Sharin Masih v The Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary

1. This is a claim for false imprisonment of the Claimant by the Defendant when the Claimant attended at the Defendant’s Compass House Custody Suite in Quedgeley Gloucester on 7 May 2020. Ms Masih was attending in her capacity as an Appropriate Adult to support a juvenile detained person.

2. The website of the National Appropriate Adult Network explains the role of an Appropriate Adult: “The role of the appropriate adult is to safeguard the interests, rights, entitlements and welfare of children and vulnerable people who are suspected of a criminal offence, ensuring that they are treated in a fair and just manner, and are able to participate effectively”.

3. On the day in question Ms Masih went into the cell in which the detained person was held. The cell door was closed and locked. M|s Masih says that that constituted false imprisonment. Although at the time of this incident Ms Masih had been working as an Appropriate Adult for more than 12 years, this was the first time that she had been to Compass House. Representation

4. The Claimant is a litigant in person, although for the purposes of the trial on 31 October 2025, she was represented by direct access Counsel, Mr Hay, who also represented Ms Masih at a number of case management or other hearings including the most recent Case Management Conference on 30 May 2025.

5. The Defendant is the Chief Constable, the responsible person for Gloucestershire Constabulary, represented by solicitors and counsel and at the trial by Mr Marwick who also represented the Defendant at the Case Management Conference on 30 May 2025. The history of the proceedings

6. The Claim was issued on 7 September 2022. A Defence was filed on 5 October 2022 and an Amended Defence on 13 July 2023. As Mr Marwick points out, the case has a long and convoluted history. I will not go into that in this judgment. In her original claim and Particulars Of Claim, Ms Masih raised a number of other allegations and heads of claim. But, at the Case Management Conference on 30 May 2025 before me it was confirmed that the Caimant abandoned all allegations save for the claim for false imprisonment. I directed that the case should remain allocated to the fast track and listed the claim for a one-day trial on the issue of liability only on the false imprisonment allegation. The Law

7. There was no major disagreement between Counsel as to the law and both referred me to the relevant sections in Clerk & Lindsell (24 th ed). Mr Hay also referred me to the relevant section in Halsbury and a 221 page bundle of authorities filed on the morning of the hearing.

8. Clerk & Lindsell at 14- 24 says this: “False imprisonment is ‘the unlawful imposition of constraint on another's freedom of movement from a particular place’ [Collins v Wilcock (1984)]. The tort is established on proof of: (1) the fact of imprisonment; and (2) the absence of lawful authority to justify that imprisonment. For these purposes, imprisonment is complete deprivation of liberty for any time, however short, without lawful cause [Bird v Jones (1845)]”.

9. And at section 14-28: “To be liable in false imprisonment, it must be demonstrated that the defendant had the necessary intention, as well as the ability, to detain the claimant. It must be shown that had the claimant attempted to leave premises controlled by the defendant, the defendant would have taken steps to stop him” .

10. And section 14-29: “ Where the claimant enters the defendant’s premises on terms which involves some restriction of his liberty he cannot later complain of false imprisonment” .

11. Mr Hay particularly drew my attention to paragraphs 141 and 152 of Halsbury’s section on False Imprisonment: “141 A claim of false imprisonment lies at the suit of a person unlawfully imprisoned against the person who causes the imprisonment. Any total restraint of the liberty of the person, for however short a time, by the use or threat of force or by confinement, is an imprisonment. It is not necessary that the person detained is aware of the detention at the time…The gist of the claim of false imprisonment is the mere imprisonment. The claimant need not prove that the imprisonment was unlawful independently of the tort or malicious but establishes a prima facie case if he proves that he was imprisoned by the defendant; the onus then lies on the defendant of proving a justification. Footnote 2 of that section says this: “There is an imprisonment if A, with the intention of detaining B (my emphasis) , locks the door of a room (Williams v Jones (1736) Lee temp Hard 298 at 301 per Lord Hardwicke CJ), or places a sentinel at the door of a house and so prevents B from leaving the room or house (Glynn v Houstoun (1841) 2 Man & G 337) .” Evidence

