Nexedge Markets Limited v Trex Global Limited

Introduction

1. This is an application for summary judgment brought by the claimant on a claim for repayment of two loans totalling US$1.5 million which were advanced on 11 and 16 December 2024. The claimant is an introducing broker operating in the contracts for difference market, authorised and regulated by the FCA in the UK. The defendant, Trex, is, or was, a broker also operating in the contracts for difference market. It is, or was, licensed by the Financial Services Commission of Mauritius.

2. The claim was issued on 4 July 2025. On 17 July 2025, the proceedings were served on Trex in Mauritius. On 1 August 2025, Trex, then acting by the firm Duan & Duan UK LLP, filed an acknowledgement of service confirming that it intended to defend the claim but not ticking the box that it intended to contest jurisdiction.

3. On 19 August 2025, the Defence was served, the Reply following on 9 September 2025. On 26 September 2025, Nexedge, the claimant, served this summary judgment application on Trex, together with an application for permission to rely on an expert in Mauritian law.

4. After this, Duan & Duan were replaced as solicitors on the record by Brown Rudnick LLP, and the parties agreed an extension of time for Brown Rudnick to prepare Trex's evidence in response to the application. This evidence, the second witness statement of Jessica Lee, was served on 31 October 2025.

5. As indicated for the first time in that evidence, Trex held a creditors' meeting on 5 December 2025, at which a majority of its shareholders voted for it to be placed into liquidation and for the appointment of a liquidator. On 9 December 2025, Brown Rudnick wrote to the court saying that it was no longer instructed in this matter as a result of the liquidation and would not be attending the hearing of the summary judgment application that has been listed before me today.

6. Since 9 December 2025, Nexedge has been in direct contact with the liquidator, a Mr Arvind Gokhool. Mr Gokhool had been named as long ago as 18 November 2025 in a letter from Brown Rudnick as the likely candidate to be the provisional liquidator of Trex. I was shown Mr Gokhool's LinkedIn profile in the course of submissions, and he is clearly a very experienced insolvency professional, having spent at least nine years at Grant Thornton.

7. I was shown various pieces of correspondence. On 9 December 2025 Mr Gokhool was provided by email with the draft bundle. On 10 December Mr Gokhool proposed that there be service by email and indicated he would accept service in this manner.

8. In his email of 15 December 2025, the liquidator pointed to various provisions of Mauritian law, to the effect that a person shall not commence or continue legal proceedings against a company in liquidation without the agreement of the liquidator or a court order. In other words, similar provisions as apply in this jurisdiction.

9. He stated that he did not consent to the continuation of the proceedings and any judgment obtained in these proceedings would be a breach of the Mauritian Insolvency Act. He pointed out that a creditor should file its proof of debt with the liquidator in accordance with that Act and that distributions of proceeds of realisation of the company's assets would be distributed in accordance with that legislation. There was no indication as to whether he intended to attend today's hearing, other than the points that I have just recited.

10. On 15 December the claimant's solicitors asked Mr Gokhool if he would attend and warned him to make contact with the court for the necessary arrangements if he intended to do so. On 17 December they sent him a copy of the second witness statement of Mr Nayer which was served by the claimants and, on 18 December, sent him the statement of costs relied on by them in this application.

11. The response was received on the same day, to the effect that "I acknowledge receipt of your email. Please note, however, that Trex Global Limited in liquidation proceedings will be done in accordance with the Mauritius Insolvency Act."

12. Most recently, on 18 December 2025, the solicitors for the claimant asked Mr Gokhool if he would attend, and shortly before this hearing commenced, he emailed to say “I will not be able to attend."

13. The first question for me, therefore, is whether I should proceed in the absence of any representative of the defendant, and in particular in the absence of Mr Gokhool, the liquidator. There are three points arising from the correspondence which I consider to be relevant.

14. First, as appears from the communications I have just cited, Mr Gokhool is not attending through choice and not because he is not aware of the hearing or for any other given reason. He has been sent all of the various materials. The claimant, through its counsel, accepts that in the absence of the defendant, it has a duty of fair presentation and the hearing has been conducted on that basis.

15. Second, as I have said, Mr Gokhool was in mind as a liquidator at least as long ago as 18 November, and most significantly, he is not asking for more time in order to be able to attend the hearing. The only substantive point he has made is as to his substantive objection to these proceedings as a matter of Mauritian insolvency law. That is the third point which arises, and that last point requires greater consideration.

