Robert Paduche v Darabani Court of Law (Romania)

Mr Justice Kimblin:

1. Mr Paduche appeals against the order of a District Judge that he be extradited to Romania to serve a sentence of imprisonment. Mr Paduche’s case turns on the validity of the European Arrest Warrant (‘AW’) which brought him before the District Judge. This is not the first time that this Court has heard essentially the same arguments. This case decides nothing new.

2. The first question in this case is this: where it appears from the terms of a warrant, read as a whole, that the requesting authority intends that the requested person would serve a longer sentence than the sentence for the particularised offences for which extradition was sought, is the warrant valid?

3. In 2016, the Divisional Court answered that question in the negative – ‘no’, such a warrant would not be valid: Edutanu v Iasi Court of Law Romania and three others (Barbu; Smadeci; Pascariu ) [2016] 1 WLR 2933 . This Court has to apply the principles from Edutanu, as developed in the case law since 2016, to the specific facts of Mr Paduche’s case, particularly as to the role of further information which supplements the AW. The second question in this case is whether the further information should be taken into account, or not?

4. There is a third question, which is whether the District Judge erred in his assessment of and conclusion on Mr Paduche’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Facts and Background

5. The facts may be introduced via the terms of the AW which brought the Appellant before the District Judge.

6. The AW was issued by a competent judicial authority for the requested person “to be arrested and surrendered … for the purposes of serving a custodial sentence .” The emphasis in the original is to contrast with circumstances where a person is requested to respond to an accusation. The custodial sentence on which the warrant is based is the judgment of the Darabani Court of Law dated 6 December 2021, made final on 24 April 2023 by the Appeal Court of Suceava (box, or section, ‘b’) and a sentence of 3 years’ and 2 months’ imprisonment with the period remaining to be served being 2 years 11 months and 19 days (box ‘c’).

7. Box ‘d’ (whether person appeared at trial resulting in decision) states that the requested person was present at the trial resulting in the decision. Next is Section ‘e’, which reads: “e) the offence: This warrant relates to 1 (one) offence. Description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence(s) by the requested person: The document instituting the proceedings mentions the following: On 17.07.2018, around 21:50, the defendant took over from Moldovan citizens, not identified so far, the amount of 10,000 packs of cigarettes from the Republic of Moldova, Rhythm Brand, which he later transport by Volvo car, the registration number TX9624AK, and as a result of this offence, he caused to the state budget a damage to the amount of 141,112 lei. The nature of the legal classification of the offence and the applicable statutory provision/code: The offence described above constitutes the offence of holding outside the bonded warehouse, provided by art. 452 paragraph 1 letter h of Law no 227/2015, with the application of art 396 paragr. 10 of the Code of criminal procedure, art 75 paragraph 2 letter b of Criminal code, art 76 par 1. of Criminal code, art. 5 of Criminal code (as a result of the change in legal classification of the offence for which the trial was ordered and the conviction of the defendant for smuggling, provided by art. 270 par.3 of Law no 86/2006)."

8. From sections ‘b’ to ‘e’ of the AW, it is apparent that in July 2018 the Appellant smuggled some 10,000 packets of cigarettes from Moldova, to Romania as a result of which he was convicted of specified offences and given a custodial sentence. The specified offence changed from smuggling to the offence of holding outside the bonded warehouse, as was made final on 24 th April 2023 by the Appeal Court of Suceava.

9. The custodial sentence remaining to be served is 2 years 11 months and 19 days.

10. It is plain from the terms of the AW that it relates to one offence because: (i) It discusses only one set of particulars of an offence; (ii) It gives only one legal classification of the offence, albeit that it explains that the classification changed from smuggling to holding outside the bonded warehouse; (iii) It expressly states and emphasises (in bold) that it relates to 1 (one) offence ; (iv) No other type of offending is mentioned, still less particularised.