12. Ms Masih gave evidence. I do bear in mind that for much of case Ms Masih has been acting in person. She had prepared a witness statement dated 24 July 2025, many years after the events in question. In her statement Ms Masih claimed that she had been locked in the cell for 30-45 minutes (in the Particulars of Claim she says 30-40 minutes). Ms Masih says that she did not consent to the door being locked. Ms Masih alleges that, when she pressed the buzzer in the cell, there was no response for a significant amount of time. She further says that, on pressing the call button in the cell in order to be released, this was ignored by police officers and staff in the custody suite.

13. Ms Masih made a formal complaint to the Defendant on 28 May 2020. The complaint was investigated by DI Ainslie of the Defendant’s Professional Standards Department who dismissed the complaint on 1 July 2020 with the Inspector finding that the service provided was reasonable. Ms Masih’s request on 5 August 2020 for that decision to be reviewed by the Independent Review Officer for the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner was also dismissed, the Independent Review Officer concluding on 1 September 2020 that the Claimant had been given a reasonable and proportionate response.

14. Ms Masih relies on what was reported to her later as an unreserved apology. That is recorded in an email dated 15 September 2020 from Mr Tickner, the Senior Appropriate Adult Coordinator for CCP, the service which employed the Claimant, which records that Andy Kilmory, the Custody Chief Inspector, offered “an unreserved apology from Gloucestershire Police; confirmation that the custody officer concerned had been firmly advised about their performance; and identified learning for the custody staff on duty at the time”.

15. At the conclusion of the Claimant’s evidence the Defendant sought to make a submission that the Defendant had no case to answer and, in accordance with CPR 32.1.6, the Defendant was put to their election and decided not to call evidence. Statements had been filed and served from three police officers who were present in Court, but the Defendant’s counsel sought to conclude matters on submissions.

16. The notes in the White Book on the issue refer to the case of Benham Limited v Kythira Investments limited [2003] EWCA Civ 1794 where Lord Justice Simon Brown is reported to have stated at paragraph 30 of his judgment that it must be recognised that in these circumstances the Claimant may establish [their] case by establishing no more than a weak prima facie case which has then been strengthened to the necessary standard of proof by the adverse inferences to be drawn from the Defendant’s election. Such adverse inference can in other words tip the balance of probability in the Claimant’s favour.

17. Although not having given evidence, I can only place limited weight on the Defendant’s evidence, I had watched the CCTV and seen a transcript of that CCTV footage. The Defence and Amended Defence are signed with a Statement of Truth. The Amended Defence denies imprisonment and any intention to do so. It avers that Ms Masih was able to leave on request and, as soon as she asked to leave she did so.

18. The Defendant’s Defence and Amended Defence set out the chronology of the CCTV. It is clear from that that Ms Masih entered the cell at 20.41 hours. The detention officer said to her “I’m going to have to shut the door, when you want to come back out just press the buzzer and I'll come back out”. Ms Masih responded, ‘OK Fine’. It is clear from the CCTV that Ms Masih agreed to the cell door being closed. The cell door was then shut and being a police cell door it self-locked and there was no handle on the inside. The CCTV also makes it clear, from Ms Masih’s discussion with the detained person, that she knew it was locked. She laughed about it to the detained person. At no time in the CCTV does it show Ms Masih pushing against the door to check. Ms Masih knew, as she was told, that if she wanted to come out all she needed to do was press the buzzer.

19. At 20.45 hours Ms Masih rang the buzzer. It was answered within 15 seconds. Ms Masih enquired what was happening. The detention officer said that they would find out. Ms Masih did not ask for the door to be opened. At 20.56 hours Ms Masih rang the buzzer again. The call was answered within 30 seconds. At 20.58 the custody officer came to the cell and spoke to Ms Masih through the opening in the door. There is a conversation about when the detained person would be interviewed. During that conversation, at 21.00 hours, Ms Masih asked if she could come out. The detention officer immediately opened the cell door and let Ms Masih out.

