse. Eventually, on 7 May 2025, when father informed the school, the childminder and the mother that if C3 was not to be handed over to the father by the mother at 3.00 pm the following day, he would not be collecting C1 and C2 either. The mother took advice and suspended contact. No application was made. I have made comments about this before. Whether that was justified is an issue. Whether she should have made an application is also perhaps another debate.

11. In any event, on 21 May 2025 (so shortly thereafter), the father issued his application that is now before me. It was originally urgent and he also made an occupation order to enable him to get back into the marital home and remove the mother, which I dealt with in short order. I made an order on 21 May 2025, at page 44 of the bundle, refusing the urgent application the father wanted, providing for Cafcass safeguarding information at that point (obviously there had been some time since the March 2024 order) and listing it for a first hearing dispute resolution appointment. In my absence , Deputy District Judge Brown, dealt with the case. Importantly, in my judgment (and the parties were present), on 2 July 2025, he made provisions to suspend the March 2024 order and provided there should be no contact between father and the children. He appointed a FPR r.16.4 guardian, joining the children as parties, and gave some case management directions towards a more full, detailed hearing before me on 10 September 2025 to determine the next steps after there had been police disclosure and some statements from the parties.

12. On 10 September, which is page 51 of the bundle, I made an order. I decided, having had input from both the then guardian with his position statement I have referred to, and both parties with their allegations and counter-allegations, that I did at that point need to make provisions for a finding of fact hearing and that it was necessary and proportionate. I made a direction in connection with the requirement of a qualified legal representative on behalf of the father because mother was vulnerable, considering the history. I also determined, and I recall giving a judgment considering the practice direction PD 12J, that I was, along with the then guardian, clear that in order to strike the balance between what clearly is a good relationship between father and the children and the concerns about what had been going on, there should be interim contact but on the basis of two hours per fortnight, as I have said.

13. I did ponder during the course of the last two days as to why on earth I was persuaded Contact Centre X, would be the right collection and return point, bearing in mind I learned and should have known that, with mother not driving, she has to take two buses every other Saturday morning with the children, which takes something in the order of two hours. However, as the children’s counsel pointed out to me, sadly, with what is effectively the deterioration in relationship with the childminder (again, I will come to that later), the issues with the school, the lack of a third party and no other relative being able to assist, there was no other option. From the boys' point of view, I am concerned about that position, because it seems impractical and on the face of it , not in the children's interest, but that is the situation and the only real ability available to preserve what would have been a neutral position pending this hearing. That is the background.

14. In so far as documents and evidence are concerned, for this hearing I have had a paginated bundle of some 826 pages, including the earlier proceedings. I have heard oral evidence from the father and the mother. As a vulnerable witness, the mother was cross-examined by the QLR. I want to record that I have had in mind throughout the overriding objective under the Family Procedure Rules Part 1 and Part 3A. Knowing, of course, that the father was a litigant in person and the mother was vulnerable, I believe, and I hope, that both have considered they have had a full opportunity and an ability to put forward their case. I hope that both believe they have been given a fair opportunity to present their case.

15. This court has the unique benefit of hearing oral evidence from parents. I have seen the witnesses. It puts me, as the judge determining the facts, in a very, significant position of advantage. I, and only I, have had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses give evidence and be the subject of cross-examination. Mindful, as I am, of the fallibility of memory and the pressure of giving evidence, it is important that I form a view as to the credibility of each of the witnesses, using my own experience of seeing and hearing witnesses and assessing credibility in investigating what I consider to be the truth, and I find that the oral evidence in this case has been of great importance, enabling the court to discover what occurred in the investigation of trying to assess the truth and reliability of witnesses.

16. The oral evidence of the parents has been considered but it has been taken in the context of all the other matters that are in the bundle, a series of recorded videos by the father outside school (although I have to say they are very difficult to read and see, unfortunately, and they are understandably redacted, and I am not sure they support either case), the police interviews and the records from the police involving both father and mother. The court has also had the benefit of written submissions from mother’s counsel , a written submission from the father and from the children’s counsel, albeit, obviously, her position on behalf of the children is more neutrally approached. It is neither possible nor necessary for me to address in this judgment every single piece of evidence. If there is something important any of the parties think I have overlooked, I will give an opportunity for reconsideration, but I have tried to give full scrutiny to this case, as I do in all cases.

17. In so far as the legal framework is concerned, at the conclusion of the evidence yesterday I gave to both counsel and to the father in person, a summary in four or five pages of what the relevant law is and how I should approach the hearing. I am not going to repeat it. When this judgment is transcribed, I will import that document into this judgment so it can be seen. I do not think it is helpful for me to recite all the principles I need to consider. I now include the paper given to the parties at the hearing in this judgment here:

18. 1. The following principles apply, which this Court has expressly taken into consideration and applied in its decision making, summarised in Re JK (A Child) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearing) [2022] 1 FLR 657 .

2. The burden of proof lies on the party making the allegation. In this case both make allegation against each other so each has the respective burden.