11. However, the background facts and the history of the proceedings go further than those which are disclosed on AW. The Crown Prosecution Service (‘CPS’) sought further information. By letter dated 13 th February 2024, the Darabani Court of Law responded to the questions put by the CPS. Ultimately there were three sets of further information. The material points were helpfully summarised by District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) Leake (Appropriate Judge) in his reserved judgment dated 8 th October 2024. So far as the Edutanu point is concerned, he set out the relevant parts of the further information: - By criminal sentence no 838 of 21 June 2019 ruled by the Darabani Court of Law, final following the decision of the Suceava Court of Appeal, the RP was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment for committing the offence of putting in circulation of counterfeit foreign currency in continuous form, contrary to Articles 313, 310, and 316 of the Romanian criminal code. The court ordered that this sentence be suspended for a term of 3 years. The court ordered that the requested person attend a social reintegration program and perform 60 days of unpaid work. The requested did not comply with these conditions. - The judgment concerning the sentence of the Botosani Court of Law dated 21 June 2019 (sentence of 3 years imprisonment suspended for 3 years in respect of the counterfeit currency offence) sets out the conditions upon which the sentence was suspended. - The judgment concerning the sentence of the Darabani Court dated 6 December 2021 (total of 3 years 6 months’ imprisonment) sets out that the “holding outside the bonded warehouse” offence was initially charged as an offence of smuggling. The specific sentence that the requested person received for the smuggling offence was 1 year 6 months’ imprisonment, which was merged with the 3-year sentence for the counterfeit currency offence, to create an aggregate sentence of 3 years 6 months’ imprisonment. - The judgment concerning the sentence of the Suceava Court of Appeal dated 24 April 2023 amended the requested person’s sentence. The conviction for smuggling was replaced with a conviction for “holding outside the bonded warehouse” and a sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment was imposed. The judgment confirms that this sentence was merged with the 3-year sentence to create a sentence of 3 years 2 months’ imprisonment. - He was initially convicted for the counterfeit offence and the sentence of 3 years 2 months’ imprisonment relates both to the counterfeit offence and the offence of “holding outside the bonded warehouse”. - The counterfeit currency offence was committed on 15 January 2018 in Botosani. The requested person bought 3 mobile phones from an individual, and offered in exchange a total of EUR 1750 in bank notes that he knew were counterfeit. This conduct meets the elements of the offence of “releasing into free circulation of counterfeit currency”, contrary to Articles 313, 310, and 316 of the Criminal Code. - The requested person was present during the trial for the counterfeit currency offence. He was represented by his lawyer Simion Marian. In the appeal proceedings, he was absent but represented by the same lawyer.

12. The further information introduces a second offence of a different type, committed at a different time and place, namely the purchase of a mobile telephone using counterfeit currency. It was a result of activation of the sentence for the counterfeit currency offence and its aggregation with the sentence for ‘smuggling’ that the sentence of 3 years and 2 months in custody was arrived at. The Judgment Below

13. The District Judge identified the issues in the case as whether: (i) the warrant contains sufficient particulars of the conviction and sentence to be a valid Part 2 warrant ( s.2 of the Extradition Act 2003 (‘ the 2003 Act ’) (ii) extradition of the requested person would be compatible with his rights under Article 8 of the ECHR ( s.21 of the 2003 Act ).

14. The District Judge was referring to the starting point in this case and in the leading cases which is Section 2 of the 2003 Act and the particulars of information which it requires, namely (so far as it is relevant): (2) A Part 1 warrant is an arrest warrant which is issued by a judicial authority of a category 1 territory and which contains— (a)the statement referred to in subsection (3) and the information referred to in subsection (4), or (b)the statement referred to in subsection (5) and the information referred to in subsection (6). (3) The statement is one that— (a)the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is accused in the category 1 territory of the commission of an offence specified in the warrant, and (b)the Part 1 warrant is issued with a view to his arrest and extradition to the category 1 territory for the purpose of being prosecuted for the offence. … (6) The information is— (a)particulars of the person’s identity; (b)particulars of the conviction; (c)particulars of any other warrant issued in the category 1 territory for the person’s arrest in respect of the offence; (d)particulars of the sentence which may be imposed under the law of the category 1 territory in respect of the offence, if the person has not been sentenced for the offence; (e)particulars of the sentence which has been imposed under the law of the category 1 territory in respect of the offence, if the person has been sentenced for the offence.

