Victor Frances, Re

1. The Appellant filed a form GRC1 dated 13 October 2025 with the Tribunal by email on 22 January 2026. The form stated that the appeal was against the South West London ICB (“SWLICB”) in relation to a decision dated 30 July 2024. The Appellant gave the reference “692 PHSO Ref C-2063882”.

2. On 29 January 2026, the Registrar issued case management directions. These stated that he was not satisfied that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, he directed that the Appellant must by 13 February 2026: a. State the statutory provision that give the Tribunal the jurisdiction to consider any decision of the SWLICB b. State why, if the Tribunal has jurisdiction, the Tribunal should consider an out of time appeal (the decision in question having been made on 30 July 2024) and c. State why the Tribunal should not strike out the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

3. The Appellant was notified that a failure to comply with these directions may result in the matter being struck out for non-compliance regardless of any consideration of striking out for want of jurisdiction.

4. The Appellant responded to the directions by email on 11 February 2025. He also applied by way of form GRC5 for a judge to review the appeal and determine whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction.

5. I have reviewed all the papers submitted by the Appellant in this appeal and I deal with the information provided under the three headings set out in the directions dated 29 January 2026 The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider a decision of the SWLICB

6. The reason provided by the Appellant as to why the Tribunal has jurisdiction is as follows: “ The General Regulatory Chamber (GRC) of the First-tier Tribunal derives its powers to review matters related to Integrated Care Boards (ICBs) primarily through the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , as outlined in the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009. These rules allow the tribunal to handle appeals against decisions made by public authorities, including ICBs, regarding data protection and information requests. Misconduct in public office (MiPO) is also applicable.”

7. This appears to me to misunderstand the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to deal with appeals concerning data protection and information rights, which are clearly set out in the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). The Tribunal Rules do not themselves provide any right of appeal, as these simply regulate the procedure which the Tribunal uses to determine appeals.

8. Section 57 of FOIA gives rights of appeal in relation to notices issued by the Information Commissioner under Part IV, namely decision notices, information notices and enforcement notices. The persons who may apply are the complainant or the public authority in question. It does not appear to me from the documentation provided that any such notice has been issued. There is therefore no jurisdiction for the Tribunal to consider the appeal under FOIA.

9. Similarly, section 162 of DPA 2018 provides a right of appeal for the person given that notice in relation to an information notice, assessment notice, interview notice, enforcement notice, penalty notice or penalty variation notice issued by the Information Commissioner. There is also a limited procedural jurisdiction for a data subject to apply under section 166 of DPA 2018 for the Tribunal to order the Information Commissioner to progress its handling of a complaint against a public authority, but there are strict time limits for doing so. I am not satisfied that any of the notices referred to in section 162 of DPA 2018 have been given to the Appellant, so that does not give the Tribunal jurisdiction to consider an appeal on that basis. The time limit for applying to the Tribunal for the Information Commissioner to progress an investigation expires 28 days following the expiry of six months from the date on which the complaint was first made to the Commissioner. The Appellant states that a complaint was made to the Commissioner which took around two and a half years to complete, so there is clearly no scope for the Appellant to make such an application in these circumstances.

10. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider decisions of an Integrated Care Board (ICB) directly under either DPA 2018 or FOIA; appeals only lie to the Tribunal against the Information Commissioner’s decisions. Orders made in favour of data subjects for compliance with data protection obligations are a civil matter, not a matter for this Tribunal under section 167 of DPA 2018. Nor does the Tribunal have any power to deal with allegations of misfeasance in public office.

11. For all these reasons I am not satisfied that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with this matter. Why the Tribunal should consider an appeal out of time

12. The reason provided by the Appellant was as follows: “ The reason is the SWLICB organisational failure to give responses to complaints both in the original forged DST Reports and subsequent FNC Reports, and all other historical failings over a long period of time, that created much delay until we could finally bring our case to the Tribunal, after all other routes were exhausted. The PHSO took two and a half years in deliberation. The ICO took around the same time, too. NHS England refused to comment after a very lengthy period to the various serious complaints we have laid before them. The SWLICB sometimes took as long as 8 months to come up with a reply ”

13. Rule 22(1)(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules provides that an appellant must start proceedings before the Tribunal by sending or delivering to the Tribunal a notice of appeal so that it is received within 28 days of the date on which notice of the act or decision to which the proceedings relate was sent to the appellant. In applying for permission to submit the appeal late, the Appellant is, in effect, applying for relief from the sanction which would ordinarily follow breach of this rule.

14. The proper approach to deciding whether to admit applications which are out of time was set out by the Court of Appeal in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 , [2014] 1 WLR 795 , Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 , [2014] 1 WLR 3926 and R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1663. The approach was summarised in Secretary of State for the Home Department v SS (Congo) & Others [2015] EWCA Civ 387 as comprising three stages. First, the seriousness of the delay must be assessed. Second, the reason for the delay must be considered. Third, all the circumstances of the case must be weighed so as to deal with the matter fairly and justly.