16. Mr Day, for the claimant, submits, and I accept, that that is obviously a question for the English court or English law as the lex fori. He also points out, and I agree, that there is nothing to suggest this court is not properly seised of this matter. There is no question that the proceedings have been properly served in Mauritius. I was taken to the relevant jurisdiction clause in the loan agreement and the certificate of service and in any event, as I have said, there is no challenge to the jurisdiction in the acknowledgement of service or by way of Part 11 application. That is the starting point.

17. Mr Day pointed out, as part of his duty of fair presentation, that the existence of foreign insolvency proceedings could have an effect on the English court in certain circumstances, and those were presented to me one by one.

18. The first possibility would be that the liquidator could apply for recognition of the Mauritian insolvency proceedings under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, which bring a modified form of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency into domestic law. I was told that this would be available to a Mauritian in relation to a Mauritian insolvency practice; and if that course were taken, an automatic stay of the present proceedings would come into effect. The claimant would then be entitled to apply for a stay to be lifted.

19. However, in this case, the liquidator has not taken that course, despite the fact that he clearly has considerable experience. Nor, importantly, has he indicated that this is something which he intends to do, or would do if he had more time. I therefore do not consider this to be a reason not to proceed today.

20. Secondly, there would be the possibility of section 426 of the Insolvency Act, which provides that the English court may assist foreign insolvencies upon a request by the foreign court, but that option is not available because Mauritius is not one of the countries identified in the schedule to the relevant order. So that does not apply, either.

21. Thirdly, my attention was drawn to the principle of "modified universalism", by which the English court can opt to assist foreign insolvency proceedings in appropriate circumstances. I am told that there was an expansive approach to modified universalism promoted by Lord Hoffmann particularly in the case of Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26 , albeit that this high point of assistance has been unwound to a considerable degree by more recent decisions in Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 and Singularis Holdings vs PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36 . I was taken to paragraph [54] of the Singularis case, the decision of Lord Collins where he pointed out:

53. The common thread in those cases in which assistance has been given is the application or extension of the existing common law or statutory powers of the court.

54. Most of the cases fall into one of two categories. The first group consists of cases where the common law or procedural powers of the court have been used to stay proceedings or the enforcement of judgments.

22. Lord Collins then goes on to cite a number of cases which fall into that category (the second category is not relevant).

23. Mr Day submitted that the majority of the cases cited in paragraph 54 are cases of enforcement of debts arising in the context of foreign insolvency proceedings, rather than the situation which faces me today, which is a question of establishing liability, ie at an earlier stage. The one exception to that is a case called Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112 , which is where an English freezing injunction against a Texas corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings was discharged.

24. In any event, the present situation is that the claimant is seeking a money judgment at a liability stage in respect of an English law-governed debt and in circumstances where the claimant, Nexedge, has not submitted to the foreign insolvency proceedings in Mauritius.

25. In those circumstances, it was submitted, and I agree, that Nexedge benefits from what is known as the " Gibbs rule", that foreign insolvency proceedings cannot affect an English law-governed debt unless the creditor has submitted to those proceedings. That rule was summarised in the textbook by Professor Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 5th Ed at paragraph 16.62 in these terms: Since common law judicial assistance can only be properly given where 'consistent with the substantive law and public policy of the assisting court', it would therefore not be appropriate for an English court to stay enforcement action by a creditor who is protected by the Gibbs rule.

26. That obviously applies in the present case.

27. Mr Gokhool clearly has notice of the hearing and has indicated that he does not intend to attend. I note in passing that his email of this morning says he is "not able to attend", but no practical reason is given as to some impediment to his attending the hearing, and he has had plenty of notice of the listing of today's hearing, so I interpret that statement as consistent with his earlier indications that under Mauritian law, the proceedings should be automatically stayed.

28. No adjournment or stay has been sought by him. Mr Day has very properly showed me the various ways in which the English court might accommodate the needs of a foreign insolvency proceedings, but I accept his submission that they either do not arise at all, such as in the case of the Cross Border Insolvency Regulations, or section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 , or there is nothing to prevent me from proceeding to hear the present application. The claim and the defence

29. The claim arises out of a series of arrangements involving Nexedge, Mr Tarik Sami, who is the sole shareholder and director of Nexedge, and also a director of Trex at the time the alleged loan agreements were concluded.

30. The arrangements also involve a Mr Chun Pui (or Duncan) Ting, and various companies associated with him, including Apollo XI Limited (“Apollo”) and DNA Capital LLP ("DNA"). Apollo is a 49% shareholder of Trex. The 59% shareholder is a Mr Shun Wai Yeung.