15. On the first issue, the District Judge considered Goluchowski v Poland [2016] UKSC 36 , Alexander v France [2017] EWHC 1392 (Admin) and Podolak v Poland [2020] EWHC 2830 (Admin) and directed himelf as follows: (i) The face of the warrant many be supplemented by further information (see Goluchowski at [47]), save where the warrant is “wholly deficient” (see Alexander at [75]). (ii) The line between situations where further information can be admitted, and those where it cannot because the warrant is wholly deficient, is a matter of evaluation; and for this purpose the court should consider whether admitting the further information is consistent with the principle of mutual co-operation or whether it tends to undermine it (see Podolak at [18], [19]).

16. The District judge concluded that: “it would not be right, in my judgment, to describe the warrant a[s] no more than a piece of paper. But for the extent of the particularisation of the merged sentence (which I do consider to be an important issue), the warrant is valid in all other respects. Furthermore, there is no basis, in my judgment, for concluding that the deficiency arose as a matter of bad faith; and in my judgment there would be no abuse of process argument which could be mounted if the judicial authority withdrew the existing warrant and then re-issued a fresh warrant all the information in the existing warrant and the three tranches of further information. Accordingly, in my judgment, receiving all three tranches of further information in these proceedings would be consistent with the principle of mutual cooperation and I am satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice for me to do so.”

17. The Appellant’s extradition was ordered by the District Judge on 8 th October 2024.

18. By way of an Order dated 10 th September 2025 (following an oral permission hearing) Sheldon J granted permission to appeal on both grounds. Submissions The Respondent

19. In this case, I have been better able to focus on the areas of dispute by firstly considering the submissions of Mr Squibbs, for the Respondent. His submissions seek to explain why the AW is valid, why the further information appropriately cures any defect in the AW, or alternatively why a split decision (an order for extradition only upon the smuggling offence) should be the fallback position. These are the Respondent’s answers to the section 2 ground.

20. Mr Squibbs submits that it is clearly open to a requesting judicial authority to add missing information to a deficient AW so as to establish the validity of the warrant. Missing ‘required matters’ may be supplied by further information. The purpose derived from Article 15(2) of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement is to obtain supplementary information. The distinction between a wholesale failure and gaps in information is fact sensitive: Alexander v France [2017] EWHC 1392 (Admin) per Irwin LJ and Sweeney J [73-75].

21. This is a gap-case, not a wholesale failure case. The AW is in the proper form and is particularised in all respects save for the details of the counterfeit currency offence. Moreover, the AW is not internally contradictory, which was also the position in Jipa v Romania [2024] EWHC 2785 (Admin), per Cutts J at [42] (emphasis added): “In this case there was a document in the prescribed form, presented as an AW and setting out to address the information provided by the Act , including giving particulars of the offence of which the appellant was convicted which was the subject of extradition proceedings. Whilst the detail of the offending of criminal case 24/2016, relevant to sentence, is absent from the warrant, I do not consider there to have been a wholesale failure to provide the necessary particulars such as to make the AW a nullity. The AW is not internally contradictory or confusing. It did not merely state that there was a longer sentence to be served than that imposed for the offence for which extradition was sought without more. It did not simply state that there was another offence. It provided the information set out in [39] above.”

22. Cutts J dismissed the appeal in Jipa . There was a sufficient nexus between the AW and the further information, including a statement in ‘box E’ that: “This warrant refers to a total of 1 crime for which he was tried in this file and 1 crime for which he was tried in files of other courts where penalties were applied that were merged by criminal sentence..”

23. Relying on the point which I have emphasised in the citation at §21 above, Mr Squibbs submits that the Edutanu principle does not apply in the Appellant’s case. There is no internal inconsistency in the AW. The AW does not seek the Appellant’s surrender for more offences than those set out in the AW. The Appellant’s case should therefore be distinguished from the cases applying the Edutanu principle: unlike in those cases, the AW is not “ extremely confusing, complicated and unclear ” and is not internally inconsistent. In a case where there is such inconsistency, there may be good reason to find that the AW reflects a “ wholesale failure ” to provide particulars: in the Appellant’s case, there is not.

