Malathi Latha Sriram (Mukti Roy) v Louise Mary Brittain

1. This judgment deals with two applications. The first is an application by the bankrupt for disclosure to her of documents and information by her trustee in bankruptcy and for an injunction. The second is an application by Pantera Property Limited to strike out the bankrupt’s claim against it and/or for reverse summary judgment. Whilst the applications are separate, they raise overlapping matters.

2. The bankrupt is known by two names. At the start of the hearing she said she would prefer to be called Malathi. She was addressed as Malathi in the course of the hearing, and I will continue to call her by that name in this judgment.

3. Before going further I should also say something about Malathi’s capacity. In the course of an earlier but ultimately unsuccessful application to annul the bankruptcy order made against her Malathi lost capacity to conduct it, and the Official Solicitor was appointed as her litigation friend, which in turn resulted in the engagement of a solicitor, Alexander Akin, to assist her. On her behalf he made a witness statement of 10 November 2022, to parts of which I have been referred.

4. At the beginning of the hearing I asked Malathi whether she felt able to deal with the applications I was hearing, and she confirmed that she was. She gave every indication of being able to do so, although some adjustments were made to accommodate her. Notably I allowed her to rely on a document described as an “Oral submission script” in place of an opening. Mr Comiskey raised no objection. As a result Mr Comiskey made his submissions first but on the basis that Malathi would be given the opportunity to say anything she felt she needed to say without regard to any order of speeches or similar formality. She would thus have the advantage of hearing the trustee’s submissions on her applications before having to deal with them. That appeared to work well. I did not detect that Malathi was experiencing any difficulty in following the proceedings – indeed on two occasions she was able to correct minor errors in dates mentioned by Mr Comiskey. I am reinforced in my view that she was able to cope with the proceedings by the materials she relied on for the hearing, including well prepared skeleton arguments and other documents. We also took a 15 minute break between dealing with the two applications. That was in part to enable those instructed by the trustee to take her instructions on giving an undertaking, but it was also to give Malathi (and for that matter me) some respite from a hearing that covered quite a lot of ground in a limited time. On a few occasions I did my best to explain to Malathi something she did not understand. I hope I was successful in doing so.

5. I reserved judgment at the end of the hearing for several reasons: first, both applications, although essentially straightforward, involve consideration of a number of matters of detail which I felt would benefit from review; secondly, because by the end of the hearing we were approaching 5.00 pm; and thirdly, because I am concerned that Malathi should understand my reasons for deciding as I have, and I believe it will be easier for her to digest a judgment in writing rather than an oral one. For the same reason I have tried to keep this judgment short and explain the reasons for my conclusions as simply as possible.

6. I should begin with a little background. Malathi was made bankrupt on 4 September 2017 on a petition of HMRC, following which Louise Brittain was appointed as her trustee in bankruptcy. Malathi remains undischarged as a result of her failure to cooperate with her trustee.

7. Ms Brittain is also the trustee in bankruptcy of Malathi’s husband, Ravikanth Gupta (aka Ravikanth Borra). He was made bankrupt on 2 October 2019, also on the petition of HMRC.

8. The trustee has applied for orders for possession and sale of six properties which are or had, until shortly before the bankruptcy order, been registered in Mr Gupta’s name. Two of those properties are currently registered in Malathi’s name, but the transfers to her are apparently void on the basis that they were made for no consideration and after the presentation of the bankruptcy petition against Mr Gupta (see s 284 Insolvency Act 1986 . Mr Gupta, it is said, has given evidence that he does not have any beneficial interest in any of the six properties and that they are owned by either Malathi’s father, Mohan Gupta Sriram, or by a family friend, Mamatha Gowda. A further two properties registered in Malathi’s name are the subject of applications for possession and sale brought by the trustee in her capacity as Malathi’s trustee. In Mr Akin’s witness statement, which was filed in connection with Malathi’s annulment application, Malathi denied, through him, having any beneficial interest in the two properties which are the subject of these applications.