31. The events in question also involve a Mr Spina, whose role is somewhat in dispute. Trex claimed he was the designated chief executive officer of Trex at the time the loan agreements were allegedly concluded, while Nexedge claims he was merely an authorised representative and not a director.

32. On 15 August 2024, Mr Sami, Apollo and DNA agreed heads of terms for a "proposed structure of various business arrangements in CFD markets in various jurisdictions, including Nexedge in the UK and Trex in Mauritius". The heads of terms contemplated Apollo providing loans to Nexedge and Trex to fund their business. In particular, clause 3.1 provided that: Apollo will advance loans initially to Nexedge and later may make loans to Trex, BVI Co, OpCo and other entities as agreed upon by the directors of Apollo for working capital purposes and/or to enable each of these entities to extend the scope of their operations. The principal amounts of the loans and terms are to be determined. It is anticipated that the loan to Nexedge will be US$10 million.

33. I was shown the pleadings in some detail, from which it appears that this much is common ground: a. Firstly, consistently with the heads of terms, on 21 August 2024, Nexedge and Apollo entered into a loan agreement by which Apollo advanced US$10 million to Nexedge. Nexedge and Apollo subsequently agreed to ring-fence US$2 million of those funds to lend on to Trex. b. On 11 December 2024, Nexedge as lender and Trex as borrower entered into a written loan agreement (“the first loan agreement”). That was recorded in a letter of 11 December 2024 and signed by Mr Sami on behalf of Nexedge and Mr Liao on behalf of Trex. The body of that letter is set out at Appendix 1 to the Particulars of Claim, and I was shown it in the course of the hearing. c. By the first loan agreement, Nexedge agreed to lend Trex $1 million (“the first loan”) repayable on 10 January 2025, or immediately on earlier written demand by Nexedge to Trex. Nexedge also agreed to pay on demand all costs and expenses that Nexedge incurred in connection with the enforcement of the first loan (“the indemnity”). d. The first loan agreement is expressed to be governed by English law and subject to the jurisdiction of the English court. e. On 11 December 2024, pursuant to the first loan agreement, Nexedge advanced the first loan, utilising the Trex ring-fenced funds, to Trex.

34. As to the second loan agreement, Nexedge alleges as follows: firstly, that this was concluded orally on 16 December 2024 by Nexedge as lender, acting by Mr Sami and Mr Spina on the one hand, and Trex as borrower, acting by Mr Ting, on the other. The second loan agreement was on the same terms mutatis mutandis as the first loan agreement. Such terms were implied in fact as a matter of obviousness or business necessity, or, in the further alternative, it was an implied term that the second loan was repayable immediately on demand.

35. Trex's position in response to that allegation is that it is unable to admit or deny the allegations regarding the second loan agreement and requires Nexedge to prove them. It does, however, admit that on 16 December 2024, pursuant to the second loan agreement, Nexedge advanced the second loan, i.e. US$500,000 from the Trex ring-fenced funds to Trex.

36. Nexedge claims that the loans were not repaid by 10 January 2025 or at all, and by two letters dated 14 May 2025, Nexedge demanded immediate repayment of the first loan and the second loan. This is formally denied in the defence but no positive case as to repayment is made anywhere.

37. Nexedge's claim is for, firstly, recovery of the principal of US$1.5 million, alternatively damages, and an indemnity pursuant to that indemnity clause expressly set out in the first loan agreement and implied in the second loan agreement, and, thirdly, costs and further or other relief.

38. In the defence, paragraph 7, Trex expressly admits that the claimant advanced it the alleged loans of $1.5 million, but goes on to say: It is the Defendant's position that the Alleged Loans were made solely at the discretion of TS [Mr Sami] and MS [Mr Spina], who expressly acknowledged that the source of such funds was the shareholder loan advanced by the Defendant's shareholder to the Claimant, rather than the Claimant's own funds. The payment flow of the Alleged Loans (of at least USD1 million) demonstrates that it was at all material times directed, applied and utilised under the control of the Claimant's key employees, including TS and MS, and for purposes only determined by them.