3. To prove the fact asserted, that fact must be established on the civil standard, that is, on the simple balance of probabilities. There is only one civil standard of proof, namely that the occurrence of the fact in issue must be proved to have been more probable than not. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences makes any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. If the Court finds it more likely than not that something did take place, then it is treated as having taken place. If the Court finds it more likely than not that it did not take place, then it is treated as not having taken place. Where a fact is required to be proved, a ‘fact in issue,’ the Court must decide whether it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system. The fact either happened or it did not. If the Court is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, the fact is treated as not having happened. If the party does discharge the burden of proof, it is treated as having happened ( Re B [2008] UKHL 35 , per Lord Hoffman).

4. Findings must be based on evidence, not suspicion or speculation ( Re A (A child) (Fact Finding Hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12 per Munby LJ).

5. The Court must take into account all the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence: Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558 , [2004] 2 FLR 838 . Per Dame Butler-Sloss.

6. If the evidence in respect of a particular finding sought is equivocal then the Court cannot make a finding on the balance of probabilities as neither the burden nor the standard of proof is discharged: Re B (Threshold Criteria: Fabricated Illness) [2002] EWHC 20 (Fam) , [2004] 2 FLR 200 ).

7. The decision on whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all the available evidence and should have regard to the wide context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors ( A County Council v A Mother, A Father and X, Y and Z [2005] EWHC 31 (Fam) ).

8. In assessing whether the evidence is sufficient to lead to a finding, it is not necessary to dispel all doubts or uncertainty ( Re D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 196 ).

9. The Court must not evaluate and assess the available evidence in separate compartments. Rather, regard must be had to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward has been made out on the balance of probabilities. The Court must take into account all of the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. A Judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof ( Re T [2004] 2 FLR 838 at 33 , per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P).

10. Failure to find a fact proved on the balance of probabilities does not equate, without more, to a finding that the allegation is false. An alleged fact not proven is not a fact in English law. That is the effect of the binary system of proof: if a negative is to be proved, that has to be proved with cogent evidence, just as if the positive is to be proved. It is not a correct proposition of law that a rejection of evidence mandates a judge to find that something is false ( Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 388 ).

11. The evidence of the parents is of the utmost import and to this end the Court will make a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. The Court is likely to place considerable weight on the evidence and the impression it forms of the parents ( Re W (Non-Accidental Injury) [2003] FCR 346 )).

12. In assessing and weighing the impression which the Court forms of the parents, the Judge appraising witnesses in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute should warn themselves to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box and to expressly indicate that they have done so: “No doubt it is impossible, and perhaps undesirable, to ignore altogether the impression created by the demeanour of a witness giving evidence. But to attach any significant weight to such impressions in assessing credibility risks making judgments which at best have no rational basis and at worst reflect conscious or unconscious biases and prejudices. One of the most important qualities expected of a Judge is that they will strive to avoid being influenced by personal biases and prejudices in their decision-making. That requires eschewing judgments based on the appearance of a witness or on their tone, manner or other aspects of their behaviour in answering questions. Rather than attempting to assess whether testimony is truthful from the manner in which it is given, the only objective and reliable approach is to focus on the content of the testimony and to consider whether it is consistent with other evidence (including evidence of what the witness has said on other occasions) and with known or probable facts.” ( Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 per of Macur LJ).

13. In principle, the approach in private Family Court proceedings between parents should be the same as the approach in care proceedings. However, there are specific risks to which the court must be alive. Allegations of abuse are not being made by a neutral and expert local authority which has nothing to gain by making them, but by a parent who is seeking to gain an advantage in the battle against the other parent. This does not mean that they are false but it does increase the risk of misinterpretation, exaggeration or fabrication ( Re W (Children) (Abuse: Oral Evidence) [2010] UKSC 12 ).

14. Intention to cause harm does not need to be proved to make a finding of abuse. None of the authorities require that a positive intent to molest must be established ( GK v PR [2021] EWFC 106 , Peel J. and Re T [2017] EWCA Civ 1889 ).

15. A Family Court Judge must consider a ”wide canvas” and scrutinise the family relationships, whether of adult to adult or adult to child over a period of time in order to arrive at a factual determination relevant to both risk and welfare. ( A and Another [2022] EWHC 3089 (Fam) , per Knowles J.)

16. The focus and purpose of a fact-finding investigation in the context of a case concerning the future welfare of children in the Family Court are wholly different to those applicable to the prosecution by the State of an individual before a Criminal Court. The primary purpose of the Family Court process is to determine what has gone on in the past, so that those findings may inform the ultimate welfare evaluation as to the child’s future with the Court’s eyes opened to such risks as the factual determination may have established. Criminal law concepts, such as the elements needed to establish guilt of a particular crime or a defence, have neither relevance nor function within a process of fact-finding in the Family Court. As a matter of principle, it is fundamentally wrong for the Family Court to be drawn into an analysis of factual evidence in proceedings based upon criminal law principles and concepts ( Re R (Children) (Care Proceedings: Fact-finding Hearing) [2018] EWCA Civ 198 [”Re R”] at [82] per McFarlane LJ).

18. The Family Court should be concerned to determine how the parties behaved and what they did with respect to each other and their children, rather than whether that behaviour does, or does not, come within the strict definition of crimes .

19. It is not uncommon for witnesses in these cases to tell lies during the investigation and the hearing. The Court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for various reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress. The fact that a witness may have lied does not necessarily mean they are guilty of the matter alleged against them and the fact that the witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything: see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 .