9. I am not directly concerned with the properties. The trustee’s applications relating to them are not before me. The background to their apparently disputed ownership is, however, relevant, since much of the disclosure, as well as the injunction, Malathi seeks relates to them.

10. The administration of Malathi’s bankruptcy has been far from straightforward. It has spawned a number of applications, including an application by a member of Malathi’s family, Shoban Sriram, claiming the proceeds of sale of one property disposed of by the trustee, an application or applications to stay the bankruptcy, the annulment application I have already mentioned, which took four days to hear, and now the applications with which I am concerned. The result, the trustee says, is to have increased the costs of what should have been a routine bankruptcy. One of Malathi’s concerns is precisely those costs, which she says are excessive and have resulted in an erosion of what should have been available to satisfy the claims of creditors and the administration costs and the return of a surplus to her. Mr Comiskey says that the costs incurred in the bankruptcy now mean that a distribution in full to creditors is impossible.

11. I think those brief observations are sufficient to set the scene for the two applications I heard. Further detail of the bankruptcy, if needed, can be gleaned from the comprehensive judgment of ICC Judge Mullen of 19 April 2024 disposing of Malathi’s annulment application.

12. In his skeleton argument Mr Comiskey raises the issue of Malathi’s standing to make the applications she has made. He did not develop those in the course of his submissions but concentrated instead on the merits. I think that was the right approach, and I shall approach the applications in the same way. I think Malathi would be aggrieved if I dismissed her applications on the basis of her standing without considering their merits, so I will deal with those and leave the issue of standing to one side. Mr Comiskey also raises the question of the jurisdictional basis on which Malathi claims to be entitled to the relief she seek. Again I will leave that to one side for the moment, although I shall say something about the law at the end of this judgment.

13. By application of 3 March 2025 Malathi seeks disclosure from the trustee of documents and information. The documents she seeks are described in her witness statements in support of her application. In her third witness statement she sets out seven categories of documents. I shall deal with them one by one, although there is some overlap in the considerations relevant to each.

14. Category 1 is property sale and conveyancing records in relation to the sales of three properties, 11 Westfields Avenue, 2 Nicholson Street and Flat 4 Gloucester Crescent. 2 Nicholson Street and Flat 4 have not yet been sold. It follows that no sale or conveyancing records will have come into existence. 11 Westfields Avenue has already been sold by the trustee. By claim form dated 9 July 2025 Malathi seeks damages for negligence and other relief against Pantera Property Limited. Pantera was the estate agency which marketed the property and introduced the buyer. At the root of Malathi’s claim is a complaint that the trustee sold for £950,000 when the property was worth some £1.4 million. I have seen no valuation or other evidence to support a value of £1.4 million beyond Malathi’s assertion of that value. Plainly I can take (and should form) no view of the merits or otherwise of her claim as to the value of the property. What I can say is that it is hard to understand how what is essentially a matter of valuation will be assisted by the provision of the documents Malathi seeks. There are other aspects of her claim, to which I shall come later, but it is hard to see the relevance of the documents to those either. I can see no reason other than in connection with her claim why she should be entitled to the information she wants. In my view she has not made out any ground for requiring the trustee to go to the trouble and incur the expense of providing what she asks for. For those reasons I decline to order disclosure of this category of documents.

15. Category 2 is trust instruments and ownership analysis. In so far as 11 Westfields Avenue is concerned, there is no legitimate reason for Malathi to seek such documents. It vested in the trustee. Malathi’s brother, Shoban Sriram, applied in 2021 for an order directing the trustee to pay the net proceed of 11 Westfields Avenue to him on the basis that he was the beneficial owner. That application was struck out. As far as I am aware, no other person has made any claim to an interest in 11 Westfields Avenue or the proceeds of its sale, nor does Malathi suggest there is any such person. If there were, it would be for that person to assert his or her rights; it would not be a matter for Malathi. The trustee has applied for orders for possession and sale of the other properties. That is the proper forum for determining any issues as to who might have an interest in the properties. Furthermore, in his witness statement of 10 November 2022, Mr Akin, gave evidence on behalf of Malathi that she had no assets at the date of her bankruptcy (paragraph 48) and did not own any properties (paragraph 51). It follows that Malathi has no reason or ground to seek the documents she asks the trustee to provide. I therefore decline to order disclosure of this category of documents.

