SK, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

HHJ Richard Williams : Introduction and background

1. By this claim, the Claimant challenges the Defendant’s alleged failure to comply with and discharge her statutory and common law obligations to provide her and her young child with suitable accommodation pursuant to s. 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“ ”). the 1999 Act

2. The Claimant, who is a national of India, arrived in the UK on 6 November 2023 on a skilled migrant visa, although the job was withdrawn on her arrival to the UK.

3. The Claimant’s now estranged husband joined the Claimant in the UK as a dependent under the visa.

4. The Claimant experienced domestic violence by her husband, and in January 2024 the Claimant fled the family home.

5. The visa was curtailed by the Defendant, and the Claimant’s leave to remain in the UK expired on 14 May 2024.

6. On 16 September 2024, the Claimant’s son was born.

7. On 17 February 2025, the Claimant applied for asylum, and shortly thereafter made an application for accommodation pursuant to s. 95 of the 1996 Act. The Claimant’s asylum claim is yet to be determined.

8. On 6 March 2025, the Claimant and her son moved to hotel accommodation at Quality Hotel, 55 Trinity Street, Stoke-on-Trent, ST1 5NB.

9. On 8 May 2025, the present claim was issued.

10. On 17 July 2025, HHJ Wall granted (i) permission to continue the substantive claim, and (ii) interim relief whereby the Defendant was mandated to “provide the Claimant and her son with suitable self-contained, self-catering dispersal accommodation within 14 days”.

11. On 25 July 2025, the Claimant and her son were moved to self-contained, self-catering accommodation. It is the Defendant’s evidence that this move was the result of “dispersal taking place in the usual mechanism in line with the overriding policy objectives of exiting hotels. This is not a concession that the Claimant’s accommodation was not adequate…... and the dispersal arose independently of [the ongoing litigation].” Legal framework

12. S. 95 of the 1999 Act provides: “(1) The Secretary of State may provide, or arrange for the provision of, support for— (a) asylum-seekers, or (b) dependants of asylum-seekers, who appear to the Secretary of State to be destitute or to be likely to become destitute within such period as may be prescribed. … (3) For the purposes of this section, a person is destitute if— (a) he does not have adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it (whether or not his other essential living needs are met); or (b) he has adequate accommodation or the means of obtaining it but cannot meet his other essential living needs. (4) If a person has dependants, subsection (3) is to be read as if the references to him were references to him and his dependants taken together. (5) In determining, for the purposes of this section, whether a person's accommodation is adequate, the Secretary of State— (a) must have regard to such matters as may be prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph; but (b) may not have regard to such matters as may be prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph or to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (6). (6) Those matters are— (a) the fact that the person concerned has no enforceable right to occupy the accommodation; (b) the fact that he shares the accommodation, or any part of the accommodation, with one or more other persons; (c) the fact that the accommodation is temporary; (d) the location of the accommodation.”

13. S. 96 of the 1999 Act provides: “(1) Support may be provided under section 95 … – (a) by providing accommodation appearing to the Secretary of State to be adequate for the needs of the supported person and his dependants (if any); (b) by providing what appear to the Secretary of State to be essential living needs of the supported person and his dependants (if any); …. (2) If the Secretary of State considers that the circumstances of a particular case are exceptional, he may provide support under section 95 in such other ways as he considers necessary to enable the supported person and his dependants (if any) to be supported.”

