Power Projects Sanayi Insaat Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Star Assurance Company Limited

Christopher Hancock KC:

1. I handed down judgment in this matter on 19 September 2025. I now have to deal with various consequential matters arising out of that judgment, namely: (1) Enhanced interest on the principal sum awarded for the period after the making of a Part 36 offer. (2) Costs. (3) Permission to appeal.

2. The Claimant (“PPR”) made initial submissions on these issues in writing on 22 August 2025, which submissions were served on the Defendant (“Star”). I gave directions for the filing of submissions in response in relation to costs, and also in relation to any application by Star for permission to appeal. No such submissions were ever served by Star.

3. In addition, I directed that further submissions be filed thereafter in relation to the question of whether I had jurisdiction to award enhanced rates of interest, given that I had dealt with certain questions of interest in my first judgment. Star served no submissions; whereas PPR did serve submissions, which I consider in this judgment.

4. I deal with matters in the order set out above. Enhanced interest on the principal sum for the period from 9 May 2025. PPR’s case.

5. The background to this is as follows: (1) As set out on p. 2 of the Part 36 offer, PPR offered to settle for the sum of $8,052,276.57. The expiry of the ‘relevant period’ under Part 36 was 8 May 2025. (2) The correct approach to assessing whether PPR beats that offer is to calculate what it would have obtained at the relevant time on the terms of the Judgment: see Lonestar Communications v. Kaye [2023] EWHC 732 (Comm) at [28] (a Calderbank case, but in my judgment equally relevant on this point in the Part 36 context). (3) Accordingly, the comparator with the offered amount is the principal amount plus interest on a 3-month LIBOR basis (i.e., as granted by the Judgment) as at 8 May 2025. That amount is $8,081,640.43. (4) Accordingly, PPR has beaten its Part 36 offer — indeed, has beaten it comfortably, by reference to the r. 36.17(2) definition of “ more advantageous ” as “ better in money terms by any amount, however small ”.

6. In terms of the costs consequences following on from PPR beating its offer, r. 36.17 relevantly provides: (4) … [W]here paragraph (1)(b) applies [i.e., where a claimant has beaten its offer], the court must, unless it considers it unjust to do so, order that the claimant is entitled to— (a) interest on the whole or part of any sum of money (excluding interest) awarded, at a rate not exceeding 10% above base rate for some or all of the period starting with the date on which the relevant period expired; (b) costs … on the indemnity basis from the date on which the relevant period expired; (c) interest on those costs at a rate not exceeding 10% above base rate; and (d) provided that the case has been decided and there has not been a previous order under this sub-paragraph, an additional amount, which shall not exceed £75,000, calculated by applying the prescribed percentage set out below to an amount which is— (i) the sum awarded to the claimant by the court … Amount awarded by the Court: Above £500,000 Prescribed percentage: 10% of the first £500,000 and (subject to the limit of £75,000) 5% of any amount above that figure. (5) In considering whether it would be unjust to make the orders referred to in paragraphs (3) and (4), the court must take into account all the circumstances of the case including— (a) the terms of any Part 36 offer; (b) the stage in the proceedings when any Part 36 offer was made, including in particular how long before the trial started the offer was made; (c) the information available to the parties at the time when the Part 36 offer was made; (d) the conduct of the parties with regard to the giving of or refusal to give information for the purposes of enabling the offer to be made or evaluated; and (e) whether the offer was a genuine attempt to settle the proceedings. (6) Where the court awards interest under this rule and also awards interest on the same sum and for the same period under any other power, the total rate of interest must not exceed 10% above base rate.

7. The starting point, said PPR, was therefore that the Court “ must ” order the various Part 36 costs consequences in r. 36.17(4), unless it is “ unjust to do so ” by reference to the r. 36.17(5) factors. PPR submits that that exception is not engaged. In particular: (i) the timing of the offer was such that if it had been accepted, the costs of the hearing (and the post-hearing steps that followed) would have been avoided; (ii) Star had full information available to it (including in particular because PPR’s skeleton for the hearing was available to Star prior to the expiry of the relevant period); and (iii) the offer was a genuine attempt to settle, offering a concession on the amount claimed worth over $92,000.