24. The Respondent’s fallback position is that even if the District Judge was wrong to admit the further information dated 3 June 2024, extradition should still be ordered on the smuggling offence. The Respondent invited me to follow Argeseanu v Romania [2018] EWHC 670 (Admin) per McGowan J who, at [20], held that a split decision was within the court’s powers. Properly, and to his credit, Mr Squibbs drew my attention to Grozavu v Romania [2018] EWHC 2606 (Admin) at [29-30] in which Nicola Davies J, as she then was, held: “31. The underlying matters of substance contained within the EAW reflecting the provision s of ss.2 , 5 and 6 of the 2003 Act are identified as the April 2010 offence of failing to provide a specimen and a final sentence of 4 years' imprisonment. The final sentence of 4 years is not the sentence of 2 years originally imposed for the 2010 offence; it is a sentence which includes periods of imprisonment in respect of unparticularised offences which have been discharged.

32. The difficulty with the respondent's submission, namely that in the event of extradition for the 2010 offence a 2-year sentence would be served by the appellant, is that it does not reflect the wording of the EAW as to the final sentence to be served in respect of which extradition is sought. Nor does it reflect the specifically requested further information from the IJA.

33. In my judgment, as the stipulated sentence of 4 years is not the sentence which was imposed for the 2010 offence, the EAW does not meet the identified requirements of s.2(6) of the 2003 Act . One purpose of s.2 is to protect the rights of a requested person. The means of so doing is to ensure that the EAW complies with its provisions. They will not be protected if that person is extradited to serve a longer sentence than was originally imposed for the identified offence in the EAW. This case is on all fours with the facts of Pascariu in Edutanu . I find that the EAW does not meet the requirements of s.2(6) of the 2003 Act and accordingly is invalid.”

25. Finally, the Respondent relies upon the measures in place in Romania to ensure that specialty rights are protected: Enasoaie v Romania [2021] EWHC 69 (Admin) and Nisipeanu v Romania [2024] EWHC 385 (Admin) .

26. In these ways, the Respondent supported the findings and the order of the District Judge. The Appellant

27. Ms Hill’s core submission was that the AW was not valid. The further information provided could not save the AW. The case was not distinguishable from Edutanu . The cases which post-date Edutanu re-enforce her case.

28. The fourth-listed case in the conjoined cases known as Edutanu is Pascariu . At [113], Beatson LJ concludes: “where it appears from the terms of an EAW read as a whole that the IJA is seeking a return that would mean the requested person will serve a longer sentence than the sentences for the offences for which extradition is sought and that the total sentence is in respect of offences which have not been particularised rather than only aggravating those which have been particularised it will not be valid. As I stated at para 9 above, particular care must be taken in ascertaining the meaning of the EAW in such cases. The fact that the EAW refers to a total sentence to be served that is longer than the sentence for the particularised offences is a strong pointer to construing the sentence as “originating from” and being for the unparticularised conduct. Of the cases before us, only the EAW in Pascariu’s case falls into this category.”

29. The Appellant’s case is on all fours with Pascariu’s case, submits Ms Hill. Reading that AW as a whole the total sentence was for a period that was two years longer than the sentence for the particularised offence. The Court reached the clear conclusion that since the total sentence in the AW clearly reflects sentences for the unparticularised offences, it does not meet the requirements of section 2 : [Beatson LJ at 129].

30. Ms Hill relied on the summary propositions rehearsed by Nicol J in M v Italy [2018] EWHC 1808 (Admin) , with which Gross LJ agreed: “i) Unless an EAW satisfies the terms of s.2 of the 2003 Act , extradition cannot be ordered. ii) It is for the Judicial Authority to show that what purports to be an EAW does indeed satisfy the requirements of s.2 - see s.206 of the 2003 Act iii) In this, as in all other matters relating to the extradition, the Judicial Authority must prove its case to the criminal standard ibid . iv) In approaching the EAW, the District Judge must do so in the spirit of mutual trust and confidence. This must include making reasonable allowance for difficulties that may arise because of documents being written in languages other than English.”