16. The third category is estate financial records and professional fees. There are two reasons why I do not think I should accede to Malathi’s request for these. The first is that they go to the level of the trustee’s fees and expenses, and no application has been made to challenge those. Secondly, Mr Comiskey submits that the effect of rr 10.87 and 18.35 Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (headed respectively “Vacation of office on completion of bankruptcy” and “Remuneration and expenses: application to court by a bankrupt on grounds that remuneration or expenses are excessive”) is that the bankrupt may only challenge these when the administration of the bankruptcy has been concluded. I agree. Even if that is wrong, that would plainly be the appropriate stage for Malathi to apply in this case, given that the administration of the bankruptcy continues, and given, on the figures I have seen (which I accept may be susceptible of challenge, although I make clear that I am not expressing a view as to whether they are or not), there is unlikely to be a surplus, which may well mean that Malathi would have no standing to apply. Thirdly, I have been taken to a wide range of information the trustee has already provided. It includes a receipts and payments account covering the period up to 24 October 2024 and SIP remuneration reports covering the period to 24 April 2024. That seems to me to be adequate. Fourthly, the nature of some of the disclosure Malathi seeks is hard to understand and/or the information she seeks is disproportionate and oppressive. For example, I do not understand what she means by “a full estate ledger,” and “cashbook entries” seem to me to be unnecessary, going way beyond what Malathi may have a legitimate interest in seeing at this stage. Again, then, I decline to order the disclosure she seeks.

17. Category 4 is correspondence with HMRC and government agencies. Malathi’s request for disclosure of those documents appears to rest on (a) her continued claim that her bankruptcy “is founded on a disputed debt” and (b) a payment made by the trustee in respect of capital gains tax, which Malathi claims was in excess of what it should have been. As to (a), it seems to me that the court has already adjudicated on the issue: not only at the petition stage (when it must have been satisfied that the debt then claimed in the petition was due in whole or in part sufficient to justify making the order) but also when ICC Judge Mullen heard Malathi’s annulment application (which was made on the ground that the order ought not to have been made). As to (b), the trustee applied to court for permission to pay the capital gains tax, and an order enabling that to be done was made by ICC Judge Greenwood on 20 October 2023. The trustee, through Mr Comiskey, has indicated that she would be content to provide Malathi with the documents put before the court to save Malathi the trouble of applying to inspect the court file. I also understand that she is prepared to provide a calculation of how the sum paid for capital gains tax arose, although I am told by Mr Comiskey that it will be in the documents to which I have just referred. I am grateful to the trustee for agreeing to do so. HMRC has not yet proved in the bankruptcy. If it does, I would ask the trustee to notify Malathi of that so that she may (subject to any issue as to her standing) challenge any decision as to the amount for which HMRC’s claim is admitted, if she thinks it appropriate to do so. In my judgment the provision of the information the trustee has agreed to provide is sufficient. Further disclosure in the form of correspondence and the like would, in my view, be disproportionate at this stage.

18. Category 5 invites the disclosure of documents relating to identity and General Data Protection Regulation misuse. Malathi elaborates on this by referring to use of her passport and name in connection with “property sales,” but, I presume, that can only relate to one sale, namely that of 11 Westfields Avenue. She also invokes what she claims to be her “rights as a data subject” and ensuring “my identity has not been used improperly or without legal basis.” The trustee claims, through Mr Comiskey, to have complied with Malathi’s data requests. Malathi has already, it seems, made a complaint to the Information Commissioner’s Office, which has confirmed that the trustee has responded appropriately. Thomas Snook, a director of Pantera, which valued and marketed 11 Westfields Avenue, confirms in a witness statement of 7 August 2025 that the only data Pantera has is Malathi’s names, her email address (which she used in correspondence with them) and the addresses of the properties “considered to be connected to [her] on her bankruptcy”. He points out that that “very basic, public information” would have been needed to deal with instructions relating to any property. He goes on to describe the various requests Malathi has made to Pantera and how they have been answered or dealt with. In my view, Malathi has provided no evidence that suggests misuse by anyone of any personal data of hers. Apart from that, issues of data use or misuse are, in my view, primarily matters for the Information Commissioner. This is not the forum in which to raise them. The basis on which disclosure is sought is unsubstantiated and too vague, and disproportionate to any perceived need. I decline to order it.