8. Apart from indemnity costs, which I deal with below, PPR accordingly sought the following: (1) Pre-judgment interest on the principal sum at 10% above the base rate (r. 36.17(4)(a)) for the period 9 May 2025 to the date of Judgment. (a) The effect of rr. 36.17(4) and (6) is that PPR is entitled to both the underlying ‘LIBOR’ interest, plus a ‘top up’ to an enhanced rate of up to 14% (the current base rate of 4% + 10%). (b) The enhanced rate is a matter of discretion (14% is a ceiling). Here, PPR submitted that the maximum is appropriate, including in particular because of (i) the relatively short period during which it applies, (ii) Star’s conduct by way of its Ghanaian proceedings, which were at least a substantial cause of delay post-hearing; and (iii) the clear margin by which PPR beat its offer, in particular by reference to PPR’s costs incurred by way of post-hearing submissions and evidence that would not have been required but for Star’s conduct. (c) Applying the maximum, the top-up rate is therefore 6.441% (the difference between the average CME Term SOFR + ISDA Spread Adjustment plus 3% for the relevant period (7.559%), and the maximum CPR r. 36.17(4) rate (14%)). (d) Applied to the principal amount of PPR’s claim of $6,297,000 across the 106-day period 9 May–22 August 2025, that amounts to an additional interest sum of $117,787.71, which continues to increase at a daily rate of $1,111.20 thereafter until the date of Judgment, which PPR accordingly seeks. (2) In addition to PPR beating its offer, the conditions for the entitlement to the additional amount under r.36.17(4)(d), said PPR, were satisfied (the case has been decided, and there has not been a previous additional amount awarded). Applying the rates in r. 36.17(4)(d) to a claim for $6,297,000 plus pre-judgment interest converted to Sterling at market rates, the £75,000 cap was easily exceeded, PPR submitted, and it therefore sought the additional amount of £75,000. (3) PPR further sought interest on costs pursuant to r. 36.17(4)(c) for the period from 9 May 2025 at 10% above the base rate, i.e. 14%. I deal with this last point below, under the heading of costs.

9. PPR argued that I should award the enhanced rate of interest provided for in CPR Part 36.17(4)(a) on the sums that I have awarded in my earlier judgment for the period from 9 May 2025 until payment of those sums, essentially because Star had failed to beat PPR’s Part 36 offer.

10. Following consideration of PPR’s initial submissions on this point, I was unsure that I had jurisdiction to make any further order in relation to interest, given that I had dealt with interest as part of my first judgment in this matter. I therefore invited further submissions from the parties on this point.

11. PPR filed further submissions on 5 January 2026, in the light of which I invited Star to comment. No further submissions were received from Star, and accordingly I now proceed to judgment on this point.

12. PPR submitted that I did indeed have jurisdiction to make a further order on interest, and should do so. The reasons that were put forward were threefold, and were as follows: (1) PPR’s entitlement to interest were separate from the substantive contractual claims to principal and interest determined in the Court’s Judgment and principal Order of 16 September 2025 (hereafter, the “ Judgment ” and “ Order for Judgment ” respectively) — they were statutory entitlements arising under the CPR, which have not been determined by the Court and have not merged in any judgment, and PPR is therefore not requesting the Court to ‘revisit’ anything. (2) Those entitlements, as costs consequences, are consequential on the Court’s principal Judgment, and were therefore within the express provisions adjourning the hearing of consequential matters (in the Order for Judgment, paragraph 4) and the express directions for further submissions (in the directions Order of 16 September 2025 (hereafter, the “ Directions Order ”)). The Court therefore is not functus officio . (3) As expressly required by the CPR, the existence of a Part 36 offer can never be disclosed to the Court before it had determined the relevant substantive claims, and entitlements to costs consequences arising from a party ‘beating’ its Part 36 offer will therefore always be determined after deciding those substantive claims.