14. In R (SA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1787 (Admin) , Fordham J summarised at [8]-[10] the case law in relation to assessing “adequacy”, referring inter alia to R (MQ) v SSHD [2023] EWHC 205 (Admin) and R (NB) v SSHD [2021] EWHC 1489 (Admin) ; [2021] 4 WLR 92 : [8.] There is a twin-track test for deciding whether the Home Secretary's duty has been discharged. This was well-established in relation to essential living needs ( NB §§145-153). It is now recognised in relation to adequate accommodation ( NB §§154-155, 161). This matches "housing" being a "material reception condition" in the foundational EU Directive ( NB §154), with its continuing impact ( NB §§157-158). Under the twin-track test, a first question is whether the Home Secretary's response meets an 'objective minimum standard', whose delineation is a hard-edged question for the judicial review court. A second question is whether the response involves an evaluative judgment which is reasonable, another objective standard but one involving the familiar secondary judgment, which respects the latitude afforded to the primary decision-maker. Both Mr Gardner and Ms Brown support that twin-track test. Ms Brown explains its logic by contending that the 'objective minimum standard' is reserved for features – which in the case of adequate accommodation would include windows and heating – which every asylum-seeker must necessarily need and receive. But that rigidity of logic cannot be right, because "nappies, formula milk and other special requirements of new mothers, babies and very young children" recognisably fell within the objective minimum standard for essential living needs ( NB §151). [9.] As with essential living needs, the question whether adequate accommodation is being provided in discharge of the statutory duty, requires this principled approach. (1) Adequacy must be tested by reference to the needs of those persons to whom the duty is owed, in a context where accommodation is being provided to prevent destitution ( A §§52-53; MQ §127a). (2) Adequacy must be tested by reference to – and so measured against – the individual circumstances and needs of each relevant individual, including each dependent, having regard to the age of any child ( A §53; NB §167, MQ §127b). (3) Adequacy must ensure, as an objective minimum standard, a dignified standard of living, which is adequate for health and is capable of ensuring subsistence ( NB §§153, 155, 161, 171). (4) The evaluative judgment of adequacy of accommodation, carried out for the Home Secretary, must satisfy basic standards of reasonableness (and any other relevant public law grounds) ( NB §§150, 161, 171). (5) These are high thresholds for an asylum seeker to meet ( NB §161). [10.] Adequacy is informed by length of time ( A §54, NB §149, MQ §127c). (1) Accommodation may be adequate only in the short-term ( A §59, MQ §128), and not adequate on a long-term basis ( NB §159), becoming unsuitable by reason of the passage of time ( A §55). (2) It is necessary to look at the totality of accommodation ( MQ §169), the conditions and how long they are being experienced ( NB §172). (3) There may also be a change in circumstances or change in needs which mean accommodation is no longer adequate ( A §59, NB §160). (4) It is relevant to consider the prospective picture and the explanation given: the period during which the accommodation was or is "likely to be" occupied ( A §54), the "uncertainty" ( NB §149), whether the "stay was only to be a short one", and whether those affected were "reliably informed that this was the case, so that they had the comfort of knowing that their stay was finite" ( NB §165).” Pleaded cases

15. In summary, it is the Claimant’s case that the hotel accommodation was inadequate for the following reasons: i) The accommodation is too small and cramped, with insufficient space for the baby to safely move around. This is compounded by the lack of storage space for the Claimant’s belongings. This problem will only be exacerbated as the baby continues growing and as additional items are needed. ii) The accommodation is full board with no cooking facilities for the Claimant to prepare her own meals; the food provided is inadequate and inappropriate for a breastfeeding mother. iii) The accommodation does not provide food that is suitable for the Claimant’s seven-month-old baby, except for puréed vegetables which the Claimant cannot keep in her room to give to her son when needed. iv) As she is in full-board accommodation, the Claimant receives extremely little money and spends whatever she can on obtaining food for her son and herself. This leaves her with almost no money to buy anything else she or her son may need, or for travel. v) The Claimant, a domestic violence survivor and vulnerable new mother, has been harassed by a male member of staff in the hotel; after being told that the member of staff had been suspended the Claimant saw him again in the hotel.