19. Counsel for the children in her closing written statement, also summarised matters which I consider are helpful comments for the benefit of father regarding police involvement: this court is not assisted by considering behaviour in the confines of the criminal justice definitions, ( ..the Family Court ), is not bound by case decisions taken by the police (for example, no further action), nor opinions of the police, ( which I think have formed a fairly big part in father's mind ) as to whether they consider allegations meet criminal standards or definitions of domestic abuse and/or threshold tests for charging or prosecution. Simply put, for the purpose of these proceedings, it matters not if the police acted . I suppose one could say that applies to both parties, because father makes allegations that mother has made unfounded reports to the police.

20. That is the law to be applied to this hearing.

21. I turn to my impression of the witnesses' credibility and the impact that has had on me in terms of the allegations, which I believe is probably the most important narrative any family judge makes in these sorts of cases, particularly on findings of fact.

22. I deal first with the father. I have no doubt that F dearly loves his children and is desperate to care for them and is desperately upset that the family broke down when it did and with the fact, he is only having two hours every two weeks with the boys. I also have no doubt, from him and the former children's guardian and indeed from the mother's own evidence, that the boys love him, they miss him and they want to spend time with him. Whether that is in the interests of the boys and without risk emotionally remains, in my view, to be seen and may or may not have to be determined at a further hearing. I also take the view that, because father has never physically assaulted or threatened mother, and has had decisions from the police and indication sometimes from certain police officers that he has not been at fault or domestically abusive, that he genuinely believes he has not been so. His written submissions seem to add weight to this and his perception. That is not the law, nor is it the test of domestic abuse, as I shall explain.

23. Father is relying on the fact, as he does in his written submission, that the coercive an controlling behaviour alleged by mother did not meet the criminal standard, and the lack of what he describes as being a pattern of behaviour is his perception, I am afraid, not what I see as being the objective situation. In his submissions he talks of things that are being interpreted in that way, saying, " The allegations seem to rely more on how things were interpreted, like tone or isolated incidents, rather than on any clear actions ." However, I think that is exactly the point here, that the father in this case has a very clear position, his perception of several things which cause me quite serious concern. I am not sure he is seeing things from an objective or, as I regard it, neutral child focused point of view, which I must try to do. He, I appreciate, will say mother has a very different point of view and she may be motivated to look at it differently.

24. Father, to me, came across as an intense individual, fixed about his concerns that neither he nor the children are being listened to. He had an obvious and clear lack of insight into his actions or reactions to what I think is a rather skewed view and perception of events. He was calm, even when pressed in questions by mothers and the children’s counsel, but I gained the clear impression he could appear quite intimidating and argumentative if you do not share his viewpoint. He had a huge, in my judgment, lack of empathy and insight for others. He had a single-minded goal of trying to right what he considered to be wrong. He is clearly of the view that he did and continues to do everything to maintain the family and no fault on his part except frustration.

25. Examples of what I would regard as father's unreasonable perspective on events have been put by and by the children’s counsel The examples are these. His arrests by the police (I think there might have been three, in February and May 2023) he considers to be wholly unwarranted, mainly due to perception of what he had or had not done by mother's false allegations, and he has also had comments from random police officers, and he talked in his evidence about meeting good officers and bad officers. I have no doubt that the officers he considered to be good were ones that shared his point of view and the officers that were bad did not. He has been ignoring officers that do not share his point of view, in trying to make reports with C3 when he was only 2 years old in 2023, which is totally inappropriate, taking C3 along on that occasion, about an allegation which I think had no foundation whatsoever. The police officer, I believe , took exactly the correct course he should have done. I believe, the officers he considers to be good are ones that have tried to be sympathetic towards him and perhaps given him some indication of reassure or endorse his view, but the problem with that is they have no idea or understanding about the full background to this case. They have some input from F about it, but they do not have the full picture. They may or may not have seen the previous matters. So the police, it seems to me, sadly have either, on the one hand, reinforced father's view that mother has been totally unjustified in making reports to the police, which I disagree with, or on the other hand have been endorsing or encouraging the thought that he has been wronged and it should be righted, as it were.

26. Similarly with the school, I find incredible the father's reaction and relationship with the school. It can see from his comment at the very end of yesterday that it is not all the teachers he does not like. He would always take the view, I think, that one of the teachers (either the deputy or the head) would side with one or other of the parents. He does not believe his perception of their actions was a problem. They have had to involve the Education Trust. The actions have involved an investigation. They have received letters of complaint. They have responded to those letters of complaint. At 217 the documents are clear. When School X were asked to provide a report dealing generally with the children, which is a positive report in the T for the children, they, unprompted, at paragraph 6 (271 of the bundle) gave a fairly lengthy history from teacher A, which I appreciate F may say is someone with whom he has a problem, who excluded him from the school unjustifiably. However, they give a lengthy report, not only from them but from other parents, about his conduct, and he does not see that as a problem from him at all. I am surprised by father’s attitude in relation to that.

27. Similarly, he accuses a social worker or the local authority of failing to investigate what he and potentially the children were saying, and says they were not listened to, but at the report at 273 from X local authority, they have investigated each of the allegations not just simply themselves, but they have sought objective clarification and found no justification of the allegations he has made.