13. In more detail, PPR submitted as follows.

14. Starting with merger , then, as explained in PPR’s consequentials skeleton dated 22 August 2025 the entitlements attendant on a claimant ‘beating’ its own Part 36 offer (that is, the situation described in CPR r. 36.17(1)(b)) are statutory entitlements which are separate from the principal claims advanced by the claimant (and by which it ‘beat’ the offer). Here, PPR’s claim made in its Claim Form was for an amount due and owing under the Performance Bond, and contractual late payment interest thereon; the Court found in PPR’s favour in the Judgment, and therefore made its Order for Judgment for USD 8,301,384.73 (being the principal sum of USD 6,297,000.00, and interest thereon in accordance with clause 7 of the Performance Bond from 13 November 2021 to the date of the Judgment of USD 2,004,384.73), with the result that the substantive contractual claims to principal and interest therefore merged in this Court’s Judgment; however, the Judgment did not decide, and the Order for Judgment giving effect to that Judgment did not address, any consequential matters, including costs (in fact, the Order for Judgment expressly adjourned the hearing of consequential matters). In particular, it did not address the entitlements set out in r. 36.17(4), which include at (a) additional interest, and at (b) interest on costs. PPR’s claims to those entitlements — which, as set out in PPR’s consequentials skeleton of 22 August 2025, it is entitled to as of right (subject only to the very restrictive ‘unjust’ proviso) — therefore did not merge in the Court’s Judgment, and remain to be determined.

15. Accordingly, the only claims that the Court has considered and determined are PPR’s substantive contractual claims. It has not considered or determined PPR’s entitlements to costs, including additional interest and interest on costs under Part 36. While both categories of claim include matters which are described as ‘interest’, the Court is not ‘revisiting’ the same claim to interest nor has it somehow lost jurisdiction to consider and determine separate, statutory entitlements.

16. Turning to the question of whether the Court was functus officio , at the time of judgment the Court expressly adjourned the hearing of matters consequential on its Judgment. That adjournment was the Court’s own decision on how to proceed on hand-down of its Judgment. Thus, the Court circulated its judgment in draft on 12 August 2025; PPR submitted corrections to the draft and a consequentials skeleton which set out its costs claims, including its claims to its entitlements under Part 36, on 22 August 2025; by the Court’s email of 4 September 2025, the Court stated that it would not deal with issues of costs or permission to appeal in the judgment to be handed down, but would adjourn consideration of such; on 19 September 2025, the Judgment was handed down, and two orders made: (1) After disposing of PPR’s substantive claims, the Order for Judgment provided at paragraph 4: “ The hearing at which the Judgment has been handed down is adjourned pending determination of consequential matters. ” (2) The Directions Order made at the same time provided for submissions “ on costs ” from Star (PPR’s submissions on costs having already been made in its consequentials skeleton of 22 August 2025) and a reply by PPR (paragraphs 1 and 2), and then at paragraph 3 (emphasis added): “ Costs and (if applicable) permission to appeal shall … thereafter be determined on paper . ”

17. PPR submitted that its entitlements under Part 36, including in particular its entitlement to additional interest and interest on costs, fall within the categories of matters consequential on the Judgment, and more specifically within the category of “ costs ”. That is put beyond doubt by the heading to r. 36.17, which provides for both additional interest (r. 36.17(4)(a)) and interest on costs (r. 36.17(4)(b)).

18. Accordingly, the Court is not functus and retains jurisdiction over those two interest entitlements, because they are “ costs consequences following judgment ”, and therefore within the express adjournment of “ consequential matters ” in the Order for Judgment and the express directions made for submissions on and determination of “ costs ” in the Directions Order.