16. In summary, it is the Defendant’s case that the hotel accommodation was adequate for the following reasons: i) The Claimant's primary complaint concerns the size and layout of her accommodation, alleging inadequate space for her son's development. However, the evidence establishes that the Claimant occupies room 304 measuring 15.48 square metres. This substantially exceeds the minimum space standards under Schedule 4 of the Housing Act 2004 , which requires only 4.64 square metres for a person under 10 years old and 6.51 square metres for a person over 10 years old. The accommodation therefore objectively meets and surpasses statutory space requirements. ii) Following the comprehensive investigation conducted by the Defendant, the evidence demonstrates that the hotel provides extensive meal options meeting nutritional requirements for both the Claimant and her infant son. Specifically for infant feeding, the hotel provides milk formula and pureed vegetables, demonstrating responsiveness to the needs of a weaning baby. The provision is supplemented by financial support of £27.22 per week enabling additional food purchases as required. iii) The Claimant's allegations of harassment by hotel staff were thoroughly investigated by the Defendant, with comprehensive remedial action taken. The investigation process and outcomes demonstrate that appropriate safeguarding systems are in place and functioning effectively. The Defendant's investigation revealed that the staff member was immediately suspended pending investigation. CCTV footage with audio was reviewed, confirming that a conversation had taken place in the Claimant's native language, during which she had asked for the staff member’s telephone number for future assistance. While the staff member was educated about professional boundaries, the investigation found no conduct warranting dismissal. Following the investigation specific protective measures were implemented whereby the staff member was instructed not to approach or engage in conversation with the Claimant, and was prohibited from entering the restaurant area during his shifts while the Claimant was present. iv) The harassment investigation conducted by the accommodation provider demonstrates thorough and professional inquiry meeting appropriate standards. The investigation included immediate suspension of the staff member, private interview of the Claimant with a female Housing Officer present, cross-referencing of provided telephone numbers with staff records, and comprehensive CCTV review with audio analysis…The CCTV evidence revealed the staff member and Claimant conversed in their native language, with the Claimant appearing "at ease and in no way looked threatened, scared, or awkward" during the interaction. Critically, the evidence established that the Claimant had requested the employee's telephone number for future assistance, contradicting the harassment allegation. The staff member, described as "a happily married man with wife and children, religious," explained he meant no harm and was simply being friendly”. The proper approach to resolving factual disputes

17. Whilst there is uncontested documentary evidence, including photographs, in the hearing bundle upon which I could rely to determine much of the factual disputes (space and food) between the parties, they do not assist me in determining the allegation of harassment. That is a serious allegation, the resolution of which would impact upon both the Claimant and the member of staff concerned if: i) I was to find the allegation not proven and where the Defendant alleges that the Claimant exaggerated the allegation; or ii) I was to find the allegation proven and where the member of staff was previously cleared by an internal investigation.

18. In closing arguments, I asked how I could fairly make a finding of the disputed allegation of harassment without it being put to the Claimant and the member of staff in cross-examination so that they both be given the opportunity to respond. It was argued on behalf of the Claimant that I can easily and safely resolve that factual dispute simply on the written evidence alone. In support of that proposition, the Claimant relied upon R (Dobson) v SSJ [2023] EWHC 50 (Admin) where Fordham J said this (at para [35]): “The judicial review Court can take the need to resolve disputed facts in its stride. It is well-established that the Court on judicial review may need to make findings of fact, whether with or without oral evidence, where to do so is key to deciding whether a ground for judicial review is made out. A paradigm of such a need is when resolving a disputed fact is key to deciding whether there has been a breach of a duty of procedural fairness (or propriety). All of that was common ground in the present case but I will interpose to add some references to recent authority: R (Talpada) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 841 at §2 (“If there is a dispute of fact, and it is relevant to the legal issues which arise in a claim for judicial review, the court usually proceeds on written evidence. Since the burden of proof is usually on the person who asserts a fact to be true, if that burden is not discharged, the court will proceed on the basis that the fact has not been proved”); R (Matthews) v City of York Council [2018] EWHC 2102 (Admin) at §19 (judicial review Court resolving a factual dispute as to whether an email was received); R (Mackay) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 1178 (Admin) at §§44-45 (judicial review Court concluding that the parole board’s factual assertion, regarding the claimant’s conduct at a hearing, was not supported by contemporaneous notes or witness statements); R (Olabinjo) v Westminster Magistrates Court [2020] EWHC 1093 (Admin) at §4 (“where a proper inference can be drawn from the available materials, this court can make findings of fact even in proceedings for judicial review”).