39. At paragraph 13, Trex points to the various duties of Mr Sami and Mr Spina as alleged directors or CEO of Trex, such as the duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company, and to make the appropriate disclosures of any conflicts of interest. It is said that the alleged loans were potentially (I emphasise) negotiated, approved and/or executed in breach of Mauritian law and the defendant's constitution. It is also said by way of defence, and I quote:

15. The Defendant has also subsequently suffered significant economic losses as a direct consequence of the conduct of TS and MS and their conflict of interest in relation to the Alleged Loans.

16. As such, the actions of TS and MS are potentially prejudicial to the Defendant and its shareholders under Mauritius Law who are entitled to a claim against TS and MS.

17. In the alternative, the actions of TS and MS (or lack of) might have potentially rendered the Alleged Loans void under Mauritius Law.

18. TS and MS have repeatedly misappropriated unauthorised payments from the Defendant, diverted funds into their own accounts or those of third parties for their own benefits. This conduct mirrors their breach of fiduciary duty towards the Defendant in the Alleged Loans ...

40. The defence concludes by inviting the English court to stay the proceedings pending determination of the relevant company law issues by the Mauritian courts, or, alternatively, a stay on the grounds of forum non conveniens. It also states that the claimant is put to strict proof that the defendant received fair value at the time of the transaction, and also that the defendant reserves the right to amend the defence after service of Mauritian law evidence. The application and Trex's evidence in response

41. By its application, Nexedge seeks summary dismissal of the claim on the basis that it has no real prospect of success. It points out, firstly, that there is no serious factual dispute that the monies had been advanced and not repaid and that they were intended by both sides to be a loan rather than a gift.

42. The usual principle of presumption of advancement applies in this regard, and I was shown Chitty paragraph 42-285: If money is proved, or admitted, to have been paid by A to B, then in the absence of any circumstances suggesting a presumption of advancement, there is prima facie an obligation to repay the money ...

43. Secondly, the written terms of the first loan agreement are not disputed.

44. Thirdly, although there is a nascent dispute about the terms of the second loan, this does not matter, because in the absence of express or implied terms in this regard, the loan would be immediately repayable, or at least repayable on demand, which demand having been served by virtue of the 14 May letters.

45. Fourthly, at best, the defence says there may potentially be a Mauritian law defence, but does not squarely put that in issue, raising only the question of a stay. As to this, there is no basis for a case management stay simply because there may be foreign law questions in play. In any event, there are no proceedings on foot in Mauritius and none have been intimated. The question of a forum non conveniens stay does not arise, because there is no challenge to the jurisdiction.

46. Finally, to the extent that it is necessary to resolve the Mauritian law issues, then it was submitted that the court can be confident that these would be decided in the claimant's favour. Essentially, the point was that the Mauritian court would find that the loans were for fair value, in the sense that monies were advanced off the back of the loan agreement, but even if the loans could be avoided, the company would still have to make counter-restitution in accordance with ordinary principles familiar to English lawyers; in particular, the claimant's expert evidence says that there are no obviously applicable Mauritian law principles on this point, and in those circumstances, the Mauritian courts would follow the New Zealand courts, which in turn would, as I have said, apply familiar principles of counter-restitution.

47. That evidence was the only Mauritian law evidence before the court, the defendants not having sought to adduce any evidence of their own, despite having indicated in a letter of 8 October 2025 from Duan & Duan that they intended to do so.

48. The defendant's position in opposition to the application, at least at the time it was represented by Brown Rudnick, was set out in the second witness statement of Ms Lee, and her evidence was as follows: firstly, the loans and Trex's defence and potential counterclaims have to be considered as part of the broader arrangements between the relevant parties, including Nexedge's sole director and shareholder, Mr Sami. It was said that: Trex is currently reviewing the need to amend its defence to clarify the position that the loans were not repayable by 10 January and that Nexedge is estopped from asserting the contrary.

49. Ms Lee argued that the context of the arrangements between the parties shows that the loans were intended to be long-term: Until Trex was generating significant profits, Trex required funds to ensure liquidity for client withdrawals, margin calls and hedging. Until such profits were achieved, Trex would not have had the means to repay the loans. The stated repayment date of 10 January 2025 was therefore not commercially meaningful and had no practical significance in this context.

50. Thirdly, she pointed out that when the alleged repayment date passed in January 2025, Nexedge did not demand repayment, which was consistent with the idea that the loans were only repayable over the longer term.

51. As regards the second loan agreement additionally, she stated the following: Trex requires Nexedge to prove these matters, which will require factual evidence from each of Mr Ting, Mr Sami and Mr Spina as regards the terms of the second loan. In any event, this begs the question what terms the first loan agreement was on.