19. Finally, said PPR, not only does the Court have jurisdiction for the two reasons set out above, but the CPR expressly requires that those entitlements only be determined after the relevant substantive claims. That sequencing is inherent in the nature of the Part 36 offer as a confidential, ‘without prejudice save as to costs’ offer of settlement: if it is not accepted, it is engaged only if it is ‘beaten’ in a judgment, and that judgment must be made without the Court being aware of the offer made by the relevant party.

20. That is stipulated by r. 36.16, which provides (subject to limited exceptions which are not relevant in this case): “(1) A Part 36 offer will be treated as “without prejudice except as to costs”. (2) The fact that a Part 36 offer has been made and the terms of such offer must not be communicated to the trial judge until the case has been decided.”

21. This necessarily means that the entitlements arising on a party ‘beating’ its Part 36 offer cannot themselves be determined until after “ the case has been decided ” — that is, after the disposal of the substantive claims. That is precisely what has happened in this case: the Court decided PPR’s substantive claims in its Judgment, as reflected in its Order for Judgment. “ [T]he case ” having thereby “ been decided ”, the Part 36 offer was disclosed to the Court, and PPR set out its claim for its entitlements under r. 36.17 arising from the fact that it ‘beat’ its offer. Not only does the Court have jurisdiction to determine those entitlements, they could not as a matter of statute have been advanced prior to the Court’s judgment on the substantive claims (including contractual interest).

22. Stepping back, PPR submitted that there is also an important fairness dimension arising: as set out above, at a time where the Court had before it PPR’s consequentials skeleton requesting its entitlements under Part 36, the Court decided to proceed by handing down its Judgment and making the Order for Judgment, but adjourning all consequential matters. It would be unfair to suggest that in those circumstances the Court could, by adopting that procedure of its own instigation, shut out PPR from pursuing statutory entitlements which it had made the Court aware (by its consequentials skeleton) were being sought. PPR said that it did not anticipate that that was in any way the Court’s intention, but addressed the matter for completeness and to underscore the propriety of now proceeding to give a judgment on all the costs entitlements sought by PPR. Discussion and conclusions.

23. I have concluded that I do indeed still have jurisdiction to deal with the claim put forward by PPR under this head, and that I am not functus officio . This is because I accept the submission that, in the circumstances of this case, my first judgment dealt with PPR’s substantive claims and its causes of action, for principal and contractual interest, with all other matters relating to costs being adjourned for further argument. The further interest that is now claimed is claimed pursuant to a different jurisdiction, namely the jurisdiction to award superadded interest given by the CPR. The purpose of this, different jurisdiction, differs from the justification for the award of contractual interest. The latter is a matter of entitlement, that entitlement being a matter of contract, whilst the former (CPR) jurisdiction is a statutory, discretionary jurisdiction which is granted to the Court to promote settlement of disputes.

24. I have also concluded that I should, in the circumstances of this case, award interest under this heading. PPR has been kept out of its money for longer because of the failure of Star to accept the Part 36 offer and make payment. This failure, in my judgment, was part of an ongoing pattern of behaviour. In my judgment, this is just the sort of case where an award of enhanced interest is justifiable, and I therefore order payment of interest at the rate of 10% above base rate from the expiry of the relevant period, ie 9 May 2025, until the date of my 16 September 2025 Judgment. The ‘additional amount’ (r. 36.17(4)(d)). The Claimant’s case.

25. In addition to PPR beating its offer, the conditions for this entitlement, the Claimant argued, are satisfied (the case has been decided, and there has not been a previous additional amount awarded). Applying the rates in r. 36.17(4)(d) to a claim for $6,297,000 plus pre-judgment interest converted to sterling at market rates, the £75,000 cap is well exceeded. PPR therefore sought the additional amount of £75,000. Discussion and conclusions.

26. I accept the Claimant’s submission that it is entitled, under the CPR, to this additional sum, and I therefore award the sum in question. Costs. PPR’s case. Costs and the basis of assessment.