19. However, in R (F) v Surrey County Council [2023] EWHC 980 (Admin) , Chamberlain J summarised as follows the principles applicable on judicial review when a dispute of fact arises: “[46] In general, a court hearing a judicial review claim does not resolve disputes about primary fact. This is because, in general, the issues for the court to determine do not turn on the resolution of such disputes. Typically, the court focuses on the procedure adopted before the decision was made; whether the decision-maker was entitled to conclude the information before him was sufficient; and whether the decision-maker identified and answered what in law were the right questions, approached and structured his task in a logically acceptable way, gave adequate and intelligible reasons and reached a decision that was open to him on the evidence. In most cases, a claim alleging a flaw of this kind will not depend on the resolution of any dispute about primary fact. When a decision is challenged on the basis of material error of fact, the claimant is required to show that the fact is “uncontentious and objectively verifiable” rather than one that the court has to determine for itself: see e.g. R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin) , [2019] 1 WLR 1649 , [98]. [47] When a claimant invites the court to resolve a dispute of fact, the invitation is sometimes an indicator of his inability to identify a proper public law ground on which the challenged decision can be impugned. There are, however, situations in which a genuine public law ground of challenge requires resolution of a dispute about a primary fact. In that situation, it is often claimed that there is a general principle that the defendant’s written evidence is to be preferred, unless exceptionally the court permits cross examination or the evidence “cannot be correct”: see e.g. R (Safeer) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 2518 , [16]-[19] (Nicola Davies LJ); R (Singh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 2861 , [16] (Underhill LJ). The scope of the “cannot be correct” exception was explained by Stanley Burnton J in S v Airedale NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 1780 (Admin) , at [18]: “There may be an exception where there is undisputed objective evidence inconsistent with that of the witness that cannot sensibly be explained away (in other words, the witness’s testimony is manifestly wrong)…” [48] There are, however, other equally authoritative statements which put the principle more neutrally and do not refer to any presumption in favour of the defendant. In R (Talpada) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 841 , Hallett LJ said this at [2]: “If there is a dispute of fact, and it is relevant to the legal issues which arise in a claim for judicial review, the court usually proceeds on written evidence. Since the burden of proof is usually on the person who asserts a fact to be true, if that burden is not discharged, the court will proceed on the basis that the fact has not been proved. It would be an exceptional case in which oral evidence was needed by the Administrative Court – or the Upper Tribunal when exercising its judicial review jurisdiction.” [49] There are many instances in which the courts have resolved questions of fact on the basis of written evidence without cross-examination, sometimes against defendants: see, for example, the cases referred to by Sir Michael Fordham in his Judicial Review Handbook (7th ed., 2020), at para. 17.3.12. [50] In my judgment, the correct approach is as follows: (a) If invited to resolve a dispute of primary fact, the court should consider carefully whether any pleaded ground of challenge really requires resolution of the dispute. In most cases, the answer will be that the resolution of the dispute was for the decision-maker, not the court: the court’s supervisory function does not require it to step into the shoes of the decision-maker and therefore does not require it to resolve the issue for itself. (b) Where the resolution of a dispute of primary fact is necessary, the court usually proceeds on written evidence: see e.g. Talpada , [2]. The court will generally do so if – as here – no application to cross-examine has been made before the start of the substantive hearing. (c) There is no absolute rule that the court must accept in full every part of the statement of a witness who has not been cross-examined, whether the statement is adduced for the claimant or the defendant. The court can reject evidence in a witness statement if it “cannot be correct” ( Safeer , [16]-[19] and Singh, [16]). That might be so if it is contradicted by “undisputed objective evidence… that cannot sensibly be explained away”: S v Airedale , [18]. But there are also examples of courts rejecting evidence given in witness statements as, on balance, inconsistent with other written evidence: see e.g. Talpada , [48]. (d) In some cases, the court may be unable to resolve a conflict of written evidence on a question of primary fact. In that situation, “the court will proceed on the basis that the fact has not been proved”: Talpada , [2]. This will be to the disadvantage of whichever party asserts the fact. That will generally be the claimant, because in judicial review the claimant generally bears the burden of proving all facts necessary to show that the decision challenged is unlawful. Thus, the principle that the defendant’s evidence is to be preferred, save where it “cannot be correct”, arises because of the difficulty of satisfying the burden of proof where there is a conflict in written evidence, not because evidence adduced on behalf of a defendant is inherently more likely to be true than that adduced on behalf of a claimant.”

20. It is Chamberlain J’s summary of the applicable principles that is set out in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 (“ the Judicial Review Guide ”) (at para [11.2.3]).