52. Fifthly, she also said: I am instructed that it was not in the contemplation of Trex that Mr Sami/Nexedge would enforce the first loan agreement contrary to Trex's interests, for example, when it could not pay.

53. Finally, she said that Trex was currently considering potential counterclaims against Nexedge and/or Mr Sami. She set out what those potential counterclaims might be in paragraph 15 of her statement, and these included: a counterclaim against Nexedge in respect to breach of the service agreement between the parties; a counterclaim against Nexedge and/or Mr Sami that they had taken for themselves business opportunities which were the property of Trex and; thirdly, potential counterclaims under Mauritian law arising from potential breach of fiduciary duties by Mr Sami and/or Mr Spina. Discussion and determination

54. As to the relevant legal principles, these were set out in Mr Day's skeleton, where he referred to the well-known decision of Easyair Limited vs Opal Telecom Limited [2009] EWHC 339 at [15], in particular: A defence needs to be more than merely arguable and, even where there are factual disputes, the Court does not take the defendant's case 'at face value and without analysis'; it may be rejected if 'there is no real substance in the factual assertions made’.

55. Dealing first with the pleaded defence, I agree with the claimant that the pleaded defence, such as it is, has no real prospect of succeeding. The basic facts of the first written loan agreement and the advance of both sums as a loan are not disputed. The claimant is put to proof of the existence and terms of the second loan, which is the alleged oral agreement. But if there were indeed a factual dispute about this, the defendant would have been aware of it via Mr Ting, who is one of the parties alleged to have agreed the loan.

56. In those circumstances, it could and should have put forward a positive case denying the existence and terms of the second loan agreement, and it is obviously not sufficient for Ms Lee simply to say on instructions that the claimant will have to prove those matters.

57. Additionally, I take note of the fact that, even if there were no express or implied terms along the same lines as those in the first loan, the second loan would essentially be without any terms as to repayment, and it follows that, as a matter of law, it would be immediately repayable or, failing that, repayable on demand. I was referred to paragraph 42-287 of Chitty as authority to this effect.

58. So, either way, it seems to me that there is no substance and no prospect of success in relation to the points raised by the defence.

59. The issues of Mauritian law as to conflict of interest are only cited as "potentially available". Personal claims against the directors are obviously not relevant. The only possible relevance of the matters raised in the defence would be the idea that the loans are "potentially void under Mauritian law". But those defences are not positively developed and only relied on as giving rise to grounds for a stay.

60. In those circumstances, I do not consider it necessary for me to consider the substantive issues of Mauritian law as to why, even if the arguments about conflicts of interest were made out, they would not affect recoverability of the loan. There did seem to me to be considerable force in what Mr Day said about the US$1.5 million being repayable come what may, but as I have said, I do not need to resolve those issues because those defences are not being advanced in the pleading.

61. I do not consider that those matters would give any reasonable basis for a case management or a forum non conveniens stay now and, if relevant, nor would such claim have any reasonable prospect of succeeding at trial.

62. In relation to the case management stay, in Athena Capital Fund SICA-FIS SCA v Secretariat for the Holy See [2022] EWCA Civ 1051 , Males LJ held at [59] that: .. it is only in rare and compelling cases that it will be in the interests of justice to grant a stay on case management grounds in order to await the outcome of proceedings abroad.

63. I agree with Mr Day that this is not an exceptional case. This is simply a case where foreign law issues have been raised by the defendant. More to the point, there are, in any event, no proceedings on foot in Mauritius at the moment, and there is no indication that any proceedings regarding these allegations of conflict of interest will be brought in the future. Accordingly, there is no basis for a case management stay, nor is there any basis for a forum non conveniens stay, that ship having sailed long ago and the defendants having submitted to the jurisdiction.

64. I now go on to consider the potential defences intimated in Lee 2.

65. The first point to note is that the defences that were summarised in this evidence and that I have referred to already as being under investigation have not been pleaded despite that evidence accepting that amendments would likely be necessary to the defence. So they are not even formally part of the case. But it is right that I should consider whether there is anything in them which militates against the grant of summary judgment.

66. The key nub of what is asserted by Ms Lee is that neither party intended the repayment date in the first loan to take effect or to be enforced, or that somehow the parties intended that the loan should be repayable over a longer period than what is expressly set out in the first loan agreement.