27. PPR submitted that, as the successful party, PPR should have its costs of these proceedings, which included all of its costs of the action save for the costs of Star’s failed application before Richard Millett KC, which had been dealt with by that judge.

28. As to the basis of assessment, PPR sought indemnity costs. It was submitted that there were two reasons why indemnity costs were appropriate: (1) Star’s conduct was outside the norm (applicable generally); and (2) PPR beat a pre-hearing Part 36 offer made to Star (applicable, cumulatively with the first reason, to PPR’s costs following the Part 36 ‘relevant period’).

29. PPR also seeks the various other costs orders that come with beating a Part 36 offer. That offer, as I have noted, was $8,052,276.57.

30. As to quantum, PPR sought summary assessment, in accordance with the Commercial Court Guide. Statements of Costs were served covering, respectively, the pre- and post-Part 36 periods.

31. PPR submitted that: (1) an order for indemnity costs is appropriate where the conduct of the parties takes the case “ out of the norm ” in a way which justifies an order for indemnity costs; and (2) ‘out of the norm’ in this context is “ not intended to reflect whether what occurred was something that happened often, so that in one sense it might be seen as ‘normal’ ”, but rather is “ intended to reflect ‘something outside the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings’ ”. (White Book at [44.3.8], citing the Court of Appeal in Excelsior [2002] EWCA Civ 879 and Whaleys (Bradford) v. Bennett [2017] EWCA Civ 2143 ).