15. The relevant principles from this case law were set out by the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) in R (Onowu) v First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (extension of time for appealing: principles) (IJR) [2016] UKUT 185 (IAC) . In essence, an application for extension of time for doing something in proceedings is an application for relief from the sanction which would ordinarily follow from non-compliance with that step. The principles set out in Onuwu have recently been confirmed as applying to the General Regulatory Chamber by the Upper Tribunal in Osborne v Information Commissioner & the Civil Aviation Authority (UA-2025-000826, 13 August 2025).

16. The first thing I must therefore consider is whether there is a serious and significant breach. Even if the Appellant was appealing a decision of the Information Commissioner, which he is not , his GRC1 form was received by the Tribunal 541 days after the decision in question purports to have been made on 30 July 2024. Any appeal must have been made by 27 August 2024, so the purported appeal was made 513 days late. Making an appeal a year and four months after the statutory time for doing so is a serious breach and significant in the context of this litigation, insofar as the litigation would not be able to proceed at all if permission to file the appeal out of time was not granted. I must therefore proceed to consider the second and third limbs of the test.

17. The second stage of the test is to consider whether there is a good reason for the breach. I do not consider that the Appellant has disclosed any good reason for the delay in filing an appeal in relation to the decision dated 30 July 2024. he fact that the Appellant is unrepresented also does not by itself present a good reason.

18. I have also taken into account the third stage of the test, which involves considering all the circumstances of the case. The two important factors identified in Onuwu were (a) the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and (b) the need to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and court orders. Other relevant factors suggested by the case law include consideration of whether the application was made promptly, but not the substantive merits of the case. I consider that the application was not made promptly after conclusion of the internal review and that no reason for not doing so was advanced. Taking all the circumstances into account and considering the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly, I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate or proportionate to allow the Appellant to file his notice of appeal 514 days after the deadline without good reason. Why the Tribunal should not strike out the appeal for want of jurisdiction

19. The reason provided by the Appellant was as follows: “It is in the public interest to highlight these very wrong practices and depict being operated by SWLICB, and there is currently no enforcement to stop their wrongdoing. I have proof that other ICBs in different areas are copying these corrupt techniques. They are also acting without my consent, and dishonestly claim they had my consent and the right to be present to the assessments, which we proved them wrong. deceit The SWLICB failed to give the official response to the complaint about the two forged and tampered DST Reports, which was being dealt with at the executive level by Rachel Colley Rachel Colley of the SWLICB ordered the Local Resolution Meeting documents and digital recordings of the meeting, to be destroyed despite written assurances from them that I would be provided with a copy of what everyone said at that meeting. The Chair of the Local Resolution Meeting admitted they cheat. The PHSO discovered that the SWLICB had done FNC assessments on my Mother without my knowledge, consent, nor me being present when they were conducted, then the SWLICB relied on that FNC Review when they had to abandon the original forged and tampered DST Reports. Rachel Colley misled the National Midwifery Council's investigation into Melody Arazaz's, Nurse Assessor who conducted the original forged DST Assessments, conduct and actions by giving her a glowing reference and giving the NMC false information by saying that "reports can change", but they failed to understand this was the final report. Instead of reporting her for misconduct, Rachel Colley did everything to protect her staff and other Nurse Assessors, such as the one that used other patient's data in an FNC Report, she was not referred to the NMC. All of these subsequent FNC Reviews are absolutely inaccurate, having data which does not apply to my Mother, being incorporated and used for their financial assessments, at no time has the SWLICB had the desire to correct them. All these failings were pointed out, but the SWLICB just ignored them. Even the retrospectively filled-in FNC Reports, which the PHSO asked the SWLICB to do, were still wrong. Unfortunately, the PHSO doesn't check the accuracy of these retrospective reports, and a new investigation would have had to take place into those Reports. Since that took two and a half years, the meaning of the complaint is lost. The SWLICB have changed their new report structure, and in my opinion, they have made it easier to cheat, as there is no tick box saying that they had consent from the Next of Kin to go ahead with a Review and to be present during that Review. We caught them cheating on this point by claiming that they had my written consent when they didn't. NHS England has failed to enter into any dialogue about these corrupt methods being used, which the SWLICB have now been given a greater role in all complaints by NHS England, without any public safeguarding. I am also concerned that the NHS Broadcare computer system, which the SWLICB use, does not record who logs on or who makes any changes, according to Andrew Eyres, Chief Executive of SWLICB. This has parallels with the Post Office scandal with the Horizon computer systems. Total lack of cooperation and honesty from a public body.”

20. The Appellant’s key point is the public interest in highlighting what he says is misconduct by SWLICB. Exploration into how the various bodies, including not only SWLICB but the NMC, PHSO and NHS England, went about making decisions is beyond the scope of this Tribunal and a matter for judicial review.

21. The assertions made by the Appellant about misconduct and the public interest in exposing it are clearly ones about which he feels strongly, but this is not in itself sufficient to override the fact that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with his complaints about SWLICB as they are articulated by the Appellant. Even if it was, the appeal was brought so far out of time that I do not consider that admitting it would be proportionate, fair or in the interests of justice.

22. Rule 8(2) (a) states that the Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them. I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with the Appellant’s appeal and accordingly must strike it out under Rule 8(2)(a) for want of jurisdiction. Signed: Judge Harris Date: 12 February 2026