19. Category 6 seeks disclosure of documents going to what are described as safeguarding and equality considerations relating to what Malathi describes as her eviction from 11 Westfields Avenue. In fact there is ample evidence that Malathi was not evicted but that 11 Westfields Avenue was empty when agents (Humphrey & Gray, not Pantera) took possession: the trustee relies on Humphrey & Gray’s possession report and photographs which bear out that the property was vacant when they took possession. Mr Akin, Malathi’s solicitor, also bears that out by indicating that Malathi had moved out because of a leak in the roof (paragraph 55 of his witness statement). Malathi says that she intended to move back in, and that arrangements had been made for children’s schools based on her living at 11 Westfields Avenue. That may or may not be the case, but I cannot see that documents will assist in taking any action that may flow from that. In those circumstances I find it hard to see how safeguarding or equality issues can have arisen. I therefore decline to order disclosure.

20. By category 7 Malathi seeks disclosure by way of schedule of all her own prior requests (whether made by email, by post or verbally) and the trustee’s responses or refusals. Malathi herself must have this information. The request is absurd. It is also mischievous and can only have been made to vex the trustee. Again, I decline to order disclosure.

21. The bundles produced for the hearing include correspondence running to some 400 pages. It includes Malathi’s requests for information from the trustee and the trustee’s responses. A helpful summary of what is described as “Documentation and disclosure requests made by Malathi Sriram aka Mukti Roy from 3 October 2024 to 18 September 2025” is appended to Mr Comiskey’s skeleton argument. It gives details of the requests and responses. It runs to five pages. That, in my view, demonstrates that the trustee has dealt with Malathi’s requests reasonably and proportionately. I have used the word “disproportionately” several times above. By that I mean that Malathi’s requests have been unreasonable, onerous and/or oppressive, having regard to their likely usefulness to Malathi. The inference I draw is that they (or at least the majority of them) have been made to vex the trustee. They can only have added to the trustee’s costs, which is to the detriment of the bankruptcy creditors. The fact there may only be two creditors does not detract from that. That is another factor I have had in mind in reaching my decisions on the categories of documents in issue between the parties.

22. I turn next to the application for an injunction. The relief Malathi seeks, as set out in her draft order, is an injunction to restrain the trustee from proceeding with the sale or disposal of any further assets in the bankruptcy estate, including a number of properties and the proceeds of sale of 11 Westfields Avenue. As we have seen, the properties mentioned (I leave 11 Westfield Avenue to one side) are the subject of one or more applications for possession and sale. It is inconceivable that a trustee in bankruptcy would dispose of properties that were the subject of such an application without an order of the court. A trustee in bankruptcy is an officer of the court. It would be improper for an officer of the court to pre-empt the outcome of an application that was before the court and usurp its role. In any event, Malathi can have no interest in the properties to which the trustee’s applications relate: I point again to Mr Akin’s evidence that Malathi has no assets or properties. If that is the case, there is no basis on which she can seek an injunction.