28. The childminder, A at page 162, has not been present at this hearing. She has done a statement. On that basis I am cautious of the weight I attach to it. I am sure she probably did not want to do a statement bearing in mind the history and what the position is in this case. However, the father's view was that the only thing he has done wrong with the childminder (employed by the mother) was not to respond to a message in four hours. I do not think so. It is clear to me that he has jeopardised and indeed created real problems in the relationship with the childminder.

29. On issue of the barbers and burger shops in place X (and I will deal with this in the schedule of allegations), his evidence was entirely incredible, in my view, about making allegations both to the police and to this court based upon the reaction of the boys, in particular one boy, freezing at the point at which he went past the shop and/or saw the man, from the community (and some comments he has been making, " When they arrived, the community's gone down "), and telling the children the man in the barbers was a ‘bad man’. I ask myself rhetorically, how would the children then react if they are getting that communication from the father, without any evidence of that at all apart from what he appears to have been told by the community (about which I do not know) and what he appears to have seen in a reaction from one of the boys, when mother maintains, walking past these shops, as I understand it, nearly every day when they go to school, the children’s reaction, is nothing of the sort. It is not consistent and not credible at all.

30. Then there is the exchange of texts at 811 of the bundle and the reasons for the breakdown. Father’s evidence about whether he agreed with the mother as opposed to agreeing with what C1 had described as a breakdown, is simply not credible. I have no doubt, he was told by C1 in relation to the meltdown and he agreed with C1, in my view, as far as that evidence is concerned.

31. Similarly with the order of 2 July 2025, an order for no contact between F and the boys F was present in court when that order was made. I understand F is taking advice from someone who is either not legally qualified or that person does not have the full background. He certainly should not have, because these papers are confidential. If F asks somebody, "Does this order mean I cannot go to the school?" the answer correctly could have been said, "Yes, it means you can still go to the school," because it does not prevent him going to the school. But for F, it was either the following day on 3 July, or shortly thereafter, to go to the school with an express adjudication by DDJ Brown that there should be no contact with the children, is bizarre, and I think either the advice he has received has been misunderstood or his insight and understanding of what that means is worrying. Either way, it is of concern that he has not followed an order 2 nd July 2025.

32. Regarding the allegations of mother of the various affairs, sex with men in hotels whilst C3 was present, with drug involvement, there is no credibility at all. There is mother's non-accidental injury, grabbing C3, throwing him over her shoulder, C2 being slapped and flying across the room. It seems to me, F has changed his evidence, because in terms of the throwing across the room in relation to C2, his evidence given to me on 6 January was that he had heard a slap and seen C2 flying across the room. However, it was not raised specifically in the previous proceedings, and I think that is because he was told not to by ‘advisers.’ F accepts that, notwithstanding in the case of C2 the incident that caused bruising to the surface, no medical treatment was taken, the incident when he kicked the bedroom wall and his message, which was contained within the bundle, despite giving evidence about an explanation as to how that came about and indeed mother gave a very lengthy explanation as to how that came about, and she did not see or witness how that damage which can be found at 261 was made, but father gave his evidence about what had given rise to that, his frustration. But what father says at 264 in his message, virtually contemporaneously, is, " I kicked it after you accused me of doing nothing." There is no mention of abuse of C3 in that context.

33. In my judgment, the possibilities of non-accidental injuries caused by the mother are either exaggerated, did happen and were not reported to the authorities (in which case, as counsel for the children quite rightly points out, there has been a lack of protection by mother and/or father) and/or mother has successful hoodwinked or managed to persuade professionals of completely contradictory information about how the children have been presenting over the years post-separation. They have, it seems to me, hoodwinked the school, the child family reporter, the social worker, the police, for the last two years, or it is more likely that something may have gone on. But the perception of father is, in my judgment, plainly wrong.

34. When asked about getting medical help, he talked about it being something you need to have school lessons on, reporting injuries. I did not understand that evidence at all.

35. When it was put to father both by mother’s and the children’s counsel whether any of these issue that have arisen were his fault, his answer in his evidence was he is not perfect but if he were to bend any more, he would break.

36. When asked, quite properly (and this was also put to mother) about whether it could be the children were talking to him about things he might want to hear (which I think was in the specific context of father and his evidence, not in his statement, because it has been more recently happening, in the three contacts that had taken place in October and November, where there were troubling discussions taking place), his response was, "I believe I am safe for them to talk with me." He has no perception that if the children say something, I do not dispute they may have said it to him, but it is his perception about what he is going to do with that information. When F was asking the children how they felt, during the November contact, and there was mention of them never potentially coming to his flat, I do not accept that he tried to deflect or avoid that awkward conversation. I think he was prompting some sort of observed response as to how upset the children would be if that was their position. Indeed, mother accepted that was going to be their view.

37. Father's lack of insight and understanding of his actions and reactions is clear. I am troubled, in considering his credibility and his understanding of how that could be managed without intervention. Even then, I worry if father is capable of sustaining change because he has deep-rooted beliefs, it seems to me, of being a wronged person, being blameless, and I am worried about him being able to see other people's point of view, but that may be a matter for investigation by the CAFCASS officer.