21. Therefore, having been invited to resolve the disputed allegation of harassment on the written evidence, I must consider carefully whether its resolution is really required/necessary to dispose of these proceedings, which brings me to the preliminary issue of whether I ought to decline to decide the claim in any event because it has been rendered academic as a result of the Claimant and her son having now been moved to self-contained, self-catering dispersal accommodation. Academic claims

20. L, M and P v Devon County Council [2021] EWCA Civ concerned a short point of statutory construction about the timetable for producing amended education health and care plans (“ ECH plans ”). By the time of the substantive hearing, the defendant had served the amended EHC plans, and the first instance judge declined to decide the claims because they had been rendered academic. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted the construction point to the Adminsitrative Court to determine. In giving the lead judgment, Laing LJ said this: “[29.] The Judge’s citation from Tshikangu included a citation from the speech of Lord Slynn in R v Home Secretary ex p Salem [1999] AC 450 at p 457. In that passage, Lord Slynn accepted (as both counsel had agreed) that the House of Lords had a discretion to hear an appeal where there is an issue involving a public authority on a point of public law, even if, by the time of the hearing ‘there is no longer a lis to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties inter se.’ Statements to the contrary in other cases and in the relevant Practice Direction ‘must be read accordingly as limited to disputes concerning private law rights…’ He qualified that by saying that ‘The discretion to hear disputes, even in the area of public law, must, however, be exercised with caution and appeals which are academic between the parties should not be heard unless there is a good reason in the public interest for doing so, as for example (but only by way of example) when a discrete point of statutory construction arises which does not involve detailed consideration of facts and where a large number of similar cases exist or are anticipated so that the issue will most likely need to be resolved in the near future’. … [49.] The first issue, logically, is whether the claims were academic. For reasons which should become clear, I do not consider it necessary to reach a final view on this issue. I will assume that they were academic, notwithstanding the view of Eady J to the contrary, which is, of course, worthy of respect. [50.] Judicial review is a flexible and practical procedure. All remedies in judicial review are discretionary, including declarations (a substantial topic on which we received no distinct submissions). The Administrative Court has at its disposal a range of doctrines, with discretionary elements, to control access to its scarce resources. They include the doctrine that judicial review will not generally be available where there is a suitable alternative remedy, and its approach to timeliness. The discipline of not entertaining academic claims is part of this armoury. It enables the court to avoid hearings in cases in which, although the issue may be arguable, the court’s intervention is not required, because the claimant has obtained, by one means or another, all the practical relief which the Court could give him. I incline to the view that the claims in these cases were academic, because the As had obtained all the practical relief for which they had asked, that is, the issue of the final amended statements. There was still a potential issue between the parties about the construction of the Regulations, but it was no longer live. It was no longer live in these proceedings, whether or not it was possible, probable, or virtually certain that it would arise again in a future year. As a matter of judicial policy, the best way of controlling access to the court for claims such as these is the rigorous filter of the test in Salem . [51.] The next question is whether, on the assumption that the claims were academic, the Judge should have refused to decide them. I should make clear that I accept Mr Broach’s submission, which was not disputed by Mr Anderson, that the Administrative Court has a discretion to decide academic claims. There are many examples of the exercise of this discretion in the decided cases…... [52.] I will consider first the factors which indicate that he should have decided the claims. The parties were before the court. Eady J had given permission to apply for judicial review. She had explained why she considered that the claims were not academic. In the light of that, the parties incurred the costs of preparing for a hearing. R did not suggest in its skeleton argument for the hearing that the construction issue should not be decided because it was academic. Not only were the parties ready to argue the construction point, but they argued it fully at the hearing. The Judge accepted both that the construction point was a short point, and that it raised ‘general issues of public interest’. Mr Broach told us that the Judge even indicated during the hearing that he would, in any event, give his view on the construction issue. The parties had expended time and money in preparing for, and attending the hearing, and precious court time had been devoted to the hearing. In those circumstances, the overriding objective would have been furthered by deciding the claims, and frustrated by declining to do so. [53.] The last question is whether there was anything in this case which compelled the Judge not to decide the issue. The Judge had a discretion to decide the claims, even if they were academic, as Mr Anderson rightly concedes. I accept Mr Broach’s submissions that the reasons which the Judge gave for refusing to exercise that discretion are circular. They are, either, an argument that he had no discretion, or reasons which would apply to every academic claim and would, if valid, mean that the court could never exercise its discretion to hear an academic claim. I also accept Mr Broach’s submissions that the Judge applied the wrong tests to the exercise of the discretion (whether it was ‘unavoidable’ or ‘necessary’), rather than the test in ex p Salem . [54.] …….. Paragraphs 18 and 30 of the judgment suggest a further confusion between the question whether the claims were academic and the distinct question whether, if they were academic, he should nevertheless have exercised his discretion to decide them. [55.] The points I have just described show that the Judge fundamentally misunderstood the nature of this discretion. There is nothing in the authorities about the exercise of the discretion which compelled him to conclude that he should not decide the issue of construction. [56.] As the Judge erred in principle in the exercise of the discretion, this Court can exercise it afresh. The dispute in this case is a pure issue of statutory construction. The issue potentially affects many children and young people who have EHC plans (and their parents), and the local authorities which are responsible for maintaining those EHC plans. Even R concedes that it is possible that the issue will arise again in the future between these very parties. The issue concerns a short period in a longer process, so it is unlikely ever to be live by the time an application for judicial review reaches a substantive hearing, and, therefore, unlikely to be decided unless in these claims. There are three cases before the court, and the facts of those cases are not in dispute. It follows that there are good reasons in the public interest for the claims to be heard. Those reasons were strongly reinforced, at the time of hearing before the Judge, by the factors I have described in paragraph 52, above. I consider that the discretion should have been exercised then so as to decide the issue of statutory construction and that it would not be right to take a different course now because that did not happen.”