23. Be that as it may, at my instigation, whilst it is my view that there is no basis on which an injunction can be granted, the trustee has indicated (without prejudice to her contention that there is no basis for doing so) that she would be prepared to give an undertaking (in a form on which she will seek advice) not to dispose of two properties that are the subject of her application(s) in order to give Malathi a measure of comfort. I am grateful to her for her assistance in agreeing to do so. A form of undertaking reached me while I was writing my draft judgment. Malathi suggested alternative wording that would, I accept, provide wider protection. I misread an email of 15 October 2025 from Mr Gilchrist, the trustee’s solicitor, as agreeing to offer the undertaking in the form Malathi proposed, and recorded that in error in an initial draft of this judgment sent to the parties. My attention was swiftly drawn to my misreading (I was actually in the process of finishing my judgment when the email came in came in) so revert to what I had originally said, which was that the undertaking offered by the trustee seems to me to be adequate, having regard to the fact that Malathi is not entitled to an undertaking at all. It can be incorporated in the order I make when judgment is handed down, with liberty to the parties to apply to vary or discharge it. I am grateful to the trustee and those advising her for her accommodation.

24. In those circumstances, I shall dismiss this limb of Malathi’s application as well as her application for disclosure.

25. I turn next to Pantera’s application.

26. When it came on for hearing after the short break we took, Malathi asked me to adjourn the application to be heard on another date, saying that she had not been able to prepare sufficiently to deal with it. Mr Comiskey asked me to press on, indicating that he could deal with it briefly, and I heard his submissions, which were indeed brief, on the basis that I would decide whether or not to adjourn when I gave judgment.

27. I do not think that I should adjourn and I decline to fix a further date for the reasons that follow.

28. The amended claim form in the proceedings to which the application relates seeks damages from Pantera as defendant for negligence, trespass, breach of statutory duty, unjust enrichment arising from what is said to be the unauthorised repossession of 11 Westfields Avenue and on the basis of various alleged data breaches.

29. Mr Snook, in his witness statement of 7 August 2025, describes Pantera as an independent consultancy and surveying practice which frequently acts for insolvency office-holders by assisting them with property sales. In this case it acted on Ms Brittain’s instructions. Pantera valued 11 Westfields Avenue at £1 million, ultimately receiving an offer to purchase at £950,000. But the decision to sell at that price could not have been that of Pantera, any more than would be the case in any conventional property sale, where the decision to sell is that of the owner, not the agent. The ultimate decision when to sell 11 Westfields Avenue and at what price can only have been made by Pantera’s principal, the trustee. It follows that, if there was negligence as to the sale price (and I cannot say whether or not there was), it was that of the trustee.

30. Nor did Pantera take possession of the property. That task was sub-contracted to a firm called Humphrey & Gray. Malathi says that she left suitcases containing clothing and toys and so on at the property which have not been returned to her. Humphrey & Gray’s possession report records the only object left at the property as being a paint pot.

31. I am in no position to make factual findings. What I can say is that any claim in respect of any loss does not appear to be against Pantera.

32. Mr Comiskey draws attention to a conundrum at the heart of Malathi’s claim. In paragraph 1 of her particulars of claim she states that at all material times she was the freehold owner of 11 Westfields Avenue. Mr Comiskey points out that, if that were so, as the trustee obviously believed to be the case, the property was a bankruptcy asset that had vested in Ms Britain as trustee. If the property was owned beneficially by someone else, there is no basis on which she can claim to be entitled to sue. As Mr Comiskey says in his skeleton argument, Malathi tries (in paragraph 14A of her particulars of claim) to rely on putative claims by family members to beneficial ownership of 11 Westfields Avenue; but the pleading of potential beneficial ownership is embarrassing (in the technical sense of being impossible coherently to plead to) because it is for Malathi as claimant to identify positively the capacity in which she makes her claim and the way in which that capacity arises. Paragraph 14A does neither of those things.

33. Malathi refers (again in paragraph 1 of her particulars of claim) to 11 Westfields Avenue’s having been registered under the name Mukti Roy, “a different legal entity” to her. That does not assist: Malathi and Mukti Roy are simply different names for the same person.