31. The AW should identify the offence or offences for which extradition is sought: s 2 of the 2003 Act . That is fundamental in order to ensure that each offence is an extradition offence and to enable the Requested Person to rely on specialty Protection: M v Italy at [47].

32. On the ‘line’ identified by Irwin LJ in Alexander , as between an AW which is invalid on its face, which could be rendered valid by supplementary information, and an AW that was wholly deficient, I was referred to the judgment of Swift J in Podolak v Polish Judicial Authority at [19], and particularly the last sentence: “In my view, such a distinction is less certain or clear than it might at first appear. Taking the present case as an example, it is equally possible to characterise the information admitted by the District Judge as updating information, supplementing the warrant to take account of events necessitated by the passage of time since it was first issued, rather than as contradictory information. In my view, the line identified by the court in Alexander as to the limits on the use of supplementary information is an expression of the principle of mutual cooperation that underpins the system established by the Framework Decision. In any particular case the question for the court is whether admitting the supplementary information is consistent with that principle of mutual cooperation, or whether it tends to undermine it. The point arising from the judgment of Irwin LJ is that admitting supplementary information to make good a wholly deficient EAW would itself go against the principle of mutual cooperation because that principle is to be adhered to as much by the requesting authority as by the extraditing authority.”

33. Grozavu v Romania is an example of the application of Edutanu principles to very similar facts with the result that the AW was found to be both invalid and not capable of being saved in whole or in part. The AW is either valid or it is not and there is no permissible ‘transient’ validity: Zakrzewski v District Court of Torun, Poland [2013] 1 WLR 324 per Lord Sumption at [8]; followed in Alexander at [411 H] and Edutanu at [103]. As a result, the adequacy of specialty measures is not relevant and does not arise. That is a subsequent question if there is a valid AW.

34. The Romanian authorities are able to issue a second, valid, warrant: see for example Marinescu v Fourth District Court in Bucharest, Romania [2025] EWHC 600 (Admin) per Collins Rice J. Discussion - Validity

35. The AW is, as the Respondent submits, in standard form and has been completed with the range and type of detail which is expected for each of its component ‘boxes’. This is not a case of a confused AW nor is it unduly difficult to follow and understand, as was, for example, found in M v Italy . It is not internally inconsistent nor contradictory.

36. However, as I have found at paragraph 10 above, it is an AW which is concerned with one offence. The problem with the AW is the sentence of 3 years and 2 months which appears on the AW and its clear relationship to the single smuggling offence. The Appellant is requested to be returned to serve that sentence, for that offence. That is what the AW says, but that is not the sentence which properly relates to the offence for which the particulars are given.

37. The AW is concerned with one offence which is referred to as smuggling. There is no dispute between the parties as to the particulars provided for that offence, and I can see no defect in that regard. However, it is conceded by the Respondent that it is necessary to go to the further information in order to supplement the AW and to complete it. The omission from the AW is not a detail of an offence with the AW refers to. The omission is not a gap or supplement to facts which already appear on the AW. The omission is the failure to mention the counterfeit currency offence, at all.

38. This is not a case in which there is, for example, a reference or case number which flags the existence of the counterfeit currency offence. Equally, it is not a case in which the custodial sentence is explained as being an aggregate of the extradition offence (here, smuggling) with other unparticularized offences. Rather, the reader of the AW, without more, is told that the sentence for smuggling is 3 years and 2 months, which is incorrect.

39. Edutanu is a decision of a Divisional Court which has guided cases under section 2 of the 2003 Act for nearly 10 years. The passages from Beatson LJ’s judgment cited at paragraphs 28 and 29 above relate directly to the facts and circumstances of this case: the complete omission of particulars of an offence and the inclusion of a sentence which does not accurately relate to the sentence for the offence which is particularized. That authority is clear about the consequence, namely that the AW is not valid.

40. Jipa does not assist the Respondent. Cutts J held that the express references in the AW to another offence with which the Romanian Court had merged the sentence led to the further information. Read together, the position which the appellant faced was clear and he was not prejudiced. I do not accept that Jipa is authority for the proposition that an AW is lawful providing it does not contain inconsistencies.