20. At no time on the CCTV did Ms Masih appear concerned about these events at the time, but I accept that she may have been acting professionally in order not to concern the detained person. Submissions

21. I am grateful to Counsel for their helpful skeleton arguments and submissions. Mr Marwick submitted that the Claimant had no arguable case; that having regard to the CCTV evidence Ms Masih was not a reliable witness; and that in any event there was no evidence of the requisite intention to imprison. Further, the Custody Suite at Compass House was a secure area in any event with locked doors at the entrance and exit to the Suite.

22. Mr Hay argued with some force that, as the Defendant had elected not to give evidence, it was a high bar to establish that the Claimant had no arguable case and the Defendant effectively no case to answer. He submitted, in the light of the Halsbury analysis (perhaps minimising the issue of intent) that Ms Masih simply had to establish that she was confined and that the burden then shifted to the Defendant to establish justification or lawful cause. As Ms Masih was confined in a cell and the Defendant gave no evidence, the Claimant must succeed. Discussion

23. The local Gloucestershire Police custody manual disclosed by the Defendant says this: “15.2.10 Appropriate adults may be escorted to the cell to wait with the person they are assisting if they wish to do so and the custody officers is satisfied there are no welfare or safety issues. The door to the cell should be closed unless there are extenuating circumstances and the cell call system explained to the appropriate adult.”

24. I understand that CCP have a policy that Appropriate Adults should not be locked in a cell with a detained person regardless of whether they agree to this.

25. But this trial is not about the Defendant’s processes and policies nor its arrangements with CCP and any conflicting policies CCP may have regarding their Appropriate Adults attending at police stations.

26. The Claimant has the burden of proof of establishing the tort of unlawful imprisonment. The burden may then shift to the Defendant to establish whether there was lawful authority or justification for the imprisonment or confinement.

27. “Intention” is defined in Collins online dictionary as ‘decide’, ‘plan’, ‘mean’, ‘aim’ and ‘determine’.

28. The Defendant may have apologised to the Claimant via her employers. But an apology is not an admission of liability. The Claimant’s complaints to the Defendant. and the OPCC were dismissed.

29. In his skeleton argument Mr Hay argues that the circumstances constituted a breach of the provisions of the PACE Code. However, he was relying on the applicable Code in 2023, which of course post-dated the events in question, and was not something pleaded in any event and no permission to amend was sought.

30. Ms Masih did not accept in evidence the accuracy of the CCTV and believed that 11 minutes was missing. In this respect Ms Masih was mistaken. Given the passage of time since the incident, that is perhaps understandable. Findings

31. Ms Masih entered the cell willingly and agreed to do so.

32. Ms Masih knew that the door would be closed and that it was locked. She was in the cell with the detained person for 20 minutes.

33. Ms Masih was clearly told by the detention officer and knew that she would be let out if she pressed the buzzer and asked to be let out. That is what happened immediately she asked to be let out.

34. There was no unreasonable delay on the part of the Defendant in responding when Ms Masih pressed the buzzer and subsequently when she asked for the door to be opened.

35. The Defendant had no intention of detaining Ms Masih or of restricting her liberty.

36. Whilst the Claimant may have been ‘confined’ in the sense submitted by Mr Hay, she was not falsely imprisoned. The circumstances do not satisfy the tests for false imprisonment set out in the sections quoted above from Clerk & Lindsell and Halsbury. Outcome

37. In all the circumstances I dismiss the claim. I will hear submissions on any consequential matters when this judgment is formally handed down. Conclusion

38. Although I have dismissed Ms Masih’s claim, I wish to record my appreciation, as I did at the conclusion of the trial, for the work that Ms Masih has done for many years in supporting children and vulnerable adults at an immensely stressful time in their lives at police stations. Her’s is a vital service and I hope that, though doubtless disappointed at my decision, she will feel able to resume or continue this valuable work.

39. Finally, I apologise for the delay in finalising this judgment. The case raised a number of important evidential and legal issues. District Judge Humphreys