NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY · DRN-6200890

The complaint Mr A complains that NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY hasn’t reimbursed payments that he disputed. What happened In May 2025, Mr A reported several payments as fraudulent – they were made from November 2024 onwards and were to a money remitter. Mr A’s representative said he was vulnerable and that someone impersonating his phone provider had told him about a job offer and that he thought the payments related to a car he would receive. NatWest didn’t reimburse the payments. It said the payments were made from Mr A’s mobile banking app on his device and went to an account in his own name. It didn’t think it ought to have intervened in the payments at the time. When Mr A complained to our service, the investigator didn’t uphold the complaint – in summary they didn’t think we’d received sufficient evidence that Mr A had lost his funds to a scam. Mr A didn’t agree, his representative provided the following: • A letter from the money remitter saying two accounts had been set up using Mr A’s details and that the payments were “self-transfer” with Mr A’s name recorded as the sender and receiver to be paid directly to the beneficiary’s account abroad. • Evidence they had been in contact with the police. • They said Mr A was vulnerable, his decision making was impaired by deception, and he thought it was a legitimate arrangement. NatWest should have safeguarded him. • Mr A had effectively lost control of his device. They thought the investigator had focused too narrowly on authorisation – it should be about more than who pressed the buttons. • The WhatsApp messages with the scammer were deleted but he’s still the victim. • NatWest should have intervened in the payments – Mr A was vulnerable and there were repeated payments to a high-risk payment channel being made for an implausible purpose. As an agreement couldn’t be reached, the matter has been passed to me for consideration by an ombudsman. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and

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reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I’m not upholding this complaint for similar reasons to the investigator. Mr A’s representative has made several detailed points about his complaint which I have only summarised above. But I’d like to reassure them that I have considered their submissions in full. And I hope the fact that I do not respond in a similar detail here will not be taken as a discourtesy. As an informal dispute resolution service, we are tasked with reaching a fair and reasonable conclusion with the minimum of formality. In doing so, it is not necessary for me to respond to every point made, but to consider the circumstances as a whole. Can NatWest fairly treat the payments as authorised? Under the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSRs) – the starting point is that Mr A is liable for authorised payments and NatWest is liable for unauthorised payments. Mr A and his representative have at times said the payments were unauthorised and that Mr A didn’t make them. They’ve said he effectively lost control of his device, but it’s not clear exactly what they mean by this. The implication has been that he might have been tricked into giving a third-party remote access to his device or shared his banking information. However, Mr A has also told NatWest that he was given the account details to send the money to and that in return he was expecting a car. So, he does appear to have been aware of the payments and at times implies he made them. NatWest has also provided evidence to show the payments were made from Mr A’s only device linked to the account using his mobile banking. Where evidence is incomplete, missing or contradictory, I need to determine what I think is more likely than not to have happened. I do this by weighing up what I do have and making a finding on the balance of probabilities. Based on the available evidence, I think it’s more likely than not that Mr A did make the disputed payments himself. It follows that I think NatWest can fairly treat them as authorised. I understand Mr A’s representative says he was deceived, but under the PSRs, giving consent to a payment is a formal concept. Consent is given when an agreed procedure is completed by the payer regardless of whether they were manipulated or if Mr A ever received what he thought he was paying for. Should NatWest have done more in the circumstances? In broad terms, the starting position at law is that NatWest is expected to process payments and withdrawals, in accordance with the PSRs and the terms and conditions of the customer’s account. But, taking into account longstanding regulatory expectations and requirements, and what I consider to be good industry practice, NatWest ought to have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and made additional checks before processing payments in some circumstances. However, for NatWest to be liable on this basis, I would need to be satisfied that Mr A had lost his funds to a scam. Here, limited information has been provided about what happened and Mr A’s account of events has changed. The broad premise described by Mr A and his representative appears to be that he was contacted by his mobile phone provider about a job opportunity and that related to this he could get a car that he’d need to pay for in

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instalments. He’s said he shared a copy of his identification documents and never accessed the accounts with the money remitter. But the only evidence our service has received in support of this is an email that Mr A’s representative sent to herself (with no record of where it came from) that appears to show a car purchase agreement dated March 2025. It doesn’t include anything that connects it to the disputed payments – such as the dates, the payment amounts, or account details. So, I’m not persuaded that this is enough to support that Mr A made payments from November 2024 as part of a scam. And I note that the evidence from the money remitter says the funds were sent to an account in Mr A’s name. I appreciate the funds went abroad, but that in itself doesn’t prove there was a scam, nor does the money remitters decision to take what has been reported at face value. I understand Mr A’s representative says he’s vulnerable, but there’s nothing to indicate NatWest was aware of this at the time. This was a relatively new account so there wasn’t a history of “normal” account usage to compare the payments to. They took place over an extended period of time and went to an account in Mr A’s own name. So even if this was a scam, I wouldn’t necessarily be concluding NatWest ought to have intervened in the payments. For the reasons explained, I don’t think NatWest needs to do anything further in relation to this complaint. My final decision My final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr A to accept or reject my decision before 22 April 2026. Stephanie Mitchell Ombudsman

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