41. The court is not limited to finding inconsistencies within the AW for it to be invalid. As the Respondent accepts, questions of validity are fact-specific. A finding that an AW is not valid is not limited in the way which the Respondent suggests. That was also the judgment of Nicola Davies J in Grosavu [paragraph 24 above]. I adopt and apply the same reasoning in this case and I conclude that the AW is not valid.

42. Per Alexander , further information may provide details which save an AW. However, this case is clearly on the side of the line (per Podolak ; paragraph 32 above) from which the AW cannot be rendered valid by further and supplementary information and it is in that respect that I have, with very great respect, reached a different conclusion to that of the District Judge. I do so with the benefit of a focused hearing on these specific issues whereas the District Judge was engaged in a much wider ambit fact-finding and analysis.

43. Nor do I accept that recourse to specialty protections cures the defect. The problems encountered by a requested person who is faced with an invalid AW are not mitigated by invoking specialty: e.g. the requested person may wish to argue that there is a bar to extradition for a particular offence, or; identifying whether the offence is a relevant offence for the purposes of the 2003 Act .

44. I therefore conclude that the AW is not valid and is not saved by the further information. The appeal is therefore allowed on Ground 1. By section 27(5) of the 2003 Act , the Court must order the Appellant’s discharge and quash the order for extradition. I note, however, that it is open to Romania to reissue a valid AW.

45. It is therefore not strictly necessary to address Ground 2, so I shall give only brief reasons. Art 8

46. In Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski and five others [2016] 1 WLR 551 a Divisional Court (Lord Thomas CJ, Ryder LJ and Ouseley J) held, in the context of article 8 arguments in extradition proceedings, that the public interest in ensuring that extradition arrangements are honoured and in discouraging persons from viewing the United Kingdom as a state willing to accept fugitives from justice are high and so those matters should be expressly addressed in the reasoned judgment. The decisions of the requesting judicial authority of the member state should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. Further, the appellate court, in deciding the question whether a district judge was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not a proportionate interference with the requested person’s rights under article 8, has to focus on the outcome, namely whether the decision on proportionality itself was wrong, rather than any errors or omissions in his reasoning.

47. In Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23 Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Stephens restated key principles on the role of article 8 in extradition cases: cases in which a submission founded on article 8 may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. It is most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life.

48. The District Judge found as follows: “73. My starting point is an assessment of the seriousness of the conduct of which the requested person has been convicted. I am satisfied that the offences are properly to be regarded as serious, given the length of the sentence imposed. Whilst no explanation has been given for the decision [to] merge [the] two separate sentences and activate the suspended sentence, I must afford a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect to the decision of the judicial authority in this respect.

74. The lengths to which the requested person has gone to develop himself in this country by enrolling on the course at Arden University is commendable and much to his credit. I agree, however, with the submissions of Mr Squibbs that the requested person is currently at a stage between the foundation course and the degree course. It would be open to him, in the event of extradition, to return to his studies after serving the sentence imposed either in the UK if he returned here or in Romania. This, together with other aspects of the requested person’s life in the UK, does not amount to very strong counterbalancing factors.

75. In my judgment, this is a case where the public interest factors in favour of extradition that I have identified above weigh heavily in the balance and the balance lies decisively in favour of extradition. There will, sadly, be an impact of extradition for the requested person; but in my judgment it will be what Lord Mance described in Norris as the adverse consequences which extradition has by its nature.”

49. Against this unpromising backcloth, Ms Hill recognized the difficulty of her argument. She made the most of her best point which was that the requirement to satisfy the suspended sentence for the counterfeit currency offence had been completed. The Appellant had returned to Romania to ‘sign on’ with the probation service and had done unpaid work. That, it was submitted, was relevant to the article 8 balance.

50. Mr Squibbs emphasised that the Appellant’s established private life in the UK was ‘modest’. The interference was not great. I accept that submission.

51. In my judgment, the District Judge’s analysis was not only careful and complete, it was also correct. I would have dismissed the appeal on this ground. Conclusion

52. The appeal is allowed on Ground 1 only. The extradition order is quashed and the Appellant is discharged.