32. PPR relied on the following conduct in particular in taking this case out of the norm so as to justify indemnity costs. (1) Star’s persistence in defending the claim (prior to its application made in Ghana) despite a clear finding that it had no arguable defence. This Court’s judgment dismissing Star’s objection to the Part 8 procedure made it clear that the sole intimated defence did not come “ anywhere near satisfying [the] strict legal requirements ” of the fraud exception to liability under an on-demand bond, [2024] EWHC 2798 (Comm) at [36] per Richard Millett KC. and was “ grounded on allegations of fact that were either in law wholly irrelevant or amounted to an incomplete and barely particularised allegation of fraud … which [the Court] had no hesitation in rejecting ”. [2024] EWHC 2816 (Comm) at [11]. It should have been clear to Star then, if not before, not only that it was liable under the Performance Bond, but that there was no defence open to it that could be properly maintained. This Court’s previous findings mean this is not simply a case of a defendant persisting with a plainly hopeless case. Rather, Star persisted with a plainly hopeless case following clear findings of fact and law to that effect (which findings included that there was no other defence available to a party in its position, beyond the hopeless fraud defence). Furthermore, even after this Court’s earlier judgment, Star elected to file no evidence in opposition to PPR’s claim, from which point there was not a vestige of doubt that it would be found liable, because it had no evidential basis at all on which to found any sort of defence. Continuing to defend the claim in those circumstances was (well) outside the norm, in the Excelsior sense. (2) Star’s lack of cooperation and candour in the pre-hearing period. At every stage between the dismissal of its Part 8 objection and the hearing of this claim, Star was at best recalcitrant, and at worst lacking in candour, in its procedural conduct: (a) As just set out, following the dismissal of its Part 8 objection, Star elected not to file evidence opposing PPR’s claim. When it came to list the final disposal hearing, PPR estimated that a half-day hearing would be required. Nevertheless, through its then-solicitors, Edwin Coe, Star insisted on a one-day hearing, despite (i) having adduced no evidence, and (ii) the Court’s clear intimation of the hopelessness of its defence as a matter of law. That was patently unreasonable, and resulted in a listing that was (as indeed demonstrated by the actual time taken for the hearing) longer than it ought to have been, and may have deprived other court users of a half-day’s hearing time. (b) Edwin Coe remained on the record as solicitors until very shortly before the hearing. Despite that, they did not engage at all with PPR’s solicitors on pre-hearing matters, including in particular the preparation of the bundle (as well as other documents which are intended to be agreed such as the chronology, dramatis personae , reading list and time estimate). That was a clear infringement of paragraphs A.1.10, J.4 and Appendix 7 of the Commercial Court Guide, which impose a positive duty on parties and their legal representatives to cooperate. Whether that lack of engagement was on instructions, or for want of instructions, does not matter — either way, it was unreasonable conduct outside the norm by Star. (c) When it came to Edwin Coe coming off the record, Star’s N434 form giving notice of change in its representation was signed on behalf of Star on 2 May 2025 (10 days before the hearing), but was not served on PPR until around 6 pm on 6 May 2025. The deadline for PPR’s skeleton was 4 pm on 6 May 2025, and it is a reasonable inference (and there was certainly no other explanation offered) that Star ‘sat on’ the notice of change until after PPR had filed its skeleton, so as to deprive PPR of the opportunity of dealing with that development in writing. That lack of candour was not only detrimental to PPR, but unhelpful to the Court. (3) Star’s commencement of proceedings in Ghana — further lack of candour and breach of the jurisdiction agreement. Star’s commencement and pursuit of the Ghanaian proceedings took its conduct in these proceedings even further outside of the norm. Those proceedings involved both lack of candour to this Court, and a flagrant breach of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement in the Performance Bond. (a) As to lack of candour: (i) Star’s Ghanaian proceedings were commenced on 8 May 2025, by way of its motion seeking permission to issue and serve its writ. The affidavit in support of that motion was accompanied by the writ and statement of claim which were subsequently issued and served. That was four days prior to the hearing (and, as it happens, the judicial reading day). Star could and should have informed PPR (and this Court) of its having taken that step on 8 May 2025 or very soon thereafter, which would have allowed the development to be properly addressed at the hearing and considered by the Court. (ii) Instead, Star waited until the morning of the hearing to email PPR informing it of the commencement of the Ghanaian proceedings. Star was aware of the date and time of the hearing, and it is therefore a reasonable inference that the email was timed with the intention of causing maximum disruption. (iii) The effect of Star waiting until that time was to deprive the Court of the benefit of proper oral submissions on the issue at the hearing, and to necessitate a further round of post-hearing written submissions and evidence, in turn (further) delaying judgment. (iv) Star’s email itself also lacked candour in at least two ways: (i) it did not accurately describe, let alone attach, the relevant Ghanaian court documents (which merely sought permission to issue and serve proceedings, but did not actually commence proceedings); and (ii) it threatened “ contempt proceedings against [PPR] and all of its directors ” including “ seek[ing] custodial sentence [sic] and hefty fines ”, but did not say that no order of any kind had been made by the Ghanaian courts. (b) As to the breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clause: (i) It follows from the clear and compelling findings in the Judgment that Star’s Ghanaian proceedings, insofar as they seek relief against PPR, constitute a breach of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement in clause 12 of the Performance Bond. (ii) The anti-suit component of Star’s Ghanaian proceedings is particularly offensive to the jurisdiction agreement in that regard: not only is seeking that relief in Ghana a breach of Star’s promise to litigate all matters in connection with the Performance Bond in England, it attempts to prevent PPR from exercising its contractual right by having recourse to the contractually-agreed forum. (iii) Star’s conduct is also particularly egregious in circumstances where it initially participated in these proceedings, including to list the final disposal hearing, but failed to cooperate in the lead-up to or participate in the final disposal hearing and instead chose to seise the Ghanaian court at the eleventh hour. (4) Ordering costs on the indemnity basis has long been “ the ‘usual practice’ where contractual ASI relief is granted by the Commercial Court ”: see most recently Manta Penyez Shipping v. Zuhoor Alsaeed Foodstuff [2025] EWHC 353 (Comm) at [95] per Cockerill J. That practice probably originated with the judgment of Cooke J in Kyrgyz Mobil Tel v. Fellowes International [2005] EWHC 1329 (QB) , and it is submitted that the explanation in that case for why indemnity costs are appropriate is also applicable here, where no anti-suit relief is sought by PPR but Star’s breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement is no less flagrant for that. See at [42]: “ the correct approach where there has been a breach of a jurisdiction clause by a party in initiating proceedings in a non-chosen jurisdiction is that the costs should be awarded on an indemnity basis. ”