23. The Judicial Review Guide states in relation to academic claims the following: “[6.3.4.1] Where a claim is academic, i.e. there is no longer a case to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties to the claim, it will generally not be appropriate to bring judicial review proceedings. An example is the situation where the defendant has agreed to reconsider the decision challenged. Where the claim has become academic since it was issued, it is generally inappropriate to pursue the claim. [6.3.4.2] In exceptional circumstances, the Court may decide to proceed with a claim even though the outcome has become academic for the claimant. The Court may do so if, for example, a large number of similar cases exist or are anticipated, or at least some other similar cases exist or are anticipated and the decision will not be fact-sensitive.”

21. In her latest witness statement, the Claimant described her current accommodation as follows: “[8.] My current accommodation is a one-bedroom flat. I have access to my own living room, bathroom and kitchen. Living in this accommodation is much better than living in the hotel, in many different ways. [9.] My son has more space to move around. He plays and crawls and is trying to stand up and take a step. If we were still in the hotel now, there is no way he would be moving around like this. He would not be happy…. [10.] A health visitor came to check my son’s weight and his height three days ago, and said that everything is looking good. [11.] In my bedroom I have a wardrobe where I can put my clothes…. [12.] I am satisfied where we are living now. We can live independently. It is 100% better than in the hotel.”

22. Therefore, plainly the claim is academic in that there is no longer a case to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties to the claim. However, I must decide whether I should exercise my discretion nevertheless to decide the claim. I have concluded for the following primary reasons not to do so: i) In closing it was argued on behalf of the Claimant that the issue potentially affects other pregnant and new mother asylum-seekers. ii) However, the pleaded claim is not formulated by way of a challenge to the lawfulness of the Defendant’s policies/processes as they might apply to the Claimant as a wider group, and no application was made to amend the grounds to pursue a systemic challenge. iii) Unlike the case of L, M and P v Devon County Council , the present case does not involve the determination on agreed facts of a point of law (by way of statutory interpretation), which might be of public interest. iv) The Claimant’s skeleton argument expressly states with my emphasis added – “[1.] This case requires that the Court seeks to answer a simple question; was the hotel accommodation provided by the Defendant adequate for the Claimant and her particular, individual circumstances ? .….. [71.] it is submitted that the cumulative effect of the issues set out above is that the accommodation was inadequate for the Claimant and her son, in light of their particular circumstances …” v) This is a fact sensitive case where the Claimant’s particular individual circumstances are highly relevant and in dispute including the allegation of harassment. vi) The overriding objective under the Civil Procedure Rules includes so far as practicable ensuring the case is dealt with fairly. There is in my view a risk of serious procedural unfairness in me proceeding to make adverse findings in relation to the serious allegation of harassment without it first being put in oral evidence to those directly affected so that they be given the opportunity to respond. vii) Whilst the court has the power, in an appropriate case, to direct oral evidence and cross-examination in judicial review proceedings, it would be wholly disproportionate and contrary to the overriding objective to adjourn this final hearing to direct oral evidence and cross-examination on the allegation of harassment when it would serve no useful purpose now that the claim has been rendered academic. Conclusion

23. I decline to decide the substantive claim, which has been rendered academic as a result of the Claimant having been dispersed during the course of these proceedings to self-contained, self-catering accommodation, which was the relief sought. There is no good reason in the public interest to decide this claim.