34. Mr Comiskey also relies on a procedural point, namely Malathi’s failure to file and serve evidence in accordance with CPR 24.5. The need to do so is referred to in Pantera’s application, and Pantera’s solicitors wrote to Malathi drawing this to her attention. In spite of that, Malathi has not filed or served evidence. Malathi told me that she had prepared evidence but had been unable to access the court file. I have some sympathy with that; but that would not explain any failure to serve it. When I asked her whether she had actually drafted a witness statement she said she had, and she showed me it on her computer screen. It was a lengthy document and was dated 19 August 2025, which she said had been prepared for the strike out application. Mr Comiskey says that in fact it was filed and served, not in response to the strike out application but in response to an application made by Malathi on 19 August 2025. That application was not before me. I did not, therefore read the witness statement.

35. I accept Mr Comiskey’s submissions. The foregoing matters are, in my judgment, sufficient to demonstrate that Malathi’s claim, as at present formulated, is unsustainable. I shall strike it out and/or give summary judgment in favour of Pantera. In doing so, as opposed to granting an adjournment, again I have regard, in the exercise of my discretion, to the likely costs of devoting more time to this matter. There is no justification for taking up more court time, and to allow further costs to be incurred in the bankruptcy would, in my view, be a disservice to the trustee, the creditors and, possibly, to Malathi herself.

36. There are various other matters I think I need to deal with.

37. Conspicuously absent from this judgment is any reference to case law. There are two reasons for that. The first is that I have felt able to deal with the issues without reference to authority because in my view they can be disposed of on the basis of the evidence and submissions. The second is this. Although in her skeleton arguments Malathi cites a great deal of case law, most of it is of little or no assistance. Mr Comiskey has prepared what he calls a “Note on Authorities”. He complains that Malathi has previously cited fake authorities and has sought to rely on authorities which provide no support for the propositions that purport to arise from them, and he says she has done it again here.

38. I begin by saying that Mr Comiskey’s criticism does not extend to or seem to apply to every case Malathi has mentioned. It is, however, true for most. Re Muir Hunter’s Trustee in Bankruptcy [2005] BPIR 329 does not exist: nor does the citation. The case name is clearly invented. Mr Comiskey draws the court’s attention to R (Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin) and in particular two passages from the judgement: paragraph 26, in which it was held that placing false information (including fake authorities) before the court with the intention that the court treat it as genuine was a contempt if done knowingly, although not if done negligently; and the discussion in paragraph 88 of another case, Bandla v SRA [2025] 4 WLR 63 in which an appeal was struck out as an abuse of process for the citation and use of fake authorities.

39. As to the many other cases relied on by Malathi which were not to point or were irrelevant, Mr Comiskey has provided a helpful schedule identifying those cases and summarising briefly what they are about. Having considered the cases in the authorities bundle myself (but without reading every case from start to finish) I accept and adopt his analysis.

40. Mr Comiskey does not invite the court to investigate whether Malathi has deliberately provided false authorities, rightly in my view, and I make no criticism of her. For what it is worth, I suspect, that, in common with many unrepresented parties, Malathi has resorted to research using the internet and has come up with false leads. The late Muir Hunter was an eminent member of the insolvency bar and the author for many years of an insolvency commentary that still bears his name. It is easy to see how his name could have come up in the course of an internet search and end up wrongly linked to a real case name and reference. The abbreviation BPIR stands for the Bankruptcy and Personal Insolvency Reports . They are not readily available to members of the public. It would have been difficult for Malathi to check the citation.

41. Mr Comiskey also notes (as did I when reading before the hearing) inapposite references to legislative provisions, in particular to rules in the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016. I attribute those to misreading or misunderstanding on Malathi’s part. It is unnecessary to say more.

42. Mr Comiskey seeks a finding that Malathi’s application was totally without merit. I will hear submissions as to that when this judgment is handed down. Suffice it to say, for Malathi’s benefit, that this may signal an intention to apply, not when judgment is handed down, but at some future stage, for a civil restraint order, the effect of which, if made, would be to prevent her from making any future application in the bankruptcy without first obtaining permission to do so from a judge.

43. I end by thanking Mr Comiskey for his assistance, in particular in the form of a helpful skeleton argument and the other material he provided, and by thanking Malathi for her patience and the courtesy with which she conducted herself throughout the hearing.