38. The mother then gave evidence and, in complete contrast to the father, was very measured, calm, clear, consistent, prepared to accept and concede her inappropriate messages about the CMS money, which I think is right (and she accepted that should not have been done), her inappropriate response calling father pathetic (again, conceded; and not half as bad as some of the comments the father has been making in his messages). She accepted when cross-examined by QLR, the inconsistent statement with the police about the report in July 2025 outside School X at page 683, involving the car block/horn incident, but explained that although she had said to the police it was not making her anxious, it did. I believe her. I would, dealing with that sort of behaviour outside of school with everyone being there, and with the children present.

39. Mother recognises the pattern of behaviour damages her and the children and her relationship with the children. Her commitment to taking the children without the car to Contact centre X on two buses on every Saturday, knowing the history, is impressive, in my view, and similarly the father's commitment to that as well. I give him credit that he has maintained that. In my view, it is probably not practical for that to continue indefinitely, and it depends on father's insight as to whether it can carry on at all, it seems to me.

40. I found mother to be credible and believable, a caring mother who genuinely wants to support a relationship with the boys and their father but not at all costs. She gave that evidence very clearly yesterday. I am also invited by her to now, depending upon allegations, consider a non-molestation order because the undertakings that have been given in previous proceedings would not adequately cover the situation and to suspend contact. We shall see, and I will hear submissions on that point.

41. I turn then to the findings. I am not going to slavishly follow the two schedules. The higher courts have been critical of schedules. I find them a very helpful focus for both the parties and me to determine matters. They start at 258. There is a schedule from the mother against father. There is a schedule from father against the mother starting at 261. I have, in accordance with a case from Cobb LJ (as he now is) in Re B-B (Domestic Abuse: Fact-Finding) [2022] EWHC 108 (Fam) , decided to deal with these in clusters. I intend, having given this judgment, to produce a typed schedule of my findings of the clusters to avoid having to recite everything I have done, and I will give an opportunity over lunch for the parties to digest it.

42. I include the schedule of my findings here: Findings of Fact - Schedule of Allegations dealt with in clusters I group the schedules into five clusters : (A) coercive/controlling conduct. (B) emotional conduct. (C) adherence to orders/handovers. (D) false reports. (E) health/education decision-making. A. Coercive & Controlling Behaviour As defined within judgment Allegation against father by mother Particulars / Dates Evidence (Bundle) Sworn oral evidence (6-7 Jan 26) Finding Direct/pressuring tone around handovers (school/childminder); venue and timing instructions on contact Examples include Local place at 10:00 on Father’s Day instead of home collection at 09:50–10:00; refusal of third‑party handovers for C3; ultimatum about direct handover. Easter holiday start agreed 26 th March Order 27 th March 2024 p. 5-9 Childminder statement p.162–165; AppClose logs p.187–195; Father’s Day thread p.140 Easter agreement Appclose p.151-153 Father sworn evidence 6.1.26: admits frustrated/derogatory language; but father disputes repeatedly. Mother sworn 7.1.26: Local place ; refusal of third‑party handover; ultimatum. Proved direct/pressure/ tone/derogatory language established on multiple occasions. B. Emotional Conduct Allegation against father by mother Particulars / Dates Evidence (Bundle) Sworn oral evidence (6–7 Jan 26) Finding a. Intimidation /Hostility at school/community (beeping/blocking; WhatsApp/profile imagery) Mother reports beeping/blocking and anxiety (acknowledges “not violent” to police). Complaints about football safeguarding/police resulted in NFA. Father denies hostility; he states Head as aggressive. School correspondence p.221–243 (incl. 19 May 2025 letters p.226–227); CCTV unclear and not corroborative either way What’s app profile photos p.157-158 Mother sworn 7.1.26: beeping/blocking perception was anxious. Father sworn 6.1.26: denial; “I’m not accepting it”; Head described as aggressive. Proved (context/exposure) Father may not have intended hostility but lacks insight to understand others perception b. Child exposure to adult confrontation at school (specified date) Interaction with Headteacher occurred while C3 was present alongside father. School admin/complaint letters p.226–227; related chain p.221–243. Father sworn 6.1.26: accepts child present; language “I’m not accepting it”. Proved C. Adherence to Orders / Handovers Allegation Both parents Particulars / Dates Evidence (Bundle) Sworn oral evidence (6–7 Jan 26) Finding a. Post–no‑contact order attendance at school event (3 Jul 2025 order) Father attended a school event after the no‑contact order; he describes this as misunderstanding and later sought legal advice. Orders C43/C21 p.53–70; School/Trust correspondence p.221–243. Father sworn 6.1.26: admissions re attendance; rationale of misunderstanding. Proved non‑compliance. b. Early collections/ variations disrupting father’s contact Mother collected early at least once due to direct‑handover demand and work/childminder constraints, altering the expected arrangements/time. School/Trust emails pp.221–243; AppClose Easter/May threads p.143, 194–195. Mother sworn 7.1.26: early collection rationale; logistics. Father sworn 6.1.26: maintains disruption theme. Partly Proved: some disruption attributable to mother’s actions; motive addressed at welfare stage and may have been justified on current evidence. c. Police station use during timing dispute (3 Sept 2024) Father took C3 to police station amid return‑time dispute (9 or 10), citing fear/prior arrests; police NFA malicious and warned about time‑wasting. Police log entries around p.589–601 (as referenced); School emails p.221–243. Father sworn 6.1.26: rationale; complaints about police attitude. Proved (insight issue); D. False Reporting Allegation Both parents Particulars / Dates Evidence (Bundle) Sworn oral evidence (6–7 Jan 26) Finding Police/agency reports are alleged to be maliciously false. Father in relation to mother and her abuse of children and drug dealers. Mother in relation to father’s coercive control, criminal damage and to school. Serious allegations (hotel/unknown men; barber/community risk) were hearsay; police/LA outcomes NFA/screened. Police logs/closure notes (Sept 2024 around p.589–601 as referenced). Damage by father p.264 Father sworn evidence 6.1.26: accepts his belief; community comments; aware of NFA outcomes. Partly Proved as malicious or false as a pattern of conduct by father. Not proved against mother, my findings indicate part of pattern by father and Impact on children E. Health & Allegations of Abuse (Physical/Sexual) Allegation against mother by father Particulars / Dates Evidence (Bundle) Sworn oral evidence (6–7 Jan 26) Finding a. Intentional physical harm by mother to children (throwing/slap; toe/brush) Throwing/slap largely hearsay; toe/brush explained as accident while retrieving ball. AppClose excerpt re brush/toe p.176; Police p.602/LA NFA entries. Father sworn 6.1.26: belief/indirect accounts; Mother sworn 7.1.26: clear denials; accident explanation; no violence to children. Not Proved: No intentional harm by mother on the evidence. b. Sexual risk allegations (hotel; barber) Father’s perceived assertions (hotel with unknown men; barber risk) without direct evidence; mother denies; Police logs/closure notes (Sept 2024 around p.589–601). Father sworn 6.1.26: belief C3 scared /community hearsay; Mother sworn 7.1.26: denials; barber interaction details. Not Proved c. Health/continence management (neglect) Ongoing engagement with Pediatric Continence Service; steady progress; no evidence for neglect allegations. Pediatric Continence p.169–178 & 244–245; CAFCASS 258–262; Guardian 624–627. Mother sworn evidence 7.1.26: updates and engagement; Father sworn 6.1.26: no contrary evidence. Not Proved