33. Finally, PPR noted that (unlike the wasted costs jurisdiction), “ it is not the law that an indemnity order will only be made if the unreasonable conduct of the paying party complained of increased the costs which are recoverable by the receiving party ”: White Book at [44.3.9], citing Phoenix Finance [2002] EWHC 1242 (Ch) per Sir Andrew Morritt VC (emphasis added). However, in this case, Star’s unreasonable conduct undoubtedly did very substantially increase PPR’s costs: from the point at which Star elected not to serve evidence (i.e., by 3 December 2024 at the latest), its defence of the claim was not properly maintainable; it nevertheless insisted on an over-long listing; and its last-minute and entirely wrongful ambush by way of the Ghanaian proceedings necessitated two rounds of post-hearing submissions. Discussion and conclusions.

34. I have concluded, first, that, as the successful party, PPR should have its costs of the action. The costs of the hearing before Richard Millett KC have already been dealt with and therefore my order deals simply with the remainder of the costs of the action.

35. Further I have concluded that this is clearly an appropriate case for the award of indemnity costs. My reasons are, essentially, those put forward by PPR. In my judgment, Star’s conduct throughout the period since the judgment of Richard Millett KC has been unreasonable, and has gone well beyond the norm. Star quite clearly must have known, following the decision of Richard Millett KC, that it had no proper defence to the claim, and yet continued to defend it, and continued to defend it in a way which led to increased and unnecessary costs.

36. Accordingly, I order that Star should pay PPR’s costs on the indemnity basis. Summary assessment PPR’s submissions.

37. Paragraph J.13.2 of the Commercial Court Guide provides that “[t]he summary assessment procedure … applies to trials lasting one day or less”. PPR submits that should apply equally (or indeed a fortiori) to a final Part 8 disposal hearing.

38. PPR therefore seeks summary assessment of the costs claimed in its two Statements of Costs covering, respectively, the pre- and post-Part 36 periods, in the following amounts: (1) Costs to 8 May 2025: €296,430.59 (or £256,210.89) . (2) Costs from 9 May 2025 onwards: €98,344.56 (or £85,001.17) .

39. PPR has subdivided this period into two because of the impact of its Part 36 offer on questions of costs. In relation to the question of the award of indemnity costs, I do not need to adopt this subdivision, since I have held that Star’s conduct attracts the award of indemnity costs throughout the period. Summary assessment: my conclusions.

40. The next question, in my judgment, is whether PPR’s costs, assessed on an indemnity basis, fall to be reduced at all. I have considered the contents of the Schedules of Costs provided by PPR carefully. In my judgment, the only area in which I take the view that the costs incurred were excessive is in relation to Counsel. At the hearing before me, although leading counsel was instructed, all of the advocacy was conducted by junior counsel. I would not wish to be thought to be discouraging the use of junior counsel, but I do not think that it is reasonable or proportionate to have two counsel where only junior counsel is to speak. Overall, I have concluded that the fairest course, given the background to this case and the award of indemnity costs that I have made, is to deduct the costs of one counsel – here junior counsel, an amount of £20,000.

41. Making this deduction leads to the summary assessment of costs in the amount of £321,212.06. Interest on costs.

42. Next, I turn to the question of interest on costs, which flows from PPR having beaten its Part 36 offer.

43. I have concluded that I should order interest on costs at 14% for the period beginning 9 May 2025 up until the date of this Judgment. My reasons for reaching this conclusion are those put forward by the Claimant. Permission to appeal.

44. No application was made by Star for permission to appeal from my judgment, as handed down on 19 September 2025.

45. I would be grateful if the parties would draw up an order giving effect to this judgment.