67. I agree with Mr Day's submissions that these defences are hopeless. There is no documentary evidence to support that assertion. The available evidence which I was shown suggests that the contrary is the case, and in fact it was accepted and acknowledged on behalf of Trex that the sums were due. In particular, I was shown a WhatsApp message, dated 11 March 2025, from William Liao, director of Trex, who is associated with Apollo, to Mr Sami, who is associated with the claimant, in which he says in terms that there is a payment of US$1.5 million due to Nexedge.

68. There was a further message I was shown, by which Mr Spina proposes to Mr Ting a repayment of the 1.5 million, and Mr Ting says "Okay", and that they can discuss cashflow. If, indeed, the evidence alluded to by Ms Lee had any legs, one would have expected Mr Ting to have raised some sort of dispute about whether in fact the US$1.5 million was repayable.

69. Now, it was of course open to Trex to address those aspects of the evidence, and they were available before Ms Lee made her statement but they were not addressed. Ms Lee, herself from Brown Rudnick, has no first-hand knowledge of these matters and does not identify the source of her evidence. There is no factual evidence given by representatives of Trex; as I have pointed out, the evidence of at least some of those representatives would have been obviously probative and important to adduce if there were any substance in the factual assertions made in the defence or in Ms Lee's evidence.

70. Finally, the potential counterclaims have not actually been brought and are not a reason not to grant summary judgment.

71. So for all those reasons, I have reached the conclusion that there is no real prospect of the defendant successfully defending this claim. It was not suggested in any of the materials provided by the defendants or by the claimant in its presentation that there was any other compelling reason why the case should go to trial, and I cannot identify one.

72. Accordingly, I grant summary judgment in respect of the principal sum of US$1.5 million, there being no claim for interest. I will hear further submission on costs. LATER ROSALIND PHELPS KC :

73. It now falls to determine the principle and quantum of costs. Mr Day points me to the indemnity provision which appears in the first loan agreement, to the effect that Trex shall pay on demand all costs and expenses that Nexedge incurs in connection with the enforcement of the lease. He sought to recover costs on two alternative bases, the first being a simple contractual entitlement, or, by way of alternative remedy, a costs order under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act.

74. It was pointed out that, if the latter route is taken, it is settled that when exercising discretion as the basis of assessment of costs, the court normally approaches that on the basis that it reflects the contractual entitlement agreed between the parties; in other words, indemnity costs: see Macleish v Littlestone [2016] EWCA Civ 127 at [38] (Briggs LJ).

75. I pointed out to Mr Day that the indemnity basis, whether contractual or arising under section 51, was a problem in relation to the second loan agreement because I have not made any findings which support his client's case that the terms from the first loan agreement are to be implied into the second agreement. Therefore I do not think it is right for me to proceed on the basis that the second loan agreement contains the indemnity which supports his argument.

76. It seems to me that it is appropriate to proceed by way of ordering summary assessment rather than sending the matter off for detailed assessment, given that this has been a hearing of only half a day. I therefore propose to approach this in principle by taking the costs that are in the costs schedule and applying a reduction to reflect the fact that I am not awarding indemnity costs in relation to the matters concerning the second loan agreement.

77. Now, in my opinion, it is right that that should only be a small reduction because, as pointed out, most of the matters would have had to be addressed in the context of the first loan agreement in any event, and there is only a very small proportion of matters which arise in addition in relation to the second loan agreement. Accordingly, I make an in-principle reduction of 5% to the overall costs sought.

78. I should also now engage on a more granular level with the quantum of the costs sought, quite apart from that in-principle 5% reduction. The total costs claimed are £345,109.32, which is made up of solicitors' fees of around £232,000 and counsel fees of around £48,000. It was pointed out to me that there has been a considerable amount of work involved in preparing this hearing today. In particular, there have been two statements served by the claimant's solicitors; there has also been an expert report of Mauritian law, and there has been a considerable amount of correspondence, both when the defendant's two sets of solicitors were on the record and most recently with the liquidator.

79. That being said, it seems to me that some of the costs can be considered to be excessive, even though I am approaching them on the indemnity basis, and I would disallow a proportion of those costs to reflect the fact, firstly, that in the event the expert evidence was not much referred to and certainly not decisive in my ruling. I consider that this is potentially a case that did not need to involve two counsel or as much counsel time as was expended, and overall it is only a half-day application and the total does seem somewhat large.

80. So, for those reasons, I am going to propose a further reduction of 20% to the total figure. Therefore, I summarily assess the costs at essentially 75% of that grand total, which are to be paid within 14 days in accordance with the usual order. ______________