43. The clusters I have identified are five (and these are applicable to both, do not get me wrong; I have merged the two together): (a) coercive, controlling conduct; (b) public emotional conduct (or emotional conduct, effectively); (c) adherence to orders and handover arrangements; (d) false reporting; and finally (e) health, education and decision making.

44. I think it is important for me to give a definition in this judgment about coercive and controlling behaviour, because a lot of the questions put by the QLR were as to mother's understanding as to why some of the allegations she was making against father met the threshold of coercive and controlling behaviour. Since practice direction 12J came into effect in 2017, domestic abuse incorporated coercive and controlling, and the definitions are these: "Coercive behaviour is an act or pattern of acts of assault, threat, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish or frighten the victim. Controlling behaviour means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour." That is the definition.

45. Within my group of five clusters. Dealing firstly with cluster (A), the coercive and controlling behaviour and the definition I have just given, the allegation effectively again father by the mother is of direct pressure, tone around handovers, school, childminder, venue, timing and instructions on contact. Examples that would have been given generically are Local place on Father's Day instead of at home, collection ten minutes earlier, refusal of third-party handovers with C3, the ultimatum about direct handover, and the Easter holiday starting, as agreed, on 26 March. There was evidence given (again I have a column in which I cross-reference all of this, but I will not repeat it in this judgment; it will be put into the judgment when it is transcribed). I have the sworn oral evidence from both parties. The father on 6 January admits he was frustrated and that he used derogatory language but disputes it was repeated. The mother's sworn evidence on 7 January was that at Local place there was a refusal of third party and/or alternatives. In my view, on the balance of probabilities I am clear that the allegation by mother of coercive and controlling behaviour is proved. There has been direct pressure. The tone of the father is both derogatory, as he admits, and it is established, in my judgment on multiple occasions, to satisfy the definitions of both coercive and controlling behaviour. It may not have been to the police in March 2023 that there was a sufficient pattern. After that there has been and may continue to be so, in my judgment.

46. Cluster (B) is emotional conduct . This is again principally allegations against the father by the mother. The first limb of the cluster is intimidation and hostility at school in the community. There is the beeping/blocking incident, the WhatsApp profiling imagery, the particulars of that being mother's reporting of that beeping/blocking incident, albeit she acknowledges it is not violent to the police, complaints about the football and safeguarding, so father might have had his ability to get involved in that reported, though police took no further action. Father denies hostility and characterises the head as aggressive. The evidence again I will not recite in this judgment. It will be contained in my schedule. Sworn evidence of the mother on 7 January was clear. It was believable and it was credible about her being anxious, notwithstanding what she said to the police. The father gave a complete denial about his intentions. It may be right, his intention may have been to do something different both at school and indeed in relation to the horn/blocking, but it is his perception of that on others. He is clear on 6 January, in his incident which he gives a video of (from what I can see, there is no auditory recording), that what he accepted was, while it was C3 with him, he said to the head, "I'm not accepting it," and the head described that as aggressive. I am clear abundantly on the balance of probabilities that the allegation of emotional contact and intimidation is proved. Father may not have intended hostility, but he lacks the insight to understand others' perception about him, in my view.

47. There is a second limb of cluster (b), emotional contact , which is the children's exposure to child confrontation at school, and that was the interaction with the head occurring whilst C3 was present alongside him. The school complaint letters are express. They are clear. I know they are challenged by father, but it is very persuasive evidence. Father's sworn evidence, again I repeat, is that he said to the head in the presence of C3, "I'm not accepting it." It could have been a lot worse, I accept. He did not do anything which was a physical assault, but it is proved, in my judgment, he has no perception of his impact and what he is doing to himself and others, and more particularly to the child that is with him.

48. Cluster (C) is adherence to orders and handovers . There are three elements to this, in my judgment. The first is the post no-contact order attendance at school. Self-evidently (and again this is within the schedule I have created), that is proved. He should never have gone to the school after 2 July 2025. He may have got bad advice, but even if he had bad advice, the thought of doing that, knowing what the consequences were going to be, it seems to me, is either lacking insight or doing it deliberately. Either way, it is not good.

49. The next part of cluster (C) is early collections and variations . I should say this allegation applies to both parents, because of course what father has maintained in his schedule is that mother has on occasions collect early, that we know about, and it must be right that that is true. The trouble with that is what has been the agreement about the arrangement. That is the difficulty here, because of course the perception of mother and perception of father and the attempted exchange over the app when it was resumed, which I appreciate was on and off, is difficult, but I have not only the school's/trust's (if they were involved) emails at 221-243 in relation to that, and the threads of AppClose in 143 and 194-195, and the sworn testimony of mother as to her rationale as to why she did that, but also the father's sworn testimony on 6 January in which he maintains the disruption of contact. The problem with this is, whether it is mother or is father, it is disruptive to the children. If you imagine a 10, 7 and 4 year old, every time there is going to be an arranged meeting, the children are thinking, "What the hell is going to happen now? Is it going to be dads? Is it going to be 10.00? Is it going to be from here?" and you are yards away from each other. I just find it incredible. I find this allegation partly proved. There is some disruption attributable to the mother's actions. But I think her motive in relation to this would have to be addressed at the welfare stage. On my findings, it may well have been justified for mother to have done it.

50. The next part of cluster (C), for handovers and orders , is the police station visits. As I have already said in my interpretation of father, father taking C3 to the police station amid the return time dispute, whether it is 9.00 or 10.00, or citing fear prior to arrest, is just completely unwarranted. Why would you do that? Why would you take a little boy to the police station at that point, in that time, in his frame of mind, doing that? The police log entry is at 589 and 601 of the reference. There are the school emails at 221 and 243 and father's sworn evidence where he tried to give me an explanation about it. He has made complaints against the police's attitude. I am not sure they are justified. I have not seen the complaint, but I have to say, on reflection, I think the policeman's attitude was perfectly right. I think it is partly proved. It is a case in which he should not have done it. He has a lack of insight and judgment on that, in my view. I cannot say it has been a systematic thing as far as that event is concerned.

51. Moving to cluster (D), that is the false reporting . This is an allegation both from mother to father, about the allegations of sexual abuse, drug use, et cetera, inappropriate relationship, and as regards father against mother for her seeking an arrest for coercive and controlling behaviour. The context of that is that there have been police agency reports maliciously or falsely alleged: from father in relation to the mother, her abuse of the children, drug dealing; mother in relation to father, coercive control and criminal damage, et cetera, and to the school. These are serious allegations about mother going to a hotel with unknown men to have sex in front of C3, based upon C3 saying that mother stayed at the hotel. What on earth is that? Where on earth has that come from?

52. The reference to the barbers and the burger shop is about the community. It is hearsay. There has been no further action. F may think it is unsympathetic. The police logs are a point of reference. Father's sworn evidence is that it is his firm and continued belief this has happened, that it is the community, that it is comments that have come to him, it is a reaction from one of the boys. However, I think it is proved that, as far as father is concerned, that these are malicious.

53. I do not think it is proved as far as mother is concerned. My findings in this case, having now heard from father and read and seen what he has put forward, are that mother was perfectly justified in raising the arrest, and allegations of coercive and controlling behaviour because I am finding that he has done that.

54. I do find that proved father being malicious and false in those allegations. There is absolutely no proof, and in fact I am surprised there has not been any action taken by those who are involved in the Turkish community in relation to this. I appreciate there have been allegations made to the police which father has given some statements about and which I have read, but to do so without any evidence is an incredible thing. To do so on the basis that he is communicating that information to the children is a dangerous thing. Father's evidence about him "just protecting the boys", I think the words that he used were, "He's a nonce." Why do that? Are the boys going to be there without him or without mother? I doubt it. I entirely agree in protecting children where there is going to be risk, but the risk must be based on evidence or clarity, not hearsay or community or views about what has happened. I do not know whether it is true. I do not know but I have not heard any evidence to that effect, and neither have the police.

55. The final cluster, (E), Abuse allegations against mother by the father of (a) intentional harm, (b) of sexual risk, and (c) of neglect, effectively. The throwing or slap is largely hearsay. We can have toe brush incident and the references I put in the schedule. We have the sworn evidence of the father. He clearly believes the accounts that have been given to him either by the children or his view of what he has had explained to him by the children with potentially what may have been leading questions. I have mother's sworn evidence denying the accident and explanations, and she has been clear she has never been violent to the children. That allegation of intentional harm is not proved. There is no evidence of intentional harm to the children. If it were proved, I agree with RI would have to consider whether there had been a failure to protect potentially by the father for not acting at that point. I am not sure whether something went on. I am not sure whether it has been exaggerated. I am not sure what was happening at that point. It was difficult and it gave rise to the frustration, as father describes it, kicking a huge hole in the wall. I am not going to make any finding about whether the children were the other side. I know father feels very strongly about that. But there is no evidence of mother doing anything. Indeed, after separation, by all accounts, from all the agencies, including the school, the local authority and the guardian, mother's care is without criticism.

56. Regarding (b), the sexual risk allegations , regarding father's perceived assertions about this, relating to this barber and/or unknown men, there is absolutely no direct evidence. The police notes have obviously clarified that. Father's belief is based upon C3's scared reaction and community hearsay. Mother completely denies it. That is not proved. There is no evidence for that at all, let alone on a balance of probabilities. Is it more likely than not that mother has gone to a hotel with strangers and had sex?

57. The final part of cluster (E) is (c) the neglect from mother , and this is ongoing engagement with paediatric service and/or not treating for the injured toe, possibly, or other things. The paediatric continence is within the records at 169; CAFCASS reports, 258-261; the guardian, 624. Mother's sworn evidence is clear that she has not neglected and would not do so. Father has no evidence to the contrary, whether that is medical or otherwise. He has a view and he has a perception, but it is not proved, I am afraid, in this case. There is no evidence of mother's neglecting of these children, quite the reverse.

58. I printed out the typed schedule to give an opportunity for everyone to read the context, the references I have made in more detail, but in summary I am clear, on the consequences of those findings on the balance of probabilities, that I should be listing this matter for a further direction after a period of reflection. After lunch I would want some reflection. Beyond that, what I intend to say is this: the former CG, I think quite rightly, had asked the court to not only deal with the history I have now found, but also to determine the four matters which I raised at the beginning of this judgment. Indeed, mother’s counsel summarises some of those in her written submissions, about the consequences of the findings I have just made.

59. The first is, has there been harm to the children, and the extent of the harm and risk of further harm. Just let me be clear here. I am not saying and I would never say that this father would do anything physically or intentionally to harm his children. He would do emotionally and he is doing emotionally, but he does not understand it. They have been harmed emotionally by the father, in my judgment. They are at risk of being harmed emotionally by the father, not only to the children directly but to the mother who is the carer of the children. That I cannot ignore. It has been for a significant period, sadly, from March 2024, when things I thought would be resolved, until of course we then had the May 2025 breakdown. I am critical of the mother not bringing it back to court, but of course father did anyway. There are the problems with the childminder and the school and the impact of that on the children. That is down to father, in my judgment. There is an extensive potential risk that unless father changes or can change his perception, that will be a problem.

60. As to the motivation of the proceedings for the children and/or whether this is a form of domestic abuse, I do not criticise father for bringing these proceedings. He had to. Mother really should have brought it, and I appreciate that may be a debate for another day, but it is not a hostile or unmotivated application, so I am not critical of this process.

61. I do need the guardian to see this judgment, consider my findings and give a welfare analysis about what is the best way going forward. I am not at this point going to make any order under section 91(14), that is for another day, but the orders I intend to make, subject to further submissions about the interim position, will be as follows. First is that the court makes the findings as I have included in a schedule which I will supply in typed form for the parties to consider over lunch. Secondly, having made those findings, the parties, the parents, the boys, the guardian, have a proper determined factual matrix upon which they are going to be able, in my judgment, to determine the welfare of this family.

62. I am going to relist this case, subject to discussion, for a further directions hearing. At that directions hearing, which will be attended by the parties, their representatives, if any, and the new guardian, I would want the parties to reflect on this judgment. I would want to give directions and management towards a welfare decision, including what further evidence, including potentially expert evidence in this case, may be needed. I will direct (and I am going to ask either mother’s or the children’s counsel or both of them to draft this order) that a copy of this judgment will be provided to the parties at public expense, in which I will include both the legal principles and my schedule of findings which I am going to give to the parties today. The reason I am doing it as a typed schedule is to give not only the parties but also the children’s guardian a full understanding of the justification of where I have come to. I am going to reserve any further applications to me. That is not just this decision today and the adjourned directions hearing, but if things are going wrong, it can come back to me before then. Parties (and I include father in this) can make that application on a C2 if, for example, things have gone wrong and there is no justification.

63. I anticipate that if father's conduct is consistent, he will not only disagree with this judgment but will seek to challenge and complain about it. That, of course, is his right. I would urge him to channel his efforts into reflecting on his own behaviour and, more importantly, the perception of his behaviour on others and the impact on them. I cannot change the history. I must adjudicate upon that from the information that is given to me evidentially. It will be for the guardian to assess and assist the court in the way forward and the welfare of the boys, but I am clear that if father does not reflect and change his conduct and the risk emotionally both to mother and to the children, then not only will this family time potentially remain as limited as it is, but it may, in my view, have to be controlled further. If he can reflect and change consistently then I think it is in the interests that he should, and should continue to have a good, wholesome relationship with his children, but that is, I am afraid, very much down to him.

64. That is my judgment.

F v M & Ors (Finding of Fact) [2026] EWFC B 48 — UK case